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CHAPTER NINE
"rand until otherwise provided by law, in all cases where the
amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of seventy-
five hundred dollars."*
9.010. INTRODUCTION
Since the constitutional amendment of 1884, the Missouri Supreme Court
has had original appellate jurisdiction based on "amount in dispute."' The
discussion in this chapter of the cases involving jurisdictional "amount"
has two objects: first, the cases in which "amount" jurisdiction was an issue
decided by the courts will be discussed and classified; second, the develop-
ment of the rules will be traced to illustrate the problems inherent in an
appellate system with original appellate jurisdiction based on the "amount in
dispute."
Determining the constitutional purpose for establishing the enumerated
categories of original supreme court jurisdiction is useful to a study of the
"amount" rules developed by the courts. If the function of exclusive
monetary jurisdiction is to insure that only the supreme court has jurisdic-
tion in appeals involving the requisite "amount," it would seem that the
rules defining "amount in dispute" should result in supreme court jurisdic-
tion if any reasonable basis exists for finding the requisite "amount." How-
ever, if the purpose of setting an "amount" limit on jurisdiction is merely
to divide the appellate case load between the two appellate levels, the
criteria employed by the courts to define jurisdictional "amount" should be
flexible enough to permit definitions of "amount in dispute" which aid in
dividing the case load according to the work capacities of the two appellate
* The present level is $15,000.
1. See "Introduction," text accompanying notes 10, 17. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 12
(1875) provided that appeals should lie from the St. Louis Court of Appeals to the
supreme court in cases where the "amount in dispute" exceeded $2,500. The amend-
ment of 1884, which created the mutually exclusive system of original appellate juris-
diction, gave the general assembly power to increase or diminish the pecuniary limit of
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. Thereafter, the limit was increased to $4,500 (Mo.
Laws 1901, at 107-08), then to $7,500 (Mo. Laws 1909, at 397). The present limit of
$15,000 is set by Mo. REv. STAT. § 477.040 (1959): "The courts of appeals of Missouri
shall have jurisdiction of appeals in all cases where the amount in dispute, exclusive of
costs, shall not exceed the sum of fifteen thousand dollars." The provisions of the 1875
constitution as amended which related to the jurisdiction of the appellate courts were
substantially re-enacted by the current 1945 constitution. Therefore, jurisdictional au-
thority prior to 1945 is valid in current cases. Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co.,
214 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1948), transZd, 222 S.W.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1949).
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levels. Although little valuable information exists to explain the original
purpose of "amount" jurisdiction,2 it presently is used to accomplish a
numerical division of the appellate case load.3
2. The use of an "amount" criterion for appellate jurisdiction seems to be a peculiarly
American invention. The idea was first suggested to limit the appeals from colonial
courts to the Privy Council, but by the eighteenth century amount jurisdiction was popu-
lar as a limitation on appeals to state supreme courts. See POUND, APPELLATE PROCE-
DURE IN CIVIL CASES 145, 146 (1941).
It has generally been assumed that cases meeting the jurisdictional "amount" compre-
hend the most "important" cases and that this was the general purpose for the category.
For a statement that the "amount" jurisdiction imposed on early federal courts was to
limit jurisdiction to "important" cases, see Note, Federal Jurisdictional Amount: Deter-
mination of the Matter in Controversy, 73 HAv. L. Rav. 1369 (1960).
3. This conclusion derives from the APPELLATE PRACTICE COMM., REPORT OF SPECIAL
COMM. ON MONETARY JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURTS (January 21, 1957) (as
amended), on file with Missouri Bar Association, Jefferson City, Mo. [hereinafter cited
as APPELLATE PRACTICE REPORT]. The report is compiled in four phases: (1) Progress
Report filed January 21, 1957; (2) Supplemental and Final Report filed January 24,
1958; (3) Amendment to (2) offered by Judge Justin Ruark; and (4) Additional Sta-
tistical Information, January 22, 1959.
The purpose of the report was to consider three problems of appellate jurisdiction:
(a) advisability of increasing the amount limit of the supreme court's appellate jurisdic-
tion; (b) methods of eliminating the "present uncertainties" in the phrase "amount in
dispute"; and (c) methods of clarifying other definitional problems in the supreme court's
original appellate jurisdiction.
Basically, the report is a study of the work loads of Missouri appellate courts with the
purpose of equalizing the loads by reducing the supreme court's load. The reporters-
lawyers and appellate judges-felt that the most appropriate guide for measuring distribu-
tion of work load was the number of written opinions filed per man per year in each
court. The study compiled these figures:
Written opinions filed per man per year
Supreme Court St. Louis Kansas City Springfield
Ct. App. Ct. App. Ct. App.
Five year period (1952-56)
22.52 23.1 14.6 19.33
(1956-57)
23.7 21.08 14.6 20.6
(1957-58)
23.5 19.8 19.8 19.7
The figures do not reflect administrative work peculiar to the supreme court; because
of its work in processing writs, the judges of that court actually handle the equivalent of
3.2 more opinions per man annually. The reporters concluded that the difficulty of writ-
ing appellate decisions makes it infeasible for an appellate judge to have a work load
greater than 22 opinions per year.
The tentative conclusion of the initial report was that inequality existed in the work
load of the various courts of appeals (note that the figures for the later years show a
trend toward uniformity) and that equalization of their work load was a prerequisite to
§ 9.010
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss4/11
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The thesis of this chapter is that the supreme court has used flexible
criteria to develop rules designed to restrict the load resulting from its origi-
nal "amount" jurisdiction in two principal ways: (1) by permitting its juris-
diction to be lost if events after the taking of the appeal reduce an "amount"
which had been sufficient and (2) by so increasing the burden of establish-
an increase of the supreme court's monetary limit with the corresponding shift of case
load to courts of appeals. The following were considered as devices to effect equalization:
Redistribution through boundary changes
This proposal was deemed inefficacious because figures from the St. Louis Court of
Appeals show that 76 per cent of its docket came from the City and County of St. Louis.
In addition, the flow of cases from boundary counties is inconstant and unpredictable.
Transfer of Judicial Personnel
A plan was conceived whereby cases involving an amount between $7,500 and $15,000
would be filed in the supreme court where transfer to the appropriate court of ap-
peals could be initiated if that court's docket permitted. This form of concurrent juris-
diction was deemed to present constitutional problems as well as practical administrative
difficulties. Moreover, because Mo. CONST. art. V, § 13 would preclude transfer across
boundaries to a court of appeals whose docket was not then crowded, its value was ques-
tionable.
CONCLUSION OF THE INITIAL AND FINAL REPORTS
The first conclusion was that equalization of appellate work loads was a complex
problem which could be satisfactorily accomplished by no single method. It was recog-
nized that the work load of the supreme court continued to be excessive, partly from
inflation which by decreasing the value of the dollar caused a corresponding increase in
the number of "amount" cases and partly from the court's administrative work which
could not be alleviated. The scheme of concurrent jurisdiction was rejected because it
was "cumbersome and uncertain and difficult of administration with the existing facili-
ties." Outright increase of the monetary limit to $15,000 was recommended.
The report noted that "much effort is spent by the appellate judges in determining
this [amount in dispute] jurisdictional question that might otherwise go into a consider-
ation on the merits." An increase to $15,000 was thought to be the only way to effec-
tively lessen the "troublesome and wasteful" results inherent in interpreting the phrase
"amount in dispute." Raising the amount was seen as a valuable aid to the court in
eliminating the workmen's compensation cases which formed a large proportion of its
work load, involved tricky jurisdictional considerations, and exceeded the then jurisdic-
tional limit but not the proposed limit of the courts of appeals. Appended data showedl
that the six-year average of the number of cases exceeding the then limit but within the
proposed limit of the courts of appeals was 53.0. This data is contained in the Appen-
dices to this treatise.
Recommendation was also made for the distribution of pamphlets containing standard
rules and authorities for determining general jurisdictional issues. This would be a means
of removing then existing jurisdictional confusion.
Finally, it was realized that the increase would cause an influx of cases to the courts
of appeals which would require more manpower. Therefore, it was recommended that
the increase should be accompanied by authorization to increase the number of com-
missioners on the courts of appeals.
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ing the "amount in dispute" as to make it impossible to satisfy in large
classes of cases.
It has been necessary to develop restrictive rules because the definition of
jurisdiction in article V, section three, potentially requires jurisdiction in the
supreme court based on "amount" in such a large number of cases that
non-restrictive rules would give an impossibly disproportionate work load to
the supreme court. However, the restrictive tests which have been developed
are critical and difficult to employ, resulting in numerous jurisdictional
transfers.
9.011. Affirmative Appearance on the Record
The general rule is that monetary appellate jurisdiction is determined "by
the amount that remains in dispute between the parties on the appeal, and
subject to determination by the appellate court."4  In measuring the
"amount," the courts consider (1) the claims of the parties at trial, (2)
the amounts of each part of the judgment entered, and (3) the parts of
the judgment from which appeal is taken. To determine jurisdictional
"amount" in a specific case they utilize precise formulae which conclusively
fix the "amount" in the standard and uncomplicated cases. The courts also
consider the possible qualifications which may effect an increase or de-
crease.
5
The vehicle for this determination is an examination of the whole trial
record from which the "amount" must affirmatively appear without con-
jecture or speculation.' The court's restrictive view of its jurisdiction is
manifested by the evolution of the affirmative appearance requirement with
the severe burden it places upon the appellant seeking to establish jurisdic-
tion.'
4. State ex rel. Lingenfelder v. Lewis, 96 Mo. 146, 148, 8 S.W. 770, 770-71 (1888).
5. The qualifications for suits involving a claim for a money judgment are considered
individually in § 9.020. The application of the general rule to suits for non-money relief
forms § 9.033.
6. See, e.g., Nemours v. City of Clayton, 351 Mo. 317, 172 S.W.2d 937, trans'd, 237
Mo. App. 497, 175 S.W.2d 60 (1943); Higgins v. Smith, 346 Mo. 1044, 144 S.W.2d 149
(1940) (en bane), trans'd, 150 S.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1941).
7. See, e.g., Molasky v. Lapin, 384 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1964), trans'd; Esmar v. Haeuss-
ler, 341 Mo. 33, 106 S.W.2d 412 (1937), trans'd, 234 Mo. App. 217, 115 S.W.2d 54
(1938); Hanssen v. Karbe, 106 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. 1937), trans'd, 234 Mo. App. 663,
115 S.W.2d 109 (1938). In cases which pose difficulties in fixing a definite sum certain,
the requirement that the "amount in dispute" be conclusively shown, when strictly ap-
plied, presents the appellant with a burden impossible to sustain. See particularly "non-
money" judgments § 9.030.
The approach of the federal courts to the burden of establishing amount jurisdiction
is noteworthy even though it is trial rather than appellate jurisdiction, a difference which
1 9.011
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The court has ruled that parties to an appeal cannot confer appellate
jurisdiction by agreement, consent or waiver8 because "under a constitu-
tional government the acts of a court not within the powers prescribed by
the organic law are usurpations, and when done by a court of last resort
may become a grave menace."9 Therefore, the court will "pierce the shell
of the pleadings, proofs, record and judgment"1 to protect the constitu-
tional integrity of its jurisdiction.
9.012. Jurisdictional Statement in Brief
In order to require an appellant to "advise the court of the basis of his
choice" of appellate forum and to insure that the confusion attending that
choice may "be lessened and more quickly ended," the supreme court in
1940 instituted a rule compelling inclusion of a statement of jurisdiction in
the appellant's brief.1 The present rule requires an appellant to make a
"concise statement of the grounds on which jurisdiction of the review court
is invoked."12 To enforce its rule, the court may dismiss any appeal repre-
sented by a brief with an inadequate statement." In practice, however, the
court is generally unwilling to impose this "harsh penalty,"' 4 although it
is minimized when the appellate court considers the record of an appeal from a directed
verdict. The federal approach places the burden upon the party asserting jurisdiction to
establish essential jurisdictional facts, but when that jurisdiction is challenged it will not
be defeated unless it affirmatively appears that jurisdiction does not exist. St. Paul Mer-
cury Indem. Co. v. Red Gab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938). Here, the Supreme Court
noted its policy of rigorous restriction of diversity jurisdiction but nevertheless was unwill-
ing to impose as strict a burden on the party asserting jurisdiction as the Missouri Su-
preme Court has done.
8. E.g., Drew v. Platt, 329 Mo. 442, 44 S.W.2d 623 (1931), trans'd, 52 S.W.2d 1041
(Ct. App. 1932); In re Wilson's Estate, 320 Mo. 975, 8 S.W.2d 973 (1928), trans'd, 16
S.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1929); Pyle v. University City, 318 Mo. 856, 1 S.W.2d 799
(1927), trans'd; In re Bennett's Estate, 243 S.W. 769 (Mo. 1922), trans'd, 249 S.W.
685 (Gt. App. 1923).
9. Vordick v. Vordick, 281 Mo. 279, 284, 219 S.W. 591, 592, trans'd, 205 Mo. App.
555, 226 S.W. 59 (1920). MO. CONST. art. V, § 11 provides that a court must transfer
any appeal over which it does not have jurisdiction. This provision first appeared in the
1945 constitution (see "Introduction," notes 40-42 and accompanying text) but the
courts have always considered it their initial duty to determine jurisdiction and transfer
any appeal if they do not have proper jurisdiction. As a result, they will raise the ques-
tion of jurisdiction sua sponte.
10. Ashbrook v. Willis, 338 Mo. 226, 89 S.W.2d 659, 660 (1936), trans'd, 231 Mo.
App. 460, 100 S.W.2d 943 (1937).
11. See (Judge) Douglas, Comments on Appellate Jurisdiction, 10 J. Mo. B. 84, 85
(1939), which remarks upon the delay inherent in the Missouri system of exclusive ap-
pellate jurisdiction.
12. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 83.05 (a), formerly numbers 15 and 1.08 (a) (1).
13. Mo. Sup. GT. R. 83.09.
14. E.g., Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., 214 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Mo. 1948),
trans'd, 222 S.W.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1949); Hicks v. La Plant, 145 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.
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has frequently expressed dissatisfaction with a perfunctory jurisdictional
statement which demonstrates merely "formal compliance" with the "spirit
and purpose" of the rule." Although the supreme court has generally not
commented on jurisdictional statements which it deemed exemplary," one
may infer from its language that a statement at least should contain the
precise facts which form the legal issue or dispute and the theory of action 7
supported by case citations of jurisdictional authority.' Yet there appear
to be a large number of briefs filed containing merely conclusionary state-
ments, and it is likely that such unsatisfactory statements contribute
significantly to jurisdictional transfers. 9
1940), trans'd, 236 Mo. App. 299, 151 S.W.2d 104 (1941). See generally Comment, 23
WASH. U.L.Q. 565 (1938).
15. A conclusionary kind of statement-"the amount 'in dispute' exceeds ... $7,500"
-was condemned in Langhammer v. City of Mexico, 327 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. 1959);
Jameson v. Fox, 364 Mo. 237, 260 S.W.2d 507 (1953); Bachler v. Bachler, 339 S.W.2d
846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); see Mo. Sup. CT. R. 83.05(b), comment. For a state-
ment of the basis of the court's policy, see MIssousu BAR Ass'N, MissouRs APPELLATE
PRACTICE 36-37 (1963). The first expression of the purpose of the rule in a decision
was Hicks v. La Plant, supra note 14, in which the court described the purpose as "pri-
marily for the benefit of litigants, to the end that the question of appellate jurisdiction
be given some thought when appeals are taken, and thus avoid the delay of having cases
come to [the wrong] court before finding that [the] court is without appellate jurisdiction."
Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), trans'd, 376
S.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1964), illustrates the fate of counsel who have not anticipated a
jurisdictional issue: "While none of the parties initially questioned the jurisdiction of
this court, we have entertained substantial doubt that we have jurisdiction. We ques-
tioned counsel at some length on this score during the oral argument . . " Id. at 226.
(Emphasis added.)
16. For a case in which the court did comment favorably upon a jurisdictional state-
ment, see Bartlett v. Green, 352 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. 1961). Evidence of the court's
desire that the basis for jurisdiction be adequately investigated is furnished by Mo. Sup.
Cr. R. 83.05(b) which suggests a form to guide attorneys.
17. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Green, supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Andrew County, 347 Mo. 156, 161, 146 S.W.2d 621, 623
(1940).
19. That inadequate statements are a large factor in the number of transferred appeals
was indicated by a random sample check (not a statistical computation which is beyond
the scope of this chapter) of the briefs (on file in the Washington University Law Li-
brary) in which appellate transfers occurred. The result, although not offered as docu-
mentary evidence, revealed a high correlation between a brief's non-compliance with the
"spirit and purpose" of the court rule and transfer by an appellate court.
One example of an insuficient jurisdictional statement leading to confusion, although
it did not result in a transfer, is in Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-2, Freed v. Feeney, 374
S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1964): "The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked because this case
involves the validity of such [special levee district] assessments which amount to an esti-
mated amount of $120,000." This statement did not specify whether jurisdiction was
based on the "amount" or on construction of revenue laws but was apparently left am-
biguous because of the difficult jurisdictional problem. The court failed to condemn the
statement and made an initial statement in its opinion that was worded similarly to the
§ 9.012
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9.013. Superintending Power
In addition to the categories of exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the con-
stitution gives the supreme court "superintending power" over the courts of
appeals with the concomitant power to hear and issue original remedial
writs.2" This form of original jurisdiction provides the court with a direct
means to control the jurisdiction of all appeals filed in the state.
Upon application for a writ of mandamus, the supreme court can compel
the court of appeals to transfer an appeal presently before it by deciding
that the court of appeals is without jurisdiction.21 It can also use mandamus
to compel a court of appeals to hear an appeal.22 With its writ of certiorari,
the supreme court can quash a decision of a court of appeals made without
jurisdiction.23
The faculty of the supreme court to supervise and enforce its jurisdictional
decisions invests the litigants with a responsibility to act by application for
an extraordinary writ if the appeal is filed with the wrong court. Because a
decision in an appellate court made without jurisdiction is of no effect, a
litigant-respondent or appellant-could have a favorable decision later
appealed to the court that in fact has jurisdiction.24 The supervisory power
appellant's statement so that it also failed to designate upon which category jurisdiction
was based. For a discussion of the resulting confusion, see § 3.040, text accompanying
note 45.
20. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1875) listed the writs that
the supreme court could use to implement its supervisory power. The present section uses
the general language "issue and determine original remedial writs."
21. Fleischaker v. Fleischaker, 338 Mo. 797, 92 S.W.2d 169 (1936) (writ denied);
State ex rel. Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 256 Mo. 710, 165 S.W. 810
(1914) (writ issued); State ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Broaddus, 212 Mo. 685, 111
S.W. 508 (1908) (writ issued); State ex rel. Hartley v. Rombauer, 130 Mo. 288, 32
S.W. 660 (1895) (writ issued); King v. Gill, 107 Mo. 44, 17 S.W. 758 (1891) (writ
denied).
Prohibition will also lie to prevent the court of appeals from deciding a case without
jurisdiction. State ex tel. Wurdeman v. Reynolds, 275 Mo. 113, 204 S.W. 1093 (1918)
(en bane); State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v. Reynolds, 245 Mo. 698, 151 S.W. 85
(1912) (en bane); State ex rel. Lingenfelder v. Lewis, 96 Mo. 146, 8 S.W. 770 (1888).
22. State ex rel. Wabash Ry. v. Shain, 341 Mo. 19, 106 S.W.2d 898 (1937); State
ex rel. Heye v. St. Louis Court of Appeals, 87 Mo. 569 (1885).
23. State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 702, 32 S.W.2d 760 (1930); State ex
rel. Long v. Ellison, 272 Mo. 571, 199 S.W. 984 (1917) (en bane). A decision of the
court of appeals acting without jurisdiction will be quashed even though the court got
the appeal by transfer from the supreme court. State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes, 345 Mo.
958, 137 S.W.2d 544 (1940) (en bane). Also, it is irrelevant that the party seeking a
writ to quash is the one who caused the appeal to go to the court of appeals, or that he
waited to apply until that court decided against him. State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble,
supra.
24. State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble, supra note 23, is a clear expression of the su-
preme court's general views that jurisdiction is a kind of objective fact, that the con-
Washington University Open Scholarship
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE
is also a natural vehicle which the court has used effectively for promulga-
tion and implementation of uniform jurisdictional "rules." Nevertheless,
the supreme court may not assume appellate jurisdiction it otherwise would
not have in order to give effect to its supervisory power, even when the
court of appeals is incapable of rendering a decision, because the "powers
of each [court] are absolute if exercised within the [jurisdictional] limits."2
However, in spite of each court's autonomy, the supreme court has the
power and duty to instruct the court of appeals on the proper jurisdictional
sent or acquiescence of the parties is irrelevant (see cases cited note 8 supra), and that
the act of a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. This policy necessarily precludes
jurisdiction based on estoppel. One supreme court case, however, used estoppel to up-
hold jurisdiction in the court of appeals when that court apparently acted without
jurisdiction. In Minter v. Toole-Campbell Dry Goods Co., 204 S.W. 725 (Mo. 1918),
trans'd from 187 Mo. App. 16, 173 S.W. 4 (1915), retrans'd, 207 S.W. 840 (Mo. 1919),
the court stated:
Now at this late date the plaintiff contends that he appealed the case to the
wrong court and waged his battle in the wrong forum. Well, suppose he did;
it was his own wrong, and he should not be permitted to take advantage of his
own premeditated wrong, after speculating with the chances of victory in the
Court of Appeals. Id. at 726. (Emphasis added.)
The court in Minter impliedly recognized the two competing policies attendant on a
decision as to the permanence of the jurisdictional fact. If the court permitted juris-
diction to be waived, i.e., deferred to consent of the parties, the language of the con-
stitution establishing the distribution of jurisdiction-whatever the end that grant sought
to effect-would be meaningless. Yet, if the losing party in the appellate court in
every case attempted to void the decision by asserting that the court acted without
jurisdiction, the system would be burdened with a steady flow of jurisdictional de-
cisions. In effect, a decision by a court would not be final until its jurisdiction had been
repeatedly tested, with delay in satisfying judgments increased measurably. While this
is an inherent problem in exclusive jurisdiction, it appears that the courts have been
able to control it. No other case has foreclosed "amount" jurisdiction on an estoppel
theory, and the only subsequent mention of Minter was by a court of appeals which
found it "unnecessary to consider whether the .. .defendant is estopped" from assert-
ing jurisdiction. McKim v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 209 S.W. 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
Certainly, the courts constantly assert that consent or acquiescence cannot "waive"
jurisdiction, and the frequent jurisdictional decisions are not affected by facts similar
to those present in the Minter case. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes, 345 Mo.
958, 137 S.W.2d 544 (1940) (en banc); State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 702,
32 S.W.2d 760 (1930) (issue not raised by respondent until after adverse decision); In re
Bennett's Estate, 243 S.W. 769 (Mo. 1922), trans'd, 249 S.W. 685 (Ct. App. 1923); cf.
Kendrick v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 166 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942) (jurisdiction
challenged in motion for rehearing by asserting trial court failed to enter final judgment).
Mandamus is also appropriate for use by either party to cause the court of appeals
to transfer a case which it decided without jurisdiction. Fleischaker v. Fleischaker, 338
Mo. 797, 92 S.W.2d 169 (1936).
25. State ex rel. Allen v. Trimble, 321 Mo. 230, 234, 10 S.W.2d 519, 520 (1928) (en
bane).
§ 9.013
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rules to be applied whenever considering an application for a remedial writ
or an appeal transferred to it by the court of appeals.2"
9.014. Doubt as a Basis for Transfer
In cases in which the jurisdictional issue presented to the court of appeals
was not capable of easy solution or in which the applicable test used pre-
viously by the supreme court was contradictory, the courts of appeals
developed the policy of transferring to the supreme court "to have the
question of jurisdiction set finally at rest."27 Whether this policy is con-
sistent with the concept of mutually exclusive jurisdiction requires one to
question whether the supreme court ultimately should decide all jurisdic-
tional issues. The supreme court's supervisory power to determine whether
the appellate court is acting with jurisdiction would support the position
that the court of appeals could, consistently with the concept of exclusive
jurisdiction, cause the supreme court to decide questions of jurisdiction."
26. In State ex rel. Allen v. Trimble, supra note 25, the court was presented with an
application for mandamus to cause the court of appeals to transfer a case pending before
the latter. The peculiar facts were that the court of appeals had reached a tentative
ruling in favor of relator, but rearguments were ordered. However, one judge dis-
qualified himself on bias and the judge assigned to prepare the opinion became in-
capacitated, leaving no quorum in the court. Relator argued that the supreme court's
supervisory power was sufficient to enable it to decide the case to prevent the plain-
tiff's being left remediless. The court held that it could not invade the "absolute juris-
diction" of the court of appeals even though it was incapable of being exercised. The
unfortunate result in this case has two alternative explanations. This may be simply
an unduly harsh view of the court's jurisdictional prerogatives confined to this isolated
situation, or if such a restriction of the exercise of its supervisory power is generally
necessary to maintain the integrity of its jurisdiction, such results are an inherent dif-
ficulty in a mutually exclusive appellate jurisdictional system.
27. Gartside v. Gartside, 42 Mo. App. 513, 515 (1890). Followed by Mayor v. Mayor,
340 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (doubt implied); Nickels v. Borgmeyer, 246
S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (express); Hogue v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 12
S.W.2d 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928) (express); Craton v. Huntzinger, 177 S.W. 816 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1915); Bach v. Hammett, 61 Mo. App. 457 (1895). For a statement of the
courts of appeals' "established policy" of resolving doubts against their jurisdiction in
"title to real estate" cases, see Chapman v. Schearf, 220 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App.
1949), trans'd, 360 Mo. 551, 229 S.W.2d 552 (1950) (en bane); accord, In rc Schell's
Estate, 370 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), trans'd, 381 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1964);
Dillen v. Edwards, 254 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 263 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. 1953);
Null v. Howell, 40 Mo. App. 329 (1890), trans'd, 111 Mo. 273, 20 S.W. 24 (1892).
For examples of transfer because of doubt in "constitutional question" cases, see State v.
Becker, 268 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954);
accord, City of Olivette v. Graeler, 329 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), trans'd,
338 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1960) (en bane).
28. It is also arguable that the duty to transfer (Mo. CONST. art. V, § 11) would
support the practice by the court of appeals of transferring when in doubt. Having
an absolute duty to transfer when it is without jurisdiction, the court of appeals could
feel obligated to do so when the issue shades into a penumbra.
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But a policy of deference toward the court of highest appeal (albeit
for the laudable purpose of achieving uniformity in the criteria to ascertain
"amount in dispute") is contrary to the usual practice whereby "doubt"
concerning jurisdiction is resolved in favor of the court of general jurisdic-
tion.2" Further, it is anomalous that the court of appeals should uniformly
seek a jurisdictional determination by the supreme court, ostensibly to con-
clude the matter,"0 when courts of appeals have held that the supreme court
decisions on jurisdiction are not res judicata.31 While most cases transferred
for "doubt" by the courts of appeals express uncertainty about the jurisdic-
tional rule or law, those courts also transfer appeals in which they cannot
decide the factual problem of jurisdiction. In these cases they are competing
with the supreme court which also transfers to the courts of appeals all
"doubtful cases" in which it does not affirmatively appear that supreme
court jurisdiction exist."2
29. In City of Poplar Bluff v. Poplar Bluff Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 369 S.W.2d 764 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1963), the court of appeals declined to transfer a case in which jurisdiction
was "somewhat cloudy" because it recognized it was a court of general jurisdiction, and
the supreme court's jurisdiction was not clear. See, e.g., Tinney v. McClain, 76 F.
Supp. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1948), indicating a policy in the federal system of having courts
of general jurisdiction decide "doubtful" cases.
30. In some cases presented to the supreme court by the appellate court stating that
the jurisdictional issue was unclear and causing difficulty, the supreme court has avoided
a decision on the knotty jurisdictional issue and retransferred by noting the absence of
some technical requirement for presentation of the issue on which the doubtful juris-
diction turned. See, e.g., Mayor v. Mayor, 340 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960),
trans'd, 349 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.), retrans'd, 351 S.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1961) (whether ap-
praisal fees were "costs" unanswered by supreme court); Nickels v. Borgmeyer, 246
S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952), trans'd, 256 S.W.2d 560 (Mo.), retrans'd, 258
S.W.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1953) (whether counterclaim "merged" "amounts in dispute"
not answered by the supreme court).
31. The earliest cases had held that decisions by the supreme court were res judicata
on the issue of jurisdiction and that the courts of appeals were bound to hear an appeal
which the supreme court decided was within the courts of appeals jurisdiction. Wolff v.
Matthews, 39 Mo. App. 376 (1890), trans'd from supreme court; Mills v. Williams, 31
Mo. App. 447 (1888), trans'd from supreme court. But see Hilton v. City of St. Louis,
63 Mo. App. 179, trans'd from 129 Mo. 389, 31 S.W. 771 (1895), retrans'd (court of
appeals retransferred because supreme court had "overlooked" a basis for its jurisdic-
tion). In recent cases, however, the court of appeals has declined to accept jurisdic-
tion of appeals sent to them by the supreme court and has retransferred to the su-
preme court which decided the case. The leading case is Odom v. Langston, 237 Mo.
App. 721, 170 S.W.2d 589, trans'd from 159 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1942), retrans'd, 351
Mo. 613, 173 S.W.2d 826 (1943); accord, Corp v. Joplin Cement Co., 323 S.W.2d 385,
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959), trans'd from supreme court, retrans'd, 337 S.W.2d 252 (Mo.
1960) (en banc); Briley v. Thompson, 285 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), trans'di
from supreme court, retrans'd; Schmidt v. Morival Farms, Inc., 232 S.W.2d 215 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1950), trans'd from supreme court, retrans'd, 240 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1951).
32. Consolidated School Dist. v. Gower Bank, 53 S.W.2d 280 (Mo.), trans'd, 55 S.W.
2d 713 (Ct. App. 1932), is a single example of this kind of case, the multitude of
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9.015. Standard Rules
If the plaintiff appeals his non-recovery, the amount stated in his petition
determines jurisdiction." This is because his claim for that amount cannot
which are catalogued in § 9.030. The firm policy of the supreme court established by
the myriad decisions makes curious the language of a recent case in which the supreme
court retained jurisdiction because a state officer or a constitutional question wag in-
volved: "With some misgivings we hold that the director is thus made a contesting
party upon the review and thereafter. There is also some merit in the contention that a
decision here involves a construction of the due process clause of our Constitution."
Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
33. E.g., Charles F. Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964); Myers v.
City of Palmyra, 355 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1962); Nydegger v. Mason, 315 S.W.2d 816 (Mo.
1958); Page v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 245 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1951); Dille v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615 (1946); Germo Mfg. Co. v. Combs, 287 Mo. 273,
229 S.W. 1072 (1921), trans'd, 209 Mo. App. 651, 240 S.W. 872 (1922); Willi v. Lucas,
40 Mo. App. 70 (1890). The rule applies similarly to a person in the position of a
plaintiff, such as a defendant who appeals an adverse verdict on his counterclaim. E.g.,
Townsend v. Maplewood Inv. & Loan Co., 351 Mo. 738, 173 S.W.2d 911 (1943);
Conrad v. De Montcourt, 138 Mo. 311, 39 S.W. 805 (1897). Despite its simplicity, the
standard rule is difficult to apply in certain complicated cases. E.g., Crouch v. Tourtelot,
350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1961) (en banc). Third party plaintiff (defendant in the prin-
cipal suit) appealed the dismissal of his cross petition against the third party defendant.
The claim of the original plaintiff had not been finally adjudicated, so the only amount
in the case was the amount for which the third party plaintiff might finally be liable
to the original plaintiff, represented in unliquidated form by the original plaintiff's
petition. The court held that that petition was also the petition of the third party plain-
tiff and applied the standard rule. Three judges made out a strong case in the dissenting
opinion that the amount the original plaintiff would recover was "contingent" (see
"Contingencies" § 9.022(a) ). Accord, Campbell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d 557 (Mo.
1964); Pierce v. Ozark Border Elec. Co-op., 378 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1964); Woods v.
Juvenile Shoe Corp. of America, 361 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. 1962); cf. Finley v. Smith, 170
S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 352 Mo. 456, 178 S.W.2d 326 (1943). Appellant in
Finley had executed a release after being injured by respondent but sued for injuries
sustained in the accident. The court of appeals was without jurisdiction of an appeal
from a decree in a separate proceeding declaring the release valid and enjoining prose-
cution of the pending personal injury action in which more than the jurisdictional
"amount" was sought.
Another problem arises when the plaintiff sues for a money judgment but does not
specify a sum certain in his petition, in which case the supreme court has rejected juris-
diction. General Theatrical Enterprises, Inc. v. Lyris, 121 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1938),
trans'd, 131 S.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1939). But see Simmons v. Friday, 359 Mo. 812,
224 S.W.2d 90 (1949) ("amount" not specified but "inherent" in plaintiff's second
amended petition); Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 Mo. 412, 126 S.W.2d 1197
(1939) (contract count for $6,000 and quantum meruit for reasonable value of at-
torney's fees).
A special problem is presented by a landowner seeking compensation in a condemna-
tion case. Since the owner does not file the suit and is considered a nominal defendant,
there is no petition or prayer on which he can base the amount of an appeal. These cases
consistently hold that the value of the owner's property as shown by his "evidence"
or "evaluation" takes the place of a formal petition. E.g., State ex tel. Kansas City
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be advanced if the verdict of the trial court is upheld, while if it is reversed
he will be able to prosecute a suit for that amount. If plaintiff's petition
is composed of several counts, the sum of the separate claims is the value
of the petition." However, to the extent that the plaintiff's petition has
been reduced by amendment during the trial or consisted of a colorable or
frivolous claim," it would not be part of the suit nor part of the amount
Power & Light Co. v. Salmark Home Builders, Inc., 375 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1964); Union
Elec. Co. v. Pfarr, 375 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. Keen, 332 S.W.2d 935 (Mo. 1960); City of St. Louis v. Kisling, 318 S.W.2d
221 (Mo. 1958); State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Conrad, 310 S.W.2d 871 (Mo.
1958). While it is clear that the plaintiff must present some evidence of the land's value
in lieu of a formal petition, how persuasive that evidence must be is doubtful. See State
ex rel. Highway Conm'n v. Mahon, 343 S.W.2d 165 (Mo.), trans'd, 350 S.W.2d 111
(Ct. App. 1961) (landowner's proof of damage involved a "contingency"). Seemingly
all the qualifications which might influence a formal petition (e.g., a contingency as in
this case) operate similarly in condemnation cases.
In cases in which the plaintiff sues joint tort-feasors and recovers against one (or
several) but one (or several) escape liability, on plaintiff's appeal of non-recovery
against those defendants who escaped liability, the amount of plaintiff's recovery against
the other defendant(s) and not the amount of his petition fixes appellate jurisdiction.
This is because only one judgment can be entered in an action which must resolve the
issues as to all parties, so that the defendants who avoided liability could pay the verdict
in plaintiff's favor entered against the other defendants and terminate plaintiff's action.
This rule is expressly restricted to instances where plaintiff appeals only from the non-
recovery and does not include in his appeal a complaint of the inadequacy of his re-
covery against the other defendant. Joffe v. Beatrice Foods Co., 335 S.W.2d 34 (Mo.),
trans'd, 314 S.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1960); Lemonds v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 626, 229 S.W.2d
691 (1950) (en banc), trans'd, 241 Mo. App. 463, 236 S.W.2d 56 (1951); Deming v.
Williams, 321 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Heninger v. Roth, 260 S.W.2d 855
(Mo. Ct. App. 1953). If one of the defendants stipulates a judgment be entered against
him for an amount agreeable to plaintiff, the appeal as to the other defendants cannot
involve as the "amount" more than the amount of plaintiff's judgment against the first
defendant. Deming v. Williams, supra. The rule equally applies whether the de-
fendants against whom plaintiff appeals were released from liability by the jury or
granted a directed verdict by the court. An attempt to assert that a defendant who en-
joyed a directed verdict became an "inactive party" to the trial and therefore cannot
be benefited by the limit on plaintiff's recovery against the other defendant will be re-
jected. Joffe v. Beatrice Foods Co., supra.
34. Cases cited § 9.023(b) (2).
35. The leading case is Vanderberg v. Kansas City Gas Co., 199 Mo. 455, 97 S.W.
908 (1906), trans'd, 126 Mo. App. 600, 105 S.W. 17 (1907), in which the court ex-
pressed an unwillingness to give a plaintiff "whimsical and unregulated power to con-
trol its jurisdiction by a mere stroke of his pen in his petition." However, in cases where
the plaintiff appeals a personal injury suit, the problem becomes especially delicate.
The courts have been reluctant to reject jurisdiction on the basis that plaintiff's claim
exceeds his injuries. This is because the supreme court had early held in State ex rel.
Hartley v. Rombauer, 130 Mo. 288, 290-91, 32 S.W. 660, 661 (1895) that:
It is not to be understood . . . that because . . . an appellate court has a right,
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to review the entire evidence and make
a finding of its own, it can also measure its own jurisdiction by the amount which,
upon a review of the evidence, it may believe to be due. Such a course would make
§ 9.015
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss4/11
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
subject to review by the appellate court and therefore, not the basis of
the jurisdiction depend, not upon the amount in dispute, but upon what, in the
opinion of the court, the judgment should have been. . . .An appellate court
has the right to examine the record in order to ascertain if it have jurisdiction,
but it has no right to review the evidence unless it have jurisdiction. (Emphasis
added.)
The court clearly indicated that a decision on the merits of the appellant's claim
would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which would be wholly inconsistent with
a finding that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Necessarily, however, the courts must be able to exclude from the basis of "amount"
jurisdiction any matter not involved in the trial and therefore not alive in the judg-
ment appealed. This would include abandoned or conceded claims, or claims that were
uncollectable or frivolous (e.g., Vanderberg v. Kansas City Gas Co., supra). This type
of exclusion is in accordance with the rule announced in a landmark jurisdictional
opinion that the "amount in dispute" for purposes of appeal is the amount for which the
"dispute could at that date [date of judgment] have been settled," i.e., the amount which
would satisfy the judgment. Schwyhart v. Barrett, 223 Mo. 497, 122 S.W. 1049, 1050
(1909), trans'd, 145 Mo. App. 332, 130 S.W. 388 (1910). In other words, if the plaintiff
appeals a non-recovery, the "amount" is determined as of the time of judgment and that
is the amount which defendant would be required to pay to satisfy the petition.
Although in some cases the determination of jurisdictional "amount" is so closely tied
to a decision on the merits that the two are practically indistinguishable, the Missouri
Supreme Court has, at least until recently, deemed it necessary to make such a dis-
tinction. State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 702, 709, 32 S.W.2d 760, 762
(1930) ("it [court of appeals] could not first determine the merits of the controversy in
order to determine whether it had jurisdiction of the appeal") ; State ex rel. Hartley v.
Rombauer, supra; Palmer v. Lasswell, 279 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), tranr'd,
287 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1956); cf. Storckman, J., dissenting in Feste v. Newman, 368
S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. 1963) (en banc). That the distinction has been required in the
federal system is manifested by the words of the United States Supreme Court:
Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted
is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not be-
fore the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does
later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do
not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits,
not for want of jurisdiction .... Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
There are several compelling reasons against tempering the amount of plaintiff's
petition by the legal limit of recovery which his evidence warrants. As a practical
matter, if the court in every case were to examine the law governing the amount which a
plaintiff appealing his non-recovery in a personal injury action could recover con-
sistent with his injuries and theories of action prior to its assumption of appellate jurisdic-
tion, it would saddle itself with a "back-breaking" work load. Further, an appellate court,
by deciding what the trial court would permit the jury to find, invades the traditionally
sacred function of the jury and ignores those "intangible factors to be weighed
ultimately" by that body. Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 1959). Clearly,
this ought not be done until a court having jurisdiction is reviewing the actions of the
trial court.
The resulting conflict can best be illustrated by considering the probable results in
two cases otherwise identical except that one was fully tried with all the evidence relating
to the amount of damages presented and in the other the defendant got a directed
verdict. It appears unlikely that the court could be equally certain in both cases that
the "evidence" did not support a claim of sufficient value to involve the jurisdictional
"amount." Moreover, it is obvious that a determination which might be easy and permit
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appellate jurisdiction."8 If the plaintiff recovers but appeals alleging that
of a definitive result in a simple case might require the nicest of discriminations in a
close case. Vanderberg v. Kansas City Gas Co., supra.
Despite these considerations, a recent decision, purporting to be merely an ap-
plication of the Vanderberg reasoning, appears to conflict with the law of earlier Mis-
souri decisions cited above, although it does not expressly overrule these cases. In
Fowler v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 672 (Mo.), trans'd, 372 S.W.2d 497 (Ct.
App. 1963), the court held as a matter of law that the injuries allegedly sustained by
plaintiff would not support the $17,500 claimed as damages in his petition.
The Fowler decision, by allowing a determination of jurisdiction to shade into a de-
cision on the merits, could logically be extended into absurdities which the court un-
doubtedly would not accept. For example, if a plaintiff sued for damages in excess of the
jurisdictional "amount" and appealed an adverse judgment but the pleadings disclosed
an affirmative defense which as a matter of law would deny the claim or reduce it below
the "amount" required, Fowler would compel the supreme court to transfer the appeal.
The difficulty inherent in applying the Fowler rule can be seen by comparing the case
with an earlier decision which recognized the same test but reached a different result.
"We think we may not say that the existing state of the law is so stare decisis on the
precise issue on the merits as to cause the beneficiary's claim . . . to be 'not in good
faith.'" Bearup v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 351 Mo. 326, 329, 172
S.W.2d 942, 944 (1943). (Emphasis added.) Perhaps the most absurd result that
Fowler could cause is illustrated by Vordick v. Vordick, 281 Mo. 279, 219 S.W. 591,
trans'd, 205 Mo. App. 555, 226 S.W. 59 (1920). There the court on a Fowler theory
denied jurisdiction since the amount of alimony which was asserted as the jurisdictional
predicate could not under the law exceed $7,500 (the then jurisdictional "amount").
When, however, the court of appeals decided the case it instructed the trial court to
enter a decree for exactly $7,500.
The real importance of the Fowler decision is that it reveals a desire of the supreme
court to restrict its appellate jurisdiction. The policy in this context, however, appears
to have the anomalous result of requiring the court to broaden the range of its inquiry
into the merits of a claim and to devote more of its time to consideration of jurisdic-
tional problems to accomplish a restriction. By slavishly adhering to a restrictive inter-
pretation of the constitution, i.e., limitation of its jurisdiction by the most stringent of
tests, the court has caused confusion and uncertainty. Rather than attempting to cir-
cumscribe its jurisdiction severely by a "case-by-case" approach, it would seem desirable
that the court develop a conceptualized overall view of jurisdiction having as its purpose
the facilitation of the appellate process by making the rules as simple as possible. De-
cisions such as Fowler appear to be decided on an ad hoc basis, in a vacuum devoid
of practical considerations. For a further discussion of deciding jurisdiction by an
anticipation of the merits, see § 7.030.
36. The problems reflected by the "elimination" cases (these cases are fully discussed §9
.021(a)) and the cases discussed in the last footnote are basic and troublesome.
Essentially they reveal two inconsistent criteria for determining jurisdiction and the
time when this determination is made. Probably the approach would be more
standardized and the court would rely exclusively on the value of the judgment
at the time it was entered if it did not fear jurisdiction would be asserted on the
basis of a completely bogus claim. By reserving the right to exclude these claims
from jurisdiction, the court provides the potential for uncertainty in determining the
time jurisdiction vests in an appellate court. This problem is discussed in § 9.021(b).
The fact that this basic inconsistency does exist-and has for fifty years-and that it
runs throughout the entire range of "amount" determination rules, will be developed in
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his recovery is inadequate, the amount of his petition minus the amount of
his recovery fixes jurisdiction.-3 Plaintiff's petition is reduced to the extent
of his recovery because the fact that he could have accepted the recovery
removes it from the realm of dispute.
If appeal is taken by the defendant from the plaintiff's judgment, the
amount of the recovery sets jurisdiction since that is the limit for which
defendant will be liable (or which the plaintiff will lose) by the decision
of the appellate court. 8 Of course, if the defendant does not appeal the
various parts of this chapter. Compare, e.g., Powers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 262 Mo. 701,
172 S.W. 1 (1914), with Stepp v. Rainwater, 373 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
In Powers, plaintiff who had petitioned for $10,000 appealed to the court of appeals
after amending his petition below the then jurisdictional limit. That court transferred
without opinion to the supreme court which accepted jurisdiction on the basis that the
full $10,000 was in dispute, that being the "amount" at the date of the judgment against
plaintiff. In the Stepp case, however, the supreme court transferred to the court of ap-
peals an appeal by defendants from a judgment entered for plaintiff which was over the
jurisdictional "amount" but which had been reduced by settlement with one of the de-
fendants during the pendency of the appeal in the supreme court.
37. The first case found to employ this rationale is Leahy v. Davis, 49 Mo. App. 519
(1892), trans'd, 121 Mo. 227, 25 S.W. 941 (1894). It has been consistently followed.
E.g., Miller v. Harner, 373 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1964); Caen v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209
(Mo. 1963); Baker v. Brown's Estate, 365 Mo. 1159, 294 S.W.2d 22 (1956); Combs v.
Combs, 284 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1955); Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 232 S.W.2d
469 (1950); Holker v. Hennessey, 141 Mo. 527, 42 S.W. 1090 (1897); Dowd v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 57 Mo. App. 219 (1894), trans'd, 132 Mo. 579, 34 S.W.
493 (1896).
The same formula is used if the plaintiff recovers, but the verdict is set aside and
plaintiff appeals and also alleges inadequacy as part of the appeal. See, e.g., Vogrin v.
Forum Cafeterias of America, 301 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 308 S.W.2d 617
(Mo. 1957). Similarly if the plaintiff gets a new trial on the ground of inadequacy and
the defendant appeals, the "amount" for jurisdiction is computed by subtracting the re-
covery from the original claim. The reason is that the new trial will permit plaintiff
to prosecute another suit for the full amount of the original petition, but the recovered
amount must be subtracted, since the plaintiff could have accepted that amount and by
not doing so, he has taken it from the realm of dispute. See, e.g., Sofian v. Douglas, 324
Mo. 258, 23 S.W.2d 126 (1929); Jones v. Allred, 298 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App.
1957). Conversely, if the plaintiff gets a new trial on the basis of the inadequacy of re-
covery after recovering $250 in a suit for $25,000 and the defendant appeals, the juris-
dictional amount is $24,750 since the defendant has in effect conceded liability for $250.
Craton v. Huntzinger, 177 S.W. 816 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915), trans'd, 187 S.W. 48 (Mo.
1916). See generally "Appeal From New Trial Order," § 9.025.
38. E.g., Akers v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 370 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1963); Hill v.
St. Louis Pub. Sere. Co., 340 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. 1960); Lockhart v. St. Louis Pub.
Sere. Co., 318 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1958); Moore v. Adams' Estate, 303 S.W.2d 936
(Mo. 1957); Jacques v. Goggin, 362 Mo. 1005, 245 S.W.2d 904 (1952); Ford v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 183 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1944). If the plaintiff's action based upon
a particular statute should have resulted in a recovery, if at all, for an "amount" suf-
ficient for supreme court jurisdiction, but the judgment from which an appeal is taken
is improperly for an insufficient "amount," the supreme court does not have jurisdiction,
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entire judgment, but appeals the verdict as excessive, the amount asserted
to be excessive is the "amount" of the dispute for jurisdiction.39
9.016. Costs
"Costs" are excluded from calculations of jurisdictional "amount in
dispute" by specific constitutional40 and statutory"' provisions. The logical
reason for the exclusion is that costs are not the direct object of a suit but an
incidental result of its prosecution. The costs excluded from calculation of
jurisdictional "amount" are the allowances to the prevailing party for
expenses of litigation definitely fixed by statute which the clerk is required
to tax as a ministerial duty.2 Allowances taxed as costs which the court
alone can order and which are the subject matter of a separate judicial
investigation and determination are included in the "amount.""3
Although the word "costs" is frequently understood as including at-
although the court of appeals may correct the judgment-so that in effect the full amount
provided by the statute is involved. Mathews v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 231 Mo. 632,
132 S.W. 1074 (1910), trans'd, 156 Mo. App. 715, 137 S.W. 1003 (1911); cf. Marsh v.
Kansas City So. Ry., 104 Mo. App. 577, 78 S.W. 284 (1904) (statute required recovery
of "amount" over court of appeals jurisdiction but plaintiff requested and got an
"amount" that was less).
39. E.g., Sleyster v. Eugene Donzelot & Son, 323 Mo. 822, 20 S.W.2d 69 (1929),
trans'd, 223 Mo. App. 1166, 25 S.W.2d 147 (1930). See generally "Eliminations" §
9.021 (a).
40. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3, formerly, Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 12 (1875).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 477.040 (1959).
42. Mo. REv. STAT. § 514.060, .260 (1959). When the court reviews the clerk's
action upon a motion to retax (Mo. Ray. STAT. § 514.270 (1959)), it is merely "correct-
ing errors" and performing the same ministerial function. Burton v. Chicago, & A.R.R.,
275 Mo. 185, 195, 204 S.W. 501, 504 (1918).
43. See Noll v. Noll, 286 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (award of alimony pendente
lite in separate hearing on wife's financial needs and husband's ability to pay); Flynn v.
First Nat'l Safe Deposit Co., 273 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954), trans'd, 284 S.W.2d
593 (Mo. 1955) (allowance of expenses and attorney fees to garnishee when plaintiff fails
to recover against him). In most of these cases the allowances are the "amount" and are
seldom sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction. Nevertheless, an order taxing attorney's
fees or other expenses as costs will be appealable to the supreme court if the order is not a
separate proceeding but a "component part" of the original judgment from which an ap-
peal lies in the supreme court. Flynn v. First Nat'l Safe Deposit Co., supra. The twofold
problem which arises-what happens if costs are properly assessable in a separate action
and what happens if the trial court modifies the original judgment (perhaps erroneously)
to assess costs-is discussed § 9.024.
The distinction between items which are merely incidental and items which are the
principal claim in itself (or an essential element thereof) is discussed in the "interest"
cases § 9.021 (b) (2).
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torney's fees,4 in Missouri costs do not include attorney's fees unless such
fees are defined as costs by statute.4" Thus attorney's fees are not excluded
in the determination of jurisdictional "amount" in actions on a contract or
instrument which provides for their payment,46 when they are expressly
recoverable by statute,4" or if they are allowed as an element of damages."
44. This is the English view as noted in the early case of Frissell v. Haile, 18 Mo.
18 (1853):
[A]ttorney[s] and solicitor[s] in England .... are recognized officers of the court,
and are entitled to fees for the services performed by them in the same manner
as the clerks of our courts of record. Their fees are ascertained and fixed by rules
of court, and are recognized in the taxation of the costs of a suit. Such being
their foundation, the law confers a lien on papers and on judgments to secure
their payment .... Id. at 20-21.
In the federal courts attorney's fees are not recoverable as costs and are not included in
calculation of "jurisdictional amount" unless there is legal authority-contract, statute
or applicable state statute-for their recovery. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 35
nn.4-7 (1963). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 991, 1011 (1932).
45. Munday v. Thielecke, 290 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. 1956); Cohn v. St. Louis, I.M. & So.
Ry., 227 Mo. 369, 131 S.W. 881, trans'd, 151 Mo. App. 661, 133 S.W. 59 (1910);
Albers v. Merchants' Exch., 138 Mo. 140, 39 S.W. 473 (1897); State ex rel. Patterson
v. Tittmann, 134 Mo. 162, 35 S.W. 579 (1896); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
Goldsmith, 239 Mo. App. 188, 192 S.W.2d 1 (1945). In the Cohn case, supra, a suit to
recover damages for freight overcharges, the treble damages provided by statute were
exactly $7,500 and therefore insufficient under the then limit. The supreme court re-
fused jurisdiction by excluding attorney's fees which were part of plaintiff's petition, be-
cause the statute creating the cause of action "designated" the fees as "costs." Designa-
tion by a state legislature of an item as "costs" will not preclude inclusion by federal
courts in their calculation of jurisdictional "amount." Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v.
Jones, 290 U.S. 199 (1933); Note, 45 IowA L. Rav. 832, 839-41 (1960) (citing
authority that Erie doctrine will not alter result in Jones).
46. When an attorney sues for collection of attorney's fees they are the "amount in
dispute." Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 344 Mo. 412, 126 S.W.2d 1197 (1939); cf.
Leslie v. Carter, 268 Mo. 420, 187 S.W. 1196 (1916) (to recover expenses of previous
litigation). When a trustee is permitted by a trust agreement to employ counsel for
reasonable compensation, an allowance of these fees by the trial court is included in
jurisdictional "amount." Vest v. Bialson, 365 Mo. 1103, 293 S.W.2d 369 (1956).
47. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 375.420 (1959) provides that in an action against an in-
surance company for "vexatious" refusal to pay a claim "the court or jury may, in addi-
tion to the amount [of loss] . . . and interest, allow the plaintiff damages not to ex-
ceed ten per cent on the amount of the loss and a reasonable attorney's fee; and the
court shall enter judgment for the aggregate sum found in the verdict." Attorney's fees
had to be included to attain the jurisdictional requisite in only one case involving the
statute. Still v. Travelers' Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963). In other cases, the
fees were only apparently included since the court did not articulate the basis for its
jurisdiction, evidently assuming it was obvious. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. v. Dischinger,
263 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1953); Lemmon v. Continental Cas. Co., 350 Mo. 1107, 169
S.W.2d 920 (1943); Rodgers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 311 Mo. 249, 278 S.W. 368 (1925);
accord, Morrow v. Loeffiler, 297 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1956) (garnishment action seeking to
recover on policy which allegedly should have been issued).
Federal courts support the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of the effect of a
statute upon monetary jurisdiction. E.g., Catalogue Direct Sales, Inc. v. United States
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Consequently, the present status of the rule appears to be that attorney's fees
which are allowed as part of a cause of action are includable as part of the
jurisdictional "amount" in the absence of a statute authorizing their taxation
as costs."
9.020. Surrs FOR A MONEY JUDGMENT
The cases in this section are appeals from suits instituted for a definite
and express money claim. The organization classifies the cases according
to the issue that determines jurisdiction.
9.021. Reducing the Plaintiff's Petition or Judgment to the
"Amount in Dispute"
The general rules for the determination of jurisdictional "amount" are
qualified by acts of the parties which remove part of the monetary claim
from the sphere of controversy. The reduction may occur before judgment
or after appeal, and the usual effect in both situations is to reduce the
Fire Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1958), holding that a "prayer to invoke a
statutory penalty and attorney's fee for vexatious refusal to pay an insurance claim, puts
that issue in controversy and adds such amounts as can be statutorily and reasonably cal-
culated to the sum in controversy, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction." Id. at
309.
48. See Vannorsdel v. Thompson, 315 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1958), trans'd, 323 S.W.2d
252 (Ct. App. 1959). Plaintiff was awarded $28,000 jury verdict which was offset by
the sum of $24,000 (which included a total of $6,000 for interest and attorney's fees)
for which the trial judge had directed a verdict on defendant's counterclaim, leaving a
judgment of $4,000. Plaintiff-appellant claimed he was entitled to a judgment of $10,000,
contending that only $18,000 should have been subtracted from his verdict by virtue of
the counterclaim; as a result, the only amount disputed on appeal was the total of $4,000
interest and $2,000 attorney's fees which was insufficient. Compare Mayor v. Mayor, 340
S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960), trans'd, 349 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.), retrans'd, 351 S.W.2d
810 (Ct. App. 1961).
49. See Mayor v. Mayor, supra note 48. Appellant contested not only the alimony
award ($7,500) but the allowance of an appraiser's fee ($50) which, if aggregated,
yielded a total in excess of the requisite "amount." Arguing from the case in which at-
torney's fees were excluded because they were designated "costs" by statute (Cohn v. St.
Louis, I.M. & So. Ry., 227 Mo. 369, 131 S.W. 881 (1910), discussed supra note 45), the
court of appeals transferred since it could not exclude the sum of $50 in the absence of
of a "statute authorizing the assessment of appraiser's fees, or attorney's fees for that
matter, as costs." The supreme court did not pass upon the court of appeals' theory but
instead, "assuming it to be correct," retransferred on the ground that the taxing as costs
of the appraiser's fee was not a "live" issue on appeal because of failure to preserve it.
(The appellant by his failure to move for a new trial on the alleged error had not com-
plied with Mo. Sup. CT. R. 79.03.)
Quaere whether the supreme court's removal of the item of the appraiser's fee on pro-
cedural grounds completely eliminated "the ever troublesome question of appellate juris-
diction" from the case. A tenable conclusion is that the court abdicated its responsibility
to resolve the "doubt" implicit in the court of appeals' opinion that it did not have juris-
diction.
§ 9.020
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"amount in dispute." However, it is important to recognize that the reasons
for reduction which are valid in the first situation are not necessarily valid
in the second.
9.021 (a). Changes Before the Judgment: "Eliminations"
9.021 (a) (1). By Act of the Parties
If the plaintiff amends his pleadings to eliminate or reduce a part of his
petition, the excluded amount cannot be recovered or considered as part of
the jurisdictional "amount." The practice of the appellate courts to subtract
any eliminated amount is well established, and when the amendment is
formally made, no jurisdictional difficulty generally results.5" More trouble-
some are reductions without formal amendment,"' because the courts con-
50. See, e.g., Simmons v. Friday, 359 Mo. 812, 818, 224 S.W.2d 90, 93 & n.5 (1949).
51. Plaintiff's manifestations of an intent to accept a reduced amount have been vari-
ously described, but are most frequently deemed results of his "trial theory." Wartenbe
v. Car-Anth Mfg. & Supply Co., 353 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.), trans'd, 362 S.W.2d 54 (Ct.
App. 1962) (statements to jury manifesting reduction); Beasley v. Athens, 365 Mo. 158,
277 S.W.2d 538, trans'd, 284 S.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1955) (statements to jury which in-
dicated trial theory); Gillespie v. American Bus Lines, 246 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1952),
trans'd (trial theory did not support claim for "amount" on which appellant sought to
base jurisdiction); Wagner v. Mederacke, 354 Mo. 977, 192 S.W.2d 865, trans'd, 195
S.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1946) (pre-trial conference agreement and stipulation reduced
"amount"); State ex rel. Cravens v. Thompson, 322 Mo. 444, 17 S.W.2d 342, trans'd,
22 S.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1929) (petition for "amount" over limit but pre-trial stipula-
tion for below); Hannan-Hickey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 226 S.W. 881
(Mo. 1920), trans'd, 247 S.W. 436 (Ct. App. 1922) (petition for "amount" over limit
but new trial motion set "amount" below); Fergusson v. Comfort, 264 Mo. 274, 174
S.W. 411 (1915), trans'd from 159 Mo. App. 30, 139 S.W. 218 (1911), retrans'd, 194
Mo. App. 423, 184 S.W. 1192 (1916) (plaintiff agreed to fact which destroyed part of
his claim and in open court abandoned that part); Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh, 97 Mo.
287, 11 S.W. 217 (1889), trans'd (trial theory and instructions to jury); Kerr v. Sim-
mons, 82 Mo. 269 (1884), appeal dismissed (demurrer admitted defendant's answer
thereby reducing "amount"); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. Commercial Restoration,
Inc., 334 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (trial theory); Daly v. Schaefer, 331 S.W.2d
150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (statements to jury); Mitchell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
298 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (trial theory); Vandagrift v. Grand Commander
of Knights Templar, 176 Mo. App. 441, 158 S.W. 461 (1913) (abandoned during trial);
Mathews v. Danahy, 25 Mo. App. 354 (1887) (instructions to jury and pre-trial stipula-
tion).
If during the course of the trial the plaintiff should amend his petition to increase the
amount demanded, jurisdiction of a subsequent appeal could include the increase. New
First Nat'l Bank v. C. L. Rhodes Produce Co., 332 Mo. 163, 58 S.W.2d 742 (1932),
trans'd from 225 Mo. App. 438, 37 S.W.2d 986 (1931). Of course, counsel cannot, while
the appeal is pending, amend so that the record demonstrates sufficient "amount" for
jurisdiction in the supreme court. McGregory v. Gaskill, 317 Mo. 122, 296 S.W. 123,
trans'd, 296 S.W. 833 (Ct. App. 1927).
If jurisdiction is predicated on the "amount" of defendant's counterclaim, the "aban-
donment" principle equally applies. Kingshighway Presbyterian Church v. Sun Realty
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sider any act manifesting to the trial court or jury that the plaintiff is seek-
ing a reduced amount as an "equivalent to an amendment of the prayer of
the petition. '5 2
If the "amount" eliminated by the express or implied amendment reduces
the "amount" of plaintiff's petition below the jurisdictional level of the
supreme court, an appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse verdict lies to the
court of appeals."5 The same result obtains if the defendant concedes partial
liability, thereby reducing the "amount in dispute" to the jurisdictional level
of the court of appeals."
9.021(a) (2). By Operation of Law
Using precedent from the cases in which an act of the parties during the
course of the trial reduced the "amount in dispute," the courts extended
the doctrine of "eliminations" to include another kind of pre-judgment
reduction.
In Vanderberg v. Kansas City Gas Co.,55 the plaintiff appealed her non-
recovery to the supreme court, basing jurisdiction on the aggregate of two
counts, one for actual and one for punitive damages. Upon an examination
Co., 324 Mo. 510, 24 S.W.2d 108 (1930), trans'd (defendant abandoned by failure to
litigate and by use of trial theory which excluded the "amount"). Also important is
plaintiff's concession of part of defendant's counterclaim as a "credit" which can offset
the amount plaintiff claims and thus preclude vesting of supreme court jurisdiction on
plaintiff's appeal. Hannan-Hickey Bros. Constr. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., supra.
52. Wartenbe v. Car-Anth Mfg. & Supply Co., supra note 51, at 571.
53. In developing "amendment" rules, it is likely that the courts first excluded from
the "amount in dispute" any part of plaintiff's petition that had been formally dropped;
the next cases on this authority excluded claims impliedly abandoned. This evolution is
apparent in the early case of Mathews v. Danahy, 25 Mo. App. 354 (1887).
54. E.g., State ex rel. Burcham v. Drainage Dist., 271 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. 1954),
trans'd, 280 S.W.2d 683 (Ct. App. 1955) (condemnation case); McBee v. Twin City
Fire Ins. Co., 235 S.W.2d 283 (Mo.), trans'd, 241 Mo. App. 404, 238 S.W.2d 685
(1951) (pleadings contained concession of partial liability on insurance policy); Lynn v.
Stricker, 207 S.W.2d 290 (Mo.), transd, 213 S.W.2d 672 (Ct. App. 1948) (plaintiff had
already received some of property claimed without contest from defendant); Bietsch v.
Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 76 S.W.2d 1079 (Mo. 1934), trans'd, 86 S.W.2d 187 (Ct.
App. 1935); SIeyster v. Eugene Donzelot & Son, 323 Mo. 822, 20 S.W.2d 69 (1929),
trans'd, 223 Mo. App. 1166, 25 S.W.2d 147 (1930); Pittsburgh Bridge Co. v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 205 Mo. 176, 103 S.W. 546 (1907), trans'd, 135 Mo. App. 579, 116
S.W. 467 (1909); In re Burke's Estate, 169 Mo. 212, 69 S.W. 277, trans'd, 96 Mo. App.
295, 70 S.W. 156 (1902); Emerson v. Treadway, 270 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954)
(partial liability conceded in answer); Spink v. Mercury Ins. Co., 260 S.W.2d 757
(Mo. Ct. App. 1953); Dixon v. Postlewait Glass Co., 241 Mo. App. 174, 238 S.W.2d 93
(1951); Anderson v. Aetna Bricklaying & Constr. Co., 226 Mo. App. 1119, 27 S.W.2d
755 (1930).
55. 199 Mo. 455, 97 S.W. 908 (1906), trans'd, 126 Mo. App. 600, 105 S.W. 17
(1907).
1 9.021 (a) (2)
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of the entire record, the court concluded that the claim for punitive damages
was completely unfounded and transferred the appeal because the amount
of actual damages was insufficient for jurisdiction. The rule of the decision
is that if part of plaintiff's petition is frivolous, colorable or uncollectable
as a matter of law, that amount cannot form a basis for jurisdiction.
In other kinds of cases, part of plaintiff's claim is excluded from calcula-
tion of the jurisdictional "amount" by operation of law. This results when
part of the petition would not be affected by the judgment of the court, e.g.,
plaintiff is entitled in any event to part of the amount claimed."0
The cases in which the "amount" is reduced by operation of law repre-
sent a logical extension of the cases involving "amendment" by act of the
parties. The effect of holding that a claim is frivolous and uncollectable is
to rule that as a matter of law the claim was not in "real dispute" at the
trial and that the trial judgment reflects the reduction. As a practical
matter, the fact that a claim is not ruled uncollectable until the decision of
an appellate court causes real jurisdictional difficulty, and cases have been
frequently transferred by the supreme court"7 because a claim necessary for
56. In re Dean's Estate, 350 Mo. 494, 166 S.W.2d 529 (1942) (en bane), trans'd,
(widow would take "contested" property by will or statute); Blakenship v. Rateliff, 335
Mo. 387, 73 S.W.2d 183, trans'd, 76 S.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1934) (plaintiffs would take
by disputed contract or as statutory heirs); Lamkin v. Kaiser, 256 S.W. 558 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1923) (plaintiff entitled to one-half the disputed property under residuary clause).
Other kinds of cases, ultimately rationalized by the standard rules (§ 9.015), arc super-
ficially similar to these cases. For example, jurisdiction cannot be founded on the value
of an estate when the relators would take in any event and the actual issue is the naming
of an administrator; the "amount" is the value of administration fees. State ex rel.
Mitchell v. Guinotte, 180 Mo. 115, 79 S.W. 166 (1904) (en bane), trans'd, 113 Mo.
App. 399, 86 S.W. 884 (1905); cf. Strahl v. Turner, 310 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1958) (in
will construction case widow's statutory share subtracted from devise). By analogy, the
defendant cannot seek to have jurisdiction based on the "amount" of plaintiff's recovery
if part of that "amount" will not actually be recovered by plaintiff. City of St. Louis v.
Franklin Bank, 98 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1936), trans'd, 108 S.W.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1937)
(condemnation recovery partially offset by special benefits); cf. Hannan-Hickey Bros.
Constr. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 226 S.W. 881 (Mo. 1920), trans'd, 247 S.W. 436
(Ct. App. 1922) (plaintiff's admission of part of defendant's counterclaim subtracted as
a "credit").
57. E.g., Fowler v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 672 (Mo.), trans'd, 372 S.W.2d
497 (Ct. App. 1963); Strothkamp v. St. John's Community Bank, Inc., 329 S.W.2d 718
(Mo. 1959), trans'd; Nemours v. City of Clayton, 351 Mo. 317, 172 S.W.2d 937,
trans'd, 237 Mo. App. 497, 175 S.W.2d 60 (1943) (evidence of property diminution in
injunction action insufficient); Bell v. Wagner, 169 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1943), trans'd,
238 Mo. App. 152, 178 S.W.2d 813 (1944) (evidence to support claim for loss of busi-
ness and good will insufficient); Vordick v. Vordick, 281 Mo. 279, 219 S.W. 591, trans'd,
205 Mo. App. 555, 226 S.W. 59 (1920); Roll v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115
S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (evidence showed suit for conversion of stock would
yield only nominal damages).
The difficulty presented to the court by its own rulings is illustrated by the Fowler
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jurisdiction was "eliminated" by operation of law under the Vanderberg
principle."5 Nevertheless, the court has extended this policy to exclude
amounts abandoned after appeal.5 9
and Vordick cases, supra (see discussion of Fowler, supra note 35). In Vordick, an ac-
tion for divorce and alimony, the wife appealed the amount recovered for alimony in
gross as inadequate. The supreme court concluded that the amount plaintiff might re-
cover in a new trial was less than the "amount" necessary to confer jurisdiction on that
court. In its transferring opinion, the court observed that determination of the juris-
dictional issue had required considerable effort, and that it "would have been easier" to
have answered the case on the merits:
This case presents a striking instance of the difficulty often encountered in deter-
mining from the record the amount in dispute when jurisdictional. From the very
nature of the controversy an examination of the evidence to determine the amount
in dispute involves to some extent a consideration of the merits .... 281 Mo. at
287, 219 S.W. at 593.
The court further noted that if the plaintiff had stated a definite claim, it would not
have been challenged, as it obviously would not have been colorable or fictitious. It can
be seen from this decision that to police claims by evaluating the evidence in the case
and the applicable law to determine if the jurisdictional "amount" is involved, requires
the court to pursue a treacherous course. On the one hand, it cannot go too deeply into
the merits to decide the jurisdictional issue or it will have decided the case. The Vordick
case, supra, illustrates what can happen in a close case. The court of appeals, taking the
case on transfer, found for the plaintiff-appellant, holding that at least $7,500 (the then
jurisdictional amount) was due the plaintiff, and ordered a decree to increase the amount
of plaintiff's alimony by exactly $7,500, since a larger award would have destroyed its
jurisdiction.
58. The solution to jurisdictional confusion in these cases lies in the ability of counsel
to determine which claims the court will rule uncollectable. While this should not be
difficult in cases in which the plaintiff is entitled, in any event, to part of the amount
claimed (obviously colorable and spurious claims would be rarely filed), it can be very
difficult in personal injury claims to determine the amount for which a verdict would
stand in cases in which plaintiff appeals on the grounds of non-recovery. The example
of Fowler v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 672 (Mo.), trans'd, 372 S.W.2d 497
(Ct. App. 1963), is graphic. The decision to transfer rested on an analysis of the cases
in which recovery for injuries similar to the plaintiff's in the instant case was upheld, in
order to determine how large a verdict the court would permit. Because the amount for
which the court would permit recovery was lower than the jurisdictional "amount,"
although plaintiff's claim had been above, the Vanderberg principle was invoked. For
discussion of this case see note 35 supra.
In the analysis used in this section, the cases have been catalogued to depict the cause
of the "elimination"-whether act of the parties, or, in some form, operation of law-
and very precisely, the time when it was effected. The courts have not made this break-
down and have applied the Vanderberg principle in all these cases. While the classifica-
tion used is somewhat artificial, it is needed in order to point up the entirely different
situation when matters, in dispute at the trial, are dropped after the judgment and
while the appeal is pending (§ 9.021 (b)).
59. Remittiturs are another kind of "elimination" which because of their use to con-
trol the jurisdiction of the appeal have caused difficulty. Thus the supreme court has
held that a plaintiff recovering an "amount" meeting its jurisdictional requirement and
having that verdict set aside by an order for a new trial may not appeal to that court if
he remits the verdict to below the jurisdictional level before an appeal is taken. State ex
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9.021(b). Changes After the Judgment: "Subsequent Events"
9.021 (b) (1). Conditionally Determined Jurisdiction and "Divestment"
The "elimination" rules developed to subtract amounts abandoned
before the judgment have been expanded to require subtraction from the
"amount in dispute" any abandonment which occurs after judgment and
while the case is pending on appeal. Although the cases which subtract post-
judgment "eliminations" had their origin in the authority supporting the
Vanderberg principle, " neither Vanderberg nor the cases on which it relied
involved exclusions after judgment.6 Nevertheless, recent cases have
rel. Long v. Ellison, 272 Mo. 571, 199 S.W. 984 (en bane), quashing 196 S.W. 409
(Ct. App. 1917). The court of appeals reached a different result, believing that the con-
trol the rule gave to an appellant was inconsistent with the spirit of exclusive jurisdiction,
but its decision was quashed by the supreme court. Reynolds v. Grain Belt Mills Co., 59
S.W.2d 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933), trans'd, 334 Mo. 712, 69 S.W.2d 947, re-
trans'd, 229 Mo. App. 380, 78 S.W.2d 124 (1934). Because the remittitur is effective
before the final judgment from which appeal is taken, these cases are not authority for
post judgment "eliminations." Accord, Hensler v. Stix, 185 Mo. 238, 84 S.W. 894
(1904), trans'd, 113 Mo. App. 162, 88 S.W. 108 (1905); McKim v. Metropolitan St.
Ry., 196 Mo. App. 544, 209 S.W. 622 (1919); Barrett v. Stoddard County, 183 S.W.
644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916); Oborn v. Nelson, 141 Mo. App. 428, 126 S.W. 178 (1910)
(plaintiff voluntarily remitted more than order of trial court).
However, the courts in an apparent effort to restrain appellants from reducing their
petitions to control the appellate forum, have held some "eliminations" ineffective to
reduce the "amount in dispute." In one case, the plaintiff, anticipating an impending
directed verdict for the defendant, reduced his petition below the jurisdictional level of
the supreme court; when a verdict was entered for defendant, the plaintiff appealed his
reduced petition. On the theory that a favorable appellate decision would allow the
plaintiff, in a new trial, to reinstate the full amount of his original claim, the court of
appeals transferred the case to the supreme court, which accepted jurisdiction. Poe v.
Kansas City, C.C. & St. J. Ry., 238 S.W. 1082 (Mo. 1922); accord, Powers v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry., 262 Mo. 701, 172 S.W. 1 (1914); Eads v. Kansas City Elec. Light Co.,
180 S.W. 994 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915) (transfer by court of appeals based on Powers).
While no recent decision has considered these cases, they are probably questionable au-
thority.
60. The court extended Vanderberg apparently without considering the time when
the "elimination" was effected as significant. As a result, Vanderberg has been consis-
tently used as authority whether the "elimination" occurred before or after the appeal
was taken. The case illustrating this transition is Fergusson v. Comfort, 264 Mo. 274, 174
S.W. 411 (1915), trans'd from 159 Mo. App. 30, 139 S.W. 218 (1911), retrans'd, 194
Mo. App. 423, 184 S.W. 1192 (1916). There the supreme court subtracted part of
plaintiff's claim, holding that it had been abandoned during trial, but noted further that
the matter had not been briefed and presented on appeal-apparently to bolster its con-
clusion of abandonment at the trial.
61. In State ex rel. Lingenfelder v. Lewis, 96 Mo. 148, 8 S.W. 770 (1888), the court
stated that jurisdiction was to be based on the "amount remaining in dispute and sub-
ject to the determination of the appellate court." Despite the language of the Lewis case
and its citation in Vanderberg as authority for the exclusion of matters eliminated at the
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indiscriminately applied Vanderberg to appeals involving both types of
elimination, for the announced purpose of predicating the "amount in
dispute" on only the amount remaining in dispute at the time of the appel-
late tribunal's decision.
The leading case on post-judgment abandonment is Ashbrook v. Willis.6 2
This was an action by plaintiff for personal injuries ($10,000) and property
damages ($1,056.30) in which defendant counterclaimed ($2,733). Both
parties obtained verdicts of $500, which were set aside by an order granting
plaintiff a new trial on the grounds of the inadequacy of his recovery and
error in giving defendant's instruction. The defendant appealed to the
supreme court. Under the then jurisdictional limits of that court ($7,500),
jurisdiction would normally have existed, based on the effect of the new
trial reinstating plaintiff's claims-an "amount" sufficient for supreme
court jurisdiction."3 However, the plaintiff-respondent did not brief or
argue his claim for personal injuries; the court ruled that the claim was
excluded from the "amount in dispute" and transferred the cause to the
court of appeals.
Subsequent cases have followed Ashbrook and employed its rule to reject
supreme court jurisdiction of appeals when the "amount" has been reduced
after the appeal was filed. The most frequent kinds of post-judgment
abandonment are failure to brief and argue issues upon which part of the
appeal was predicated"' and settlement or dismissal of part of the appeal."5
trial, the Lewis decision did not reject, but rather upheld jurisdiction in the supreme
court.
Conspicuously absent in both Vanderberg and cases following it was a citation to a
case which predated Vanderberg and which in fact involved a "post-judgment" elimina-
tion. In Reichenbach v. United Masonic Benefit Ass'n, 112 Mo. 22, 20 S.W. 317
(1892), trans'd from 47 Mo. App. 77 (1891), discussed infra note 65, a dismissal of one
of two appeals from the same judgments before the supreme court (to which the cause
had been transferred) left one appeal involving less than the requisite jurisdictional
"amount," and the supreme court rejected jurisdiction of the remaining appeal.
62. 338 Mo. 226, 89 S.W.2d 659 (1936), trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 460, 100 S.W.2d
943 (1937).
63. See "Appeal From New Trial Order," § 9.025 and "Standard Rules," § 9.015,
note 37 and accompanying text.
64. Haley v. Horwitz, 286 S.W.2d 796 (Mo.), trans'd, 290 S.W.2d 414 (Ct. App.
1956) (dictum) (excessiveness of award not established on record); Heuer v. Ulmer,
273 S.W.2d 169 (Mo.), trans'd from 264 S.W.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1954), retrans'd, 281
S.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1955) (counterclaim issue not included in defendant-appellant's
brief); Kansas City v. National Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 265 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1954) (amount
of inadequacy of appellant's verdict reduced in his brief); Buddon Realty Co. v. Wallace,
188 S.W.2d 28 (Mo.), trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 900, 189 S.W.2d 1002 (1945) (failure to
brief issue of indebtedness deemed "admission" of colorability); Ewing v. Kansas City,
350 Mo. 1071, 169 S.W.2d 897 (1943), trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 266, 180 S.W.2d 234
(1944) (jurisdiction based only on "live issues" presented to appellate court).
65. Settlement cases: Two clear examples transferred by the supreme court to the
J 9.021 (b) (1)
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Ashbrook introduces a flexible rule for measuring jurisdictional "amount."
This flexibility gives rise to conflicting theories which presently coexist in the
court of appeals without opinion are: Hopkins v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 382 S.W.2d
442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Stepp v. Rainwater, 373 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
In both cases, two defendants appealed a plaintiff's verdict to the supreme court (in
Hopkins, the verdict was in favor of husband and wife on separate counts) which totaled
more than the jurisdictional "amount." While the case was pending there, plaintiff set-
tled with one appellant, and a motion to transfer was sustained because the remaining
"amount" was insufficient for supreme court jurisdiction. But see Pierce v. Ozark Bor-
der Elec. Co-op., 378 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1964), in which (defendant) third party plain-
tiff appealed the judgment in favor of third party defendant dismissing third party plain-
tiff's petition for any damages for which he might become liable to plaintiff. After the
appeal, third party plaintiff settled plaintiffs claim of $150,000 for $34,500. Although
in this case either "amount" was sufficient, the court found the "amount" requirement
satisfied because the claim for $150,000 "fixes the amount in dispute for the purpose of
our jurisdiction." Id. at 506. By its denial of the effect of the settlement upon juris-
diction, the court indicates that it would have had jurisdiction even if the third party
plaintiff had successfully compromised plaintiff's claim for less than the jurisdictional
requisite.
A problem similar to settlement arises if plaintiff recovers part of his claim which is
appealed by one defendant and plaintiff also appeals, seeking to preserve his claim against
the other defendant if a new trial is ordered. Feste v. Newman, 368 S.W.2d 713
(Mo. 1963) (en banc), trans'd. In this case, plaintiff's appeal of the verdict for the sec-
ond defendant would have conferred jurisdiction upon the supreme court had it not
been dismissed by plaintiffs failure to brief and argue it as a contention of error.
Dismissal Cases: In Hutchinson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 288 S.W. 91 (Mo. Ct. App.
1926), a suit against three defendants for $50,000, two of the defendants had judgment
rendered in their favor but plaintiff recovered an amount against one defendant insuffi-
cient for supreme court jurisdiction. The losing defendant appealed plaintiff's recovery
and plaintiff appealed the judgment in favor of the other defendants to the court of
appeals. The ordinary practice of aggregating the separate "amounts" of two appeals
would have given a total "amount" which was sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction,
but plaintiff's appeal was excluded because it was dismissed by plaintiff while still
pending in the court of appeals. That court ruled against the defendant's argument that
jurisdiction lay in the supreme court because the appeals originally vested there. Reichen-
bach v. United Masonic Benefit Ass'n, 112 Mo. 22, 20 S.W. 317 (1892), transd from
47 Mo. App. 77 (1891), retransd, involved cross appeals which provided supreme court
jurisdiction. After transfer by the court of appeals to the supreme court, plaintiff dis-
missed her appeal. Because the "amount" of the second appeal was insufficient, the
supreme court retransferred, holding that jurisdiction had not irrevocably vested.
Here the appeal from the judgment against defendant, based on the finding upon
the second count, is the only matter for examination, and the defendant alone com-
plains of that judgment. In this state of the record we are of the opinion that the
amount involved is to be determined as though defendant alone had originally ap-
pealed.... Id. at 25, 20 S.W. at 318. (Emphasis added.)
Contra, Wilson v. Buchanan County, 298 S.W. 842 (Mo. 1927), trans'd from court of
appeals (plaintiff did not "press" his appeal of inadequacy); cf. Pierce v. Ozark Border
Elec. Co-op, supra.
A problem similar to "dismissal" is involved when the defendant appeals the denial
of his motion to set aside a verdict for plaintiff and on appeal concedes partial liability.
In Briley v. Thompson, 285 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), trans'd from supreme
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supreme court's catalog of jurisdiction. According to one, jurisdiction is
determined on the record at the time of judgment from those parts of the
judgment which are appealed. The rationale of this rule is that because
the appeal is taken from the adverse judgment, the "amount" of the appeal
is the amount of recovery denied or liability assessed by the judgment.8 6 The
court, retrans'd, the defendant induced transfer from the supreme court by filing a motion
stipulating that his appeal was predicated on the excessiveness of plaintiff's verdict, but
that it was not excessive by an "amount" sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction. The
appeal was retransferred, however, when his appellate theory in the court of appeals
placed plaintiff's entire verdict (an "amount" over the then jurisdictional limits) in issue.
The "dismissal" cases must be distinguished from standard cases in which appeal is
taken from only part of the judgment. In Anthony v. Morrow, 306 S.W.2d 581 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1957), defendant appealed a judgment which contained a verdict for plaintiff
($6,500) and a dismissal of defendant's cross claim ($15,000). However, the notice of
appeal stated only that defendant appeals from the judgment "in favor of plaintiff" and
the court of appeals retained jurisdiction, concluding that the only amount appealed was
plaintiff's verdict. Likewise, in a suit to cancel a lease and to recover damages to which
defendant filed a cross bill for damages, the jurisdiction of an appeal by defendant from
the cancellation of the lease for plaintiff and denial of defendant's damage claim against
plaintiff would be predicated solely on the issues appealed (defendant's non-recovery),
even though plaintiff did not recover on his damage claim; if plaintiff had also
appealed, jurisdiction would have been in the supreme court. Jackson v. Merz, 358 Mo.
320, 219 S.W.2d 320, trans'd, 223 S.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1949); see Nickels v. Borg-
meyer, 256 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1953).
Crawford v. Dixon, 166 Mo. 501, 66 S.W. 159 (1901), trans'd, 97 Mo. App. 558, 71
S.W. 470 (1903), is a further indication the court does not consider that jurisdiction
irrevocably vests at the time the appeal is taken. In this case the "amount" was sufficient
for the supreme court, but while the appeal was pending in that court, the legislature
increased its jurisdictional limit to an "amount" greater than that involved. The court
based its transfer on the legislative act which stated that appeals pending but not involv-
ing the increased jurisdictional "amount" should be transferred.
66. This was the precise holding in the case of Schwyhart v. Barrett, 223 Mo. 497,
122 S.W. 1049 (1909), trans'd, 145 Mo. App. 332, 130 S.W. 388 (1910). In this case,
the court refused to include interest that had accrued after the judgment was entered
but before appeal was taken. In conclusion, the court stated "that 'the amount in dis-
pute' ... is the amount for which the judgment was rendered December 14, 1906." Id.
at 504, 122 S.W. at 1051. Schwyhart has been a prolific authority because of its clear
expression of guides for determining jurisdictional "amount."
Supreme court cases recurringly quote the phrase that "appellate jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined upon the record at the time the appeal is granted and 'noth-
ing subsequently occurring will defeat or confer jurisdiction on this court.'" Pierce v.
Ozark Border Elec. Co-op, 378 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. 1964). Particularly significant is
the fact that this frequent usage is generally limited to those cases in which the court
would have jurisdiction in any event. In Pierce, the court by footnote incorporated
"qualifications," but the case cited (Feste v. Newman, 368 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1963) (en
banc), discussed infra note 71), stands on its facts-expressed by precise language-for
a rule that is the exact antithesis of the general rule quoted by Pierce.
"Amount" jurisdiction in federal cases provides a parallel. The rule consistently ap-
plied is that "events occurring subsequent to the institution of the suit which reduce the
amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction." Saint Paul Mer-
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conflicting position, represented by Ashbrook, is that jurisdiction is not
capable of conclusive determination at the time of judgment, but is "con-
ditional" and subject to divestment as long as the "amount" of the appeal
can be revalued. 7
As authority for its decision in Ashbrook, the court cited holdings that
jurisdiction based on a "constitutional question" exists only if the con-
stitutional issue is briefed and argued."8 It also relied on Vanderberg,
cury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90 (1938); Wade v. Rogala, 270
F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959) (claimant's death while suit pending did not "oust" jurisdic-
tion although limiting recovery). This was also the rule when the Supreme Court had
"amount" appellate jurisdiction. In Cook v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 218
(1865), appeal was taken from a judgment entered against defendant for an "amount"
over the jurisdictional level. While the appeal was pending, Congress remitted the re-
covery by the United States to below the jurisdictional "amount" but the Supreme Court
rejected a motion to dismiss the appeal. "The jurisdictional facts existed at the time of
issuing and serving the writ of error. By its issue and service the court obtained jurisdic-
tion over the cause, and this jurisdiction once acquired, cannot be taken away by any
change in the value of the subject of the controversy." Ibid.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 512.050 (1959) prescribing the time allowed to file a notice of
appeal, supports the position that filing the notice of appeal invests the court with
jurisdiction (if in fact the requisite "amount" then exists) from the time appeal is taken:
After a timely filing of such notice of appeal, failure of the appellant to take any of
the further steps to secure the review of the judgment or order appealed from does
not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground for such action as the appellate
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. Ibid. (Em-
phasis added.)
Additional support for the view that "amount" jurisdiction must be determined at the
time the appeal is taken is found in a proposed constitutional amendment-an 1896
concurrent resolution which was rejected at the polls. There "amount in dispute" was
defined as "the money value of the real dispute at the date of the judgment appealed
from, and the courts shall look to the entire record for the purpose of ascertaining such
value." (Emphasis added.) "Introduction," notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
67. Ashbrook does not clearly articulate this jurisdictional philosophy and purportedly
stands on the ground that a matter dropped after appeal was never part of the dispute
at the trial because it is colorable and uncollectable as a matter of law. But this basis
for the decision is a fiction because on its facts Ashbrook predicates jurisdiction on the
shifting basis of the "amount" which will be the subject of appellate determination. This
decision places the court in the position of determining jurisdiction at a time at least
as late as the filing of the appellate briefs. The latest time at which the jurisdictional
issue can be decided has not been defined. See Briley v. Thompson, 285 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1955) (oral argument induced transfer), discussed supra note 65.
68. Note, however, that the "constitutional question" cases relied on by the court
also held that the failure to brief and argue evidences the colorability of the matter as a
question at the trial court. Therefore, if these cases actually hold that the issue on which
jurisdiction was attempted to be based, was not in dispute at the trial-because it was
colorable, e.g., Vanderberg-and if they do not hold that an issue in dispute at the trial
but abandoned after appeal was taken from the judgment is excluded from jurisdictional
consideration, they do not support the result in Ashbrook. There are "constitutional
question" cases which have flatly identified the failure to brief and argue as the sole
cause of a transfer to the court of appeals. E.g., Wright v. Tucker, 137 S.W.2d 557 (Mo.
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implying that the failure to contest an issue at the appellate level created
a sort of presumption 9 that the issue was colorable and frivolous and there-
fore not in "real" dispute at the trial court.
The court's efforts to bring its decision within the Vanderberg principle
obviously stemmed from its recognition that its theories conflicted and that
the existing rule, uniformly stated although sporadically followed, was that
jurisdiction is "determined upon the record in the trial court at the time
the appeal is granted."7 The cases following Ashbrook have generally
maintained its rationalization when rejecting jurisdiction on post-judgment
abandonment grounds, but the reasoning appears strained.7 It is especially
1940), trans'd; Cooper County Bank v. Bank of Bunceton, 310 Mo. 519, 276 S.W. 622
(1925), trans'd, 221 Mo. App. 814, 288 S.W. 95 (1926).
69. For an unequivocal statement of the fictional "presumption," see Buddon Realty
Co. v. Wallace, 188 S.W.2d 28 (Mo.), trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 900, 189 S.W.2d 1002
(1945):
Furthermore, in the brief filed in this court by the plaintiffs, the issue of indebted-
ness is abandoned. This is an admission that the claim of indebtedness, as alleged
in plaintiff's petition is colorable and for that reason cannot be considered in de-
termining the question of appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 29. (Emphasis added.)
In Snowbarger v. M.F.A. Cent. Co-op., 317 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1958) (en banc), trans'd,
328 S.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1959), the court stated that the "jurisdictional facts" must have
existed at the time appeal was taken:
Certainly, none will question that the amount in actual dispute for jurisdictional
purposes is determined at the time the appeal is taken, and that nothing that sub-
sequently occurs should be invoked to confer jurisdiction which did not exist at the
time of the appeal, and that the possibility or contingency that a subsequent event
will reduce the amount that was actually in dispute at the time an appeal was taken
should not deprive the court of the jurisdiction which it had at the time of the
appeal. Id. at 393.
While this statement is perfectly correct, the court does not pass on (because unnecessary
in the case) the real source of difficulty, i.e., what are the criteria to determine whether
an issue was in "real dispute" at the trial. The Vanderberg case holds the court must
base this decision on the facts existing at the time the judgment was entered and appeal
taken. Ashbrook holds that the court may also consider events subsequent to the appeal.
70. Ashbrook v. Willis, 338 Mo. 226, 89 S.W.2d 659 (1936), trans'd, 231 Mo. App.
460, 100 S.W.2d 943 (1937).
71. That the reasoning in Ashbrook rests on a fiction is demonstrated by the facts.
Although constrained by the "rule" that jurisdiction must be fixed as of the time the
appeal is taken, the court obviously found alluring the denial of jurisdiction when a de-
cision on the merits would only affect an "amount" below its jurisdictional level. There-
fore, it postulated the theory that failure of counsel to contest the issue of respondent's
claim for personal injuries in the appellate court, ipso facto, made the claim colorable.
The court declined to state as its holding that jurisdiction is determined when the briefs
are filed and when the case is submitted for appellate determination, but in effect this was
done. In Ashbrook plaintiff got a new trial which reinstated his damage claims for over
the "amount" limit. Because on defendant's appeal if the order of new trial was upheld,
plaintiff would be able to assert the "abandoned" claim notwithstanding the court's de-
cision that it was no longer involved, the court's reasoning seems weak.
The opinions transferring on the authority of Ashbrook continue to writhe on the horns
of the dilemma it created. The court has gravitated from fictional use of the Vanderberg
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difficult to accept Ashbrook because there the respondent was the party who
did not preserve the issue." Probably the fundamental reason for maintain-
ing "conditional" jurisdiction is to permit the court to take into account
subsequent events that reduce the "amount in dispute" in order to restrict
its appellate jurisdiction.73 It does not appear to be used to "confer" juris-
principle towards an express adoption of the view that facts which occur after judgment
and appeal are determinative. In Ewing v. Kansas City, 350 Mo. 897, 169 S.W.2d 897
(1943), discussed supra note 64, the court talked about "live issues" on appeal as the
jurisdictional litmus before it reverted to the Ashbrook fictionalization of Vanderberg.
In Heuer v. Ulmer, 273 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1954), discussed supra note 64, defendant
cross appealed to the court of appeals his loss on a counterclaim which was above the
"amount" limit, but in his brief in the supreme court (to which the case had been trans-
ferred by joint motion of the parties) he stated that the entire trial had been properly
conducted and he had appealed only to protect his counterclaim if plaintiff got a new
trial. Relying in part on Ashbrook, the court transferred, holding that its jurisdiction de-
pended on "live issues," which remain "'in dispute between the parties on the appeal, and
subject to determination by the appellate court.'" Id. at 170. Finally in Feste v. New-
man, 368 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1963) (en banc), discussed supra note 65, the court squarely
faced the issue:
This presents the question whether appellate jurisdiction is irrevocably established
as of the time the appeal is taken, or whether if jurisdiction in a court of limitedjurisdiction is established by the record at the time of taking the appeal it may
subsequently be lost by failure to preserve or present for appellate review an issue
within the scope of the limited jurisdiction.
It went on to hold that:
However, even though the record indicates that appellate jurisdiction exists in this
court at the time the appeal is taken, the failure to preserve and keep alive for
appellate review issues essential to the exercise of jurisdiction will result in the lack
of jurisdiction of this court to rule the case on appeal. Id. at 715. (Emphasis
added.)
Citing Ewing and Heuer, the court in Feste clearly recognized that it was using a princi-
ple of jurisdiction that divested it of the power which had once existed to decide the case.
Nevertheless, at the end of its opinion the court lapsed into a quotation from Heuer to
the effect that abandoned issues are considered "'colorable and meritless, and insufficient
to vest appellate jurisdiction'" implying that the "amount" was never in dispute.
Id. at 716. That jurisdiction of an appeal may properly lie in the supreme court only to
be lost or divested by operation of an event subsequent to the appeal is conclusively illus-
trated by the settlement cases cited supra note 65. Obviously, no fiction can transform a
settlement of part of plaintiff's judgment (the total of which is over the jurisdictional
amount) into a claim "colorable" ab initio and insufficient to "vest" jurisdiction.
72. Respondent-plaintiff would be able to reinstitute his full claim if for any reason
the new trial order were affirmed. If the appellate court held that the giving of de-
fendant's instruction was error and the proper basis for ordering a new trial, the damage
issues argued by respondent-after being reinstated by the new trial-appear to be an
unalterable ground for jurisdiction. Cf. Poe v. Kansas City, C.C. & St. J. Ry., 238 S.W.
1082 (Mo. 1922). Powers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 226 Mo. 701, 172 S.W. 1 (1914), dis-
cussed supra note 59, suggests that there is jurisdiction in the supreme court if-on Ash-
brook facts-before the defendant appeals the new trial, plaintiff intentionally amends
his petition to preclude supreme court jurisdiction.
73. Evidence exists to indicate that the docket load of the supreme court historically
has been very heavy, but the load of the courts of appeals disproportionately low. The
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diction when events subsequent to the judgment increase the "amount."'
Because jurisdiction which is capable of being re-valued after the appeal
has been perfected cannot be conclusively determined by the courts or
litigants at any point of time, the court's adoption of this policy has injected
serious practical difficulties into the appellate process. Unlike a simple
definite jurisdictional formula, "conditional" jurisdiction permits counsel5
to appeal and argue cases, and courts--at both appellate levels-to trans-
fer,7 dismiss, 7 or accept and hear cases on the merits,7 although never corn-
worst offender in burdening the court's calendar is the "amount" case which involves only
slightly more than the limit. The court in an effort to relieve its docket attempted sundry
solutions including suggestions for the raising of the "amount" level. The failure of the
legislature to increase the amount until recently (the limit of the court was $7,500 from
1909 to about 1960) undoubtedly made it imperative that the court adopt restrictive
rules. The "divestment" rule made possible a definition of jurisdiction that precluded
appeal to the supreme court of some of the very many cases in which the "amount" ex-
ceeded $7,500 but was less than $15,000, cases which of late at least appear onerous to
the supreme court. See APPELLATE PRACTICE REPORT, discussed supra note 3. This re-
port demonstrated the increasing load of the supreme court and the somewhat lighter load
of the courts of appeals and the number of cases (Exhibits E & F) in which jurisdiction
would have been in the court of appeals if the limit had been increased to $15,000. The
report throughout contains suggestions to improve the workings of "amount" jurisdiction,
if it cannot be eliminated by constitutional amendment.
74. Certainly, if a defendant appeals a verdict of $15,000 several days after judgment
was entered, the accrual of interest is not includable. See "Conferring Jurisdiction,"
§ 9.021(b) (2).
75. In Ashbrook, counsel for appellant must answer in a second appellate forum be-
cause respondent in his brief abandoned a jurisdictional necessity. Similarly, in Stepp v.
Rainwater, 373 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), the defendant-appellant who did not
settle properly filed his appeal in the supreme court, but ultimately the appeal was in the
court of appeals. Bewildered indeed the plaintiff-respondent must have been in Briley v.
Thompson, 285 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), discussed supra note 65. After preparing
to argue in the supreme court, respondent was forced by appellant's footwork to answer
in the court of appeals. But argument there resulted in respondent again being trans-
ferred because of a determination by the court of appeals that appellant's "misinforma-
tion" induced the supreme court transfer.
76. An example of the supreme court transferring erroneously on the divestment
principle is Briley v. Thompson, supra note 75. Even though the court of appeals prop-
erly sustained a motion to transfer to the supreme court, Heuer v. Ulmer, 273 S.W.2d
169 (Mo. 1954), discussed supra note 71, the appeal was returned by the supreme court
because of abandonment by statements in the appellate briefs (unavailable to the court
of appeals when it first transferred). Moreover, if it appears that the requisite "amount"
is in dispute, a motion in the court of appeals to transfer will be sustained despite its
expression of apprehension concerning what will be discarded by the appellate brief.
Mitchell v. Mosher, 352 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 362 S.W.2d 532 (Mo.
1962): "Of course, plaintiffs counsel might, by some such concession in his appellate
brief or oral argument, ticket himself and his client for another ride on the jurisdictional
merry-go-round and another stop on our stoop." Id. at 934; see Albers Milling Co. v.
Carney, 335 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 341 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1960).
77. Feste v. Newman, 368 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1963) (en banc), trans'd.
78. Ibid.; Briley v. Thompson, 285 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), discussed supra
note 65.
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pletely certain that the court has jurisdiction or will continue to retain
it. Another vice of the policy is the added leverage for control of the appel-
late forum given to the litigants, both appellant and respondent."'
The supreme court remains in a quandary concerning the use of "con-
ditional" jurisdiction. Current decisions continue to use language of the
general rule denying the efficacy of events subsequent to the judgment to
"defeat or confer" jurisdiction;8" indeed in some cases the "rule" is clearly
followed and the divestment principle expressly rejected."' Nevertheless,
79. A certain degree of control is unavoidable. Generally little benefit can be gained
by an appeal to one court rather than the other, but there are some advantages. A party
might desire supreme court jurisdiction to avoid two appellate decisions when he appeals
a case of such novelty and importance that an adverse decision in the court of appeals
would be likely to be appealed to the supreme court. On the other hand, appeal to the
court of appeals might be desirable to avoid the expense and delay of an appeal
to the supreme court-especially when most appeals in the courts of appeals originate in
the immediate vicinity of those courts. See APPELLATE P.AcTicz REPORT, discussed supra
note 3.
Some examples do exist of jurisdictional control which appear unfortunate. One tech-
nique available to a defendant appealing a plaintiffs verdict sufficient for supreme court
jurisdiction is to pay enough of the judgment after the appeal is taken to cause a transfer.
Cf. Hopkins v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 382 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), trans'd
from supreme court; Stepp v. Rainwater, 373 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), trans'd
from supreme court. Powers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 262 Mo. 701, 172 S.W. 1 (1914), dis-
cussed supra note 59, illustrates that plaintiff-appellant could in appellate briefs or in
arguments reduce the amount claimed and divest jurisdiction once well established in the
supreme court. And it would cost plaintiff little, for if he won a new trial he could
again amend his petition to reinstate the abandoned amount or claim. Ashbrook ex-
emplifies the plaintiff-respondent who can divest jurisdiction by not pursuing a claim in the
supreme court, but can still contest in the court of appeals a claim for a smaller "amount"
which involves the same rule of law. If the new trial order is affirmed, respondent is able
to prosecute both claims. Consider the defendant-appellant, who in his brief or oral
argument in an appeal filed with the supreme court can divest jurisdiction by conceding
partial liability but can rescind his concession when appearing before the court of appeals.
Briley v. Thompson, supra note 78.
The problem of control has concerned the courts. See Poe v. Kansas City, C.C. & St.
J. Ry., 238 S.W. 1082 (Mo. 1922), discussed supra note 72. For references to the prob-
lem in federal courts see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 89 n.37 (1963).
80. Generally, the language is used when the problem of abandonment is not an issue
(Snowbarger v. M.F.A. Central Co-op, 317 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1958) (en bane), discussed
supra note 69) or when the supreme court would have had jurisdiction in any event
(Pierce v. Ozark Border EIec. Co-op., 378 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1964), discussed supra
note 65).
81. In Yax v. Dit-Mco, Inc., 366 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1963), a decision handed down
only three months prior to Feste v. Newman, 368 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. 1963) (en bane),
trans'd, the supreme court considered its jurisdiction in a case concerning an increase in
the value of corporate stock. At the time the appeal was filed, the "amount" of increase
was sufficient for jurisdiction. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the stock
value fell sufficiently to reduce the "amount" below the court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the court retained jurisdiction based on the facts "as of the time the appeal was taken."
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recent approval of "conditionally determined" jurisdiction is witnessed by
the "imprimatur" of the court en banc.82
9.021 (b) (2). Conferring Jurisdiction and Inclusion of Interest
The rule that nothing occurring subsequent to the judgment will confer
jurisdiction" is demonstrated by the cases considering the effect of interest
on the determination of jurisdictional "amount." In cases ex contractu84--
366 S.W.2d at 366. Yax was not considered by the court in Feste, but the cases appear
to be diametrically opposed.
In Pierce v. Ozark Border Elec. Co-op., supra note 80, discussed supra note 65,
the compromise of the claim (for an "amount" over the jurisdictional limits) which
was the basis of the appeal occurred while the appeal was pending. The court on
the one hand noted the "qualifications" of Feste, and on the other specifically based juris-
diction on the full amount of the claim, before settlement and gave the specific date of
August 17, 1962 as the time when it should "look at the record" to affix jurisdiction.
This is the date appellant filed notice of appeal from the judgment of August 14, 1962'
which dismissed appellant's cross-claim. Brief for Appellant, pp. 1, 8. Therefore, juris-
diction was based on the record at the time the appeal was taken and the supreme court
would have had jurisdiction even if the claim on which jurisdiction was based ($150,000)
had been settled during the pendency of the appeal for an amount less than $15,000 (in
fact it was settled for $34,000, giving supreme court jurisdiction whichever test was used).
This case also indicates that a problem exists whether these cases base jurisdiction on the
judgment at the time of rendition or the time of appeal. This problem is thoroughly con-
sidered in § 9.021(b) (2).
82. Feste v. Newman, supra note 81.
83. The general rule denying any jurisdictional effect to events occurring subsequent
to the judgment is stated by the courts as applying equally to those events which tend to
"defeat" jurisdiction (§ 9.021(b) (1)) and those tending to "confer," discussed in this
section.
84. Because the critical analysis and logical approach of the first Missouri case found
which considered interest as a component of "amount" has been strictly followed by most
of the "interest" cases, little jurisdictional difficulty has arisen. In Baerveldt Constr. Co.
v. Bagley, 231 Mo. 157, 132 S.W. 688 (1910), the plaintiff sued in two counts, quantum
meruit and on the contract. The amount allegedly owing on the contract was less than
the jurisdictional requirement, but plaintiff also demanded interest on his claim from
the date of demand on defendant. The "amount" of accrued interest at the time the
suit was filed was insufficient to confer jurisdiction, but the supreme court had jurisdiction
because the "amount in dispute" was the amount claimed plus interest until the date of
judgment adverse to plaintiff:
[W]e observe a distinction between an action in tort, where the amount of dama es
claimed in the petition does not bear interest before judgment, and an action of t is
kind, where the amount claimed arises out of a contract, express or implied, and
where the petition states facts constituting a right to recover, not only the amount
specified as principal, but also interest.
e call attention to the distinction to be observed in this particular case between
a case where interest does not run on the amount demanded in the petition and a
case where it does run . . . . Id. at 162-63, 132 S.W. at 690-91. (Emphasis
added.)
Therefore, the general rule is based on the question whether the action permits interest
to accrue before a judgment affixing liability.
Although interest is specifically excluded from jurisdictional "amount" in the federal
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claims in which interest is an integral part of the cause of action,8" or
actions on instruments providing for payment of interest8 -- interest which
has accrued to the time of judgment is included," but interest after the
judgment is generally held to be a "mere incident" and not part of the
"amount in dispute.""8
system (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1958)), the effect attributed to interest by the federal
courts in determination of the "amount in controversy" is not unlike the approach of the
Missouri courts. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 35 (1963); Annot., 77
A.L.R. 991, 995-1011 (1932); Note, 45 IowA L. Rnv. 832 (1960).
85. Jenkins v. Meyer, 380 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1964) (bank certificates); Still v. Trav-
elers Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963) (interest an element of recovery on insur-
ance claim for vexatious delay); Cross v. Gimlin, 256 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1953) (profit
sharing contract); Newco Land Co. v. Martin, 358 Mo. 99, 213 S.W.2d 504 (1948)
(money had and received for recovery of trust funds); Lemmon v. Continental Cas. Co.,
350 Mo. 1107, 169 S.W.2d 920 (1943) (contract of accident insurance); Harvey v.
Peoples Bank, 136 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1939) (action to establish liquidated claim against
insolvent bank); State ex rel. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Reynolds, 278 Mo. 695, 213
S.W. 804 (1919) (en bane) (money had and received for funds depo3ited in bank);
Baerveldt Constr. Co. v. Bagley, supra note 84 (suits in quantum meruit and con-
tract to collect payments under building contract); Berry v. Crouse, 370 S.W.2d
724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1964) (purchase pay-
ments plus interest from date of demand to judgment); Beckemeier v. Baessler, 261
S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953), transd, 270 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1954) (mechanic's
lien); Laustrup v. Bankers Life Co., 192 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 355 Mo.
304, 196 S.W.2d 260 (1946) (en bane) (contract of life insurance); Fidelity Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Go., 220 S.W. 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920),
trans'd, 293 Mo. 194, 238 S.W. 474 (1922) (written contract for purchase of corporate
stock); Myers v. Myers, 22 Mo. App. 94 (1886), trans'd, 98 Mo. 262, 11 S.W. 617
(1889) (contest of probate settlement concerning interest bearing notes).
In addition to claims sounding in contract in which the petition is for a liquidated
sum, appeals from garnishment actions to collect tort judgments also include interest. In
these cases, the amount of interest included is that which accrued from the first judg-
ment to the time of the judgment in the garnishment action. E.g., Chailland v. M.F.A.
Mut. Ins. Co., 375 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1964) (en banc); Meyers v. Smith, 375 S.W.2d 9
(Mo. 1964) (appeal from garnishee action instituted to collect $15,000 judgment); ci.
Pruellage v. De Seaton Corp., 380 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1964), trans'd (interest included in
action to revive judgment); Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 358 Mo. 65, 213 S.W.2d 416
(1948) (revival of foreign judgment); Missouri, Kan. & E. Ry. v. Watson, 64 Mo. App.
465 (1896), transd, 144 Mo. 253, 45 S.W. 1101 (1898) (injunction action to restrain
collection of judgment).
86. An example would be a suit on a promissory note. See Roethemeier v. Veith,
341 Mo. 706, 108 S.W.2d 346 (1937); Huttig v. Brennan, 328 Mo. 471, 41 S.W.2d
1054 (1931).
87. Interest is included until the time of judgment. However, this does not mean until
all post-trial motions are filed and appeal is taken. Harrison v. Harrison, 334 S.W.2d
127 (Mo.), trans'd, 339 S.W.2d 509 (Ct. App. 1960).
88. The leading case is Schwyhart v. Barrett, 223 Mo. 497, 502, 122 S.W. 1049, 1050
(1909), trans'd, 145 Mo. App. 332, 130 S.W. 388 (1910); accord, Harrison v. Harrison,
supra- note 87.
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In tort cases interest is never included because it does not begin to accrue
until after the judgment. This result is reached in tort cases in which
plaintiff's recovery is reduced by remittitur. If plaintiff recovers a judgment
for $16,000 and remits $2,000, the trial court normally enters a new judg-
ment for the smaller sum, in this example for $14,000. As in other tort
cases, no interest is included in determining jurisdictional "amount.""s
However, the supreme court has not adhered unfalteringly to its policy of
refusing to include interest which accrues after judgment. In State ex rel.
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Broaddus,90 plaintiff recovered judgment for $5,500
(jurisdictional "amount" was $4,500) but filed a remittitur of $1,000 while
post-trial motions were pending. The trial judge remitted plaintiff's verdict
on the record but erroneously failed to enter a new judgment. Defendant
was granted an appeal to the court of appeals from which it unsuccessfully
attempted to transfer the cause. After the trial court decision was affirmed
and a second motion to transfer overruled, the defendant petitioned the
supreme court for mandamus to compel transfer, contending that the
court of appeals decision was void because rendered without jurisdiction.
The supreme court issued the writ, concluding that the interest which had
accrued on the judgment to the date of remittitur made the "amount in
dispute" $4,632. The court upheld relator's contention that the original
judgment had not been nullified but was merely modified by the entry of
the remittitur and it subtracted the rernittitur as a "credit" on the record.
The respondent argued that the proper basis for jurisdiction was the
"amount" for which a new judgment should have been entered ($4,500)
on the ground that the remittitur had nullified the original judgment, but
the court rejected this argument apparently because such a holding would
have left respondent with no judgment. The court specifically quashed the
decision by the court of appeals by holding that the accrued interest was
not erased by the effect of the remittitur and that the appellant-defendant
would have had to pay the interest to satisfy the judgment. But it did not
89. For discussion of remittitur cases see note 59 supra.
90. 212 Mo. 685, 111 S.W. 508 (1908) (en banc), quashing Partello v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., 141 Mo. App. 162, 107 S.W. 473 (1908).
The argument made in the court of appeals by appellant was that he would have had
to pay the accrued interest at the time appeal was taken to satisfy the judgment. That
court, in refusing to transfer to the supreme court, noted that appellant could have paid
on the date the remittitur was entered which, just as on the day judgment was ren-
dered, would have cost the appellant no interest. A simpler answer is that interest always
accrues on a judgment and the amount-albeit very small-that would accrue before a
timely appeal, would frequently give supreme court jurisdiction of appeals from judgments
which themselves are insufficient. The question whether defendant would have to pay the
interest accrued on the judgment should have been extraneous to the question of inclusion
of interest in the "amount in dispute."
1 9.021 (b) (2)
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indicate why its holding that the original judgment was unimpeached
resulted in the inclusion of interest in the calculation of jurisdictional
",amount."9
'
Broaddus appears to be nothing more than an inexplicable departure
from the general rule that events subsequent to the judgment cannot be
included in the calculation of jurisdictional "amount" (in fact its applica-
tion has been limited to "remittitur" cases)2 By including the interest
91. The peculiar aspect of Broaddus is the effect given the remittitur by the court, for
had it based jurisdiction on the "amount" of the original judgment unaffected by the
remittitur, the result would have excluded interest; i.e., if the court had held that the
attempt to enter a remittitur was so defective that it could not be counted as a credit on
the record it probably would have held the "amount in dispute" to be exactly $5,500.
Thus if the original judgment in Broaddus had been for $4,500 and an attempt to remit
the judgment to $3,500 was held ineffective, the "amount in dispute" would have been
exactly $4,500, giving (at this time) jurisdiction in the court of appeals. Nor is there any
reason to differentiate this case simply because interest was allowed to accrue as a result
of the trial court's failure to enter a new judgment, because interest always accrues on a
judgment.
Clearly the court wanted to include the effect of the remittitur since it held the
"amount in dispute" was not the $5,500 original judgment. Since the trial judge errone-
ously failed to enter a new judgment, appeal must be from the original (the only) judg-
ment. But the court clearly reckoned the effect of the remittitur in its holding, so it
obviously based appeal on the original judgment as altered by remittitur. But by the time
the remittitur took effect, interest had accrued. The jurisdictional amount was thus
calculated by considering the $5,500 plus accrued interest of $132 and remitting that
total by $1,000.
92. Gray v. Doe Run Lead Co., 331 Mo. 481, 53 S.W.2d 877 (1932); Osborn v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 1 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1927). But see Barrett v. Stoddard County,
183 S.W. 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (remanded to circuit court to enter second judgment
where one had not been entered after remittitur-but for amount excluding accrued
interest); cf. McKim v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 209 S.W. 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919) (plain-
tiff's remittitur "threw off" accrued interest where second judgment actually entered but
first not set aside). In the normal remittitur case where a second judgment is entered after
the first has been set aside, interest begins to accrue from the time of entry of the second
judgment. Start v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 222 S.W. 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920). The
Gray and Osborn cases, supra, demonstrate the theory the court has adopted: if, after
remittitur without a new judgment, interest is not nullified and will be owing on the
judgment, it is included in the calculation of jurisdictional "amount." See Start v.
National Newspaper Ass'n, supra (plaintiff's remittitur could be worded to permit accrued
interest to remain payable).
The supreme court obtained jurisdiction in another case apparently on the Broaddus
principle. In Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153 (1938) (en banc), transd
from 107 S.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1937), the court of appeals transferred on the principle
that cross appeals put into dispute both the amount of plaintiff's recovery and the amount
plaintiff failed to recover against the co-defendant. However, the supreme court, refusing
the jurisdictional theory of the court of appeals, noted merely that it had jurisdiction be-
cause the respondent had recovered an amount "slightly in excess of $7,500" (the then
jurisdictional limit of courts of appeals). The "amount," as reduced by remittitur, was ex-
actly $7,500. The actual basis for the court's jurisdiction was uncovered from the court's
files by Lemonds v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 626, 628, 229 S.W.2d 691, 693 n.1 (1950) (en
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which accrued during the interim from the rendition of judgment until the
judgment in effect assumed its "appealable" form (i.e., modifying effect
given to remittitur), Broaddus represents one of the conflicting formulae
concerning the time at which jurisdiction is determined. It apparently
holds that jurisdiction is based on the record at the date the appeal is taken
and not on the state of the record when the judgment from which appeal
is taken was entered. 3
bane). In a footnote the court revealed that jurisdiction in Bunner was based on the
second judgment for $7,500 which had been entered after the first judgment had been
set aside by a remittitur of $2,500, plus the interest which had accrued from the time of
the first judgment until the second judgment was entered to give effect to the remittitur.
The court overlooked the fact that the Broaddus case was not in point because a second
judgment had been properly entered after the first had been set aside. The facts of Bunner
conform to the standard remittitur cases in which post-judgment interest is considered ir-
relevant. See, eg., Osborn v. Nelson, 141 Mo. App. 428, 126 S.W. 178 (1910), in which
the plaintiff voluntarily entered a remittitur for an amount slightly greater than ordered
by the trial court; as a result, the judgment entered-just within the court of appeals
monetary limit-determined jurisdiction.
The result in the Bunner and the Broaddus cases is an anomaly. Cases not involving
a remittitur adopt as axiomatic the principle that post-judgment interest is a "mere inci-
dent" and is not a product of the legal dispute. As a result, post-judgment interest is not
part of the "amount" included for jurisdiction, although it accrues on every judgment of
recovery and would have to be paid by the judgment debtor to satisfy the debt (the fact
apparently causing the Broaddus rule). The leading case excluding post-judgment interest
is Schwyhart v. Barrett, 223 Mo. 497, 122 S.W. 1049 (1909), trans'd, 145 Mo. App.
332, 130 S.W. 388 (1910); accord, Pyle v. University City, 318 Mo. 956, 1 S.W.2d 799
(1927), trans'd; see Harrison v. Harrison, 334 S.W.2d 127 (Mo.), trans'd, 339 S.W.2d
509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (interest accruing during pendency of after trial motions before
notice of appeal not includable). But see Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Kansas City
Transit, Inc., 339 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Mo. 1960), trans'd, 350 S.W.2d 828 (Ct. App.
1961) (dictum) (parenthetical indication that if appeal had not been taken on the
same date as judgment interest from judgment to date of appeal would have been in-
cluded).
A unique aspect of Schwyhart is that it cites and summarizes Broaddus, which
reaches the opposite result but does not comment on the apparent conflict. If the two
decisions were harmonious, the court's lack of discussion would be understandable, but
that Broaddus is contradictory on its face is inescapable. If the Schwyhart case can be
read as upholding Broaddus, the supreme court has never made it clear upon what ground
this is accomplished.
The basis for the decisions in Pyle and Schwyhart is that although the interest does
accrue and become part of the debt, it accrues after the judgment and therefore ought
not be included. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 408.040 (1959). This reasoning would pre-
clude with equal force inclusion of interest in a remittitur situation in which there were
two judgments, i.e., Bunner, or an appeal from a single judgment after crediting remit-
titur, i.e., Broaddus. Moreover, a contrary rule would permit an appellant to control the
forum of appeal in some cases by waiting until sufficient interest had accrued on the judg-
ment to be determinative of jurisdiction.
93. Compare the cases on "subsequent events" defeating jurisdiction (§ 9.021 (b) (1))
in which the court operates with a general rule that jurisdiction is not affected by events
that occur after appeal is taken. The problem the remittitur cases raise is whether juris-
§ 9.021 (b) (2)
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However, the recent case of Harrison v. Harrison,"' although apparently
disregarding Broaddus, destroyed that decision's only possible rational
foundation. In Harrison a suit for a liquidated sum resulted in a verdict
slightly below the requisite "amount," but by the time the appeal was filed,
the judgment including interest was in excess of the court of appeals' limit.
The supreme court rejected jurisdiction on the basis of the existing practice
to ignore accruing interest, but the case definitely supports the conclusion
that jurisdiction is determined on the record at the time the judgment is
entered because it unequivocally excluded interest which accrued during
the period in which post-trial motions were resolved and the judgment
became appealable."5
diction is determined by the judgment from which the appeal is taken at the time of its
entry, or by the state of the judgment and the disputed "amount" which it represents cal-
culated at the time appeal is filed. No case found recognized or discussed the potential
for difference in result the two formulae provide.
The cases determining jurisdiction unqualified by "subsequent events," use the lan-
guage that the jurisdiction must be determined "from the facts appearing in the tran-
script as of the time the appeal was taken." Yax v. Dit-Mco, Inc., 366 S.W.2d 363, 366
(Mo. 1963), discussed supra note 81. In Pierce v. Ozark Border Elec. Co-op., 378 S.W.2d
504 (Mo. 1964), discussed supra notes 66, 81, the court stated the rule that jurisdiction
is determined by the judgment at the date the appeal is filed and referred to the date
when appeal was taken as the date when jurisdiction vested. When using the corollary
principle that events after judgment cannot confer jurisdiction, the court views the judg-
ment at the time of rendition as the referent and holds that events which occur after
judgment but before filing of appeal (e.g., accruing interest) are not included in the cal-
culation of "amount." The language of the cases considering the problem of accruing in-
terest is the best example. Precisely in point is Harrison v. Harrison, 334 S.W.2d 127
(Mo. 1960), discussed supra note 92. The probable reason that the court has not dis-
tinguished between the time the judgment was entered and the time appeal was taken
therefrom, when it considers a "divestment" problem is that nothing would be likely to oc-
cur in the interim to reduce the "amount." This fact permits imprecision in the court's
language. However, in "conferring" jurisdiction cases, accruing interest and installment
payments make the time difference crucial, forcing the court to precisely assert that the
time at which the judgment is entered, as opposed to the time when appeal is taken there-
from, is the jurisdictional referent. Harrison v. Harrison, supra, holding that interest after
the judgment but before post-trial motions had been filed to make the judgment appeal-
able was not included.
94. 334 S.W.2d 127 (Mo.), trans'd, 339 S.W.2d 509 (Ct. App. 1960).
95. This holding would, in an installment award situation as well (see § 9.022(a)),
preclude basing jurisdiction in the supreme court on an "amount" including installments
accruing after the judgment until the time of appeal or appellate hearing. This is the
result apparently reached by the courts, since no case can be found in which the court
included the installments accruing during the interim. In light of the purpose of the
policy to minimize confusion and control of jurisdiction, it appears anomalous that events
can occur to defeat but not confer jurisdiction. See Feste v. Newman, 368 S.W.2d 713
(Mo. 1963) (en banc), discussed supra note 71. It is arguable that Feste would support
the rule if something occurs to increase the amount which is to be determined by the
decision on the merits, that amount is the "actual amount" and the "live issue subject
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9.022. Cases Where the "Amount" Is Indefinite or Incalculable
9.022(a). "Contingencies"
The general rules for "amount" determination are subject to the quali-
fication that the "amount in dispute" must affirmatively appear "inde-
pendent of all contingencies." When the facts necessary to establish juris-
diction are unclear or speculative because they cannot be satisfactorily
proved from the record, the supreme court will bolster its decision to transfer
by utilizing the "contingency" language. Notwithstanding that the language
is extensively used to indicate a failure of litigants to sustain the burden of
establishing the jurisdictional fact, the "contingency" principle itself de-
veloped from cases in which uncertainty existed about the precise "amount"
which could eventually be recovered under a judgment. In this context,
the principle means that to the extent that the disputed claim or award
involves a "right... not enforceable at all events,""6 it is "contingent" and
cannot support jurisdiction in the supreme court.
One class of "contingencies" includes cases in which a judgment affixes
liability for an amount, but the potential value of the award is dependent
upon the continued existence of certain operative facts. The most common
example is the case in which the award sought or obtained is payable in
installments which cease upon the occurrence of some future event. In
Stuart v. Stuart," a wife's appeal from an alimony award, the supreme
court set the tone for future installment cases by excluding from its defini-
tion of jurisdictional "amount" any part of the award which was not pay-
able at the date of judgment and which would cease to be payable if the
wife died or resumed conjugal relations. 8
to determination by the appellate court" in its increased form, but the court's policy of
restriction as opposed to expansion of its jurisdiction forecloses such a view.
The holding in Harrison-that the precise time when jurisdiction attaches is the entry
of the judgment-is important also in cases which reject the "divestment" or "condi-
tional jurisdiction" rule. These cases base jurisdiction on the value of the appeal at the
time it is taken, stating the rule that "events after the appeal is filed cannot operate to
defeat jurisdiction." Harrison would suggest that events after the judgment and before
the appeal cannot operate to defeat jurisdiction otherwise in the supreme court. Gen-
erally, the rule is: jurisdiction is determined by the state of the judgment from which
appeal is taken including only those parts of the judgment for which notice of appeal is
given, calculated at the date the judgment was entered.
96. Stuart v. Stuart, 320 Mo. 486, 488, 8 S.W.2d 613, 614 (1928), trans'd, 14
S.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1929).
97. Stuart v. Stuart, supra note 96.
98. Accord, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 251 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. 1952), transd, 257 S.W.2d 250
(Ct. App. 1953) (installment award which would cease on death or remarriage of wife
contingent), overruling Maxey v. Maxey, 203 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1947) (installment ali-
mony decree not contingent because enforceable during minority of dependent children) ;
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S.W.2d 556 (1949) (pay-
I 9.022(a)
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The court's second class of contingencies is illustrated by Cotton v. Iowa
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.9" in which plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment con-
cerning defendant insurance company's liability for plaintiff's injuries if
negligence was established against the individual defendant. The "amount"
determining jurisdiction was held not to be the coverage limit of the in-
surance contract (over the then jurisdictional limit) but the speculative and
"contingent" amount of a judgment or settlement which plaintiff might
eventually secure, precluding supreme court jurisdiction. At the time of
the declaratory judgment action, no personal injury suit had been filed.
The relief sought in the declaratory judgment cases is a declaration con-
cerning existence of liability if negligence is established; the question of
how much is "contingent" because the circumstance giving rise to a liability
may never arise.'
ment of trust income for life to beneficiaries rendered "indeterminate" total amount of
future income that would be paid); cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 149 S.W.2d 867 (Mo.),
trans'd, 156 S.W.2d 937 (Ct. App. 1941) (value of lease for life "contingent" on length
of tenant's life); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Toberman, 343 Mo. 613, 134 S.W.2d 45
(1939), trans'd, 235 Mo. App. 559, 140 S.W.2d 68 (1940) (increased annual revenue
payments to beneficiary for life "contingent" in action for investment of trust estate);
Grant v. Bremen Bank & Trust Co., 108 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. 1937), trans'd from court of
appeals, retrans'd (monthly trust payments to beneficiary "contingent" on length of his
life); MeCaskey v. Duffley, 335 Mo. 383, 73 S.W.2d 188 (1934), trans'd, 229 Mo. App.
289, 78 S.W.2d 141 (1935) (monthly rentals to continue as long as widow lived contin-
gent).
The most recent installment "contingency" demonstrates that a contingency can oper-
ate in reverse to defeat jursdiction. In Baer v. Baer, 364 Mo. 1214, 274 S.W.2d 298
(1954) (en banc), trans'd, plaintiff-appellant's claim was for alimony in gross of $75,000
but she obtained a decree of $500 per month for one year and $400 for each month
thereafter while she remained unmarried. She asserted jurisdiction in the supreme court
on appeal (in effect on a theory of inadequacy of recovery) on the ground that because
her judgment was "contingent, indefinite and uncertain" it had no jurisdictional value
(except for $6,000 which she would recover in any event) which could be subtracted
from her original claim of $75,000 to yield the necessary jurisdictional "amount." (The
normal formula for amount jurisdiction when plaintiff appeals inadequacy of his verdict
is to subtract the amount recovered from the amount claimed.) In rejecting this ingenious
theory, the supreme court stated that the judgment might be worth "either more or less"
than the $75,000 claimed. The court in effect held that even though in the usual
"contingency" case the terminable award would be considered of no definite value for
jurisdiction, in this case, because the husband might eventually pay $75,000 to satisfy
the judgment, the effect of the contingency worked in reverse. Its effect was to destroy
any basis for asserting that the claim for alimony in gross ($75,000) exceeded in value
the judgment obtained by an "amount" sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the supreme
court. Although this case is unique because the court looked to the maximum rather
than the minimum possible recovery, the result is consistent with the court's application
of the "contingency" principle.
99. 363 Mo. 400, 251 S.W.2d 246 (1952), trans'd, 260 S.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1953).
100. National Sur. Corp. v. Burger's Estate, 183 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1944), trans'd, 238
Mo. App. 730, 186 S.W.2d 510 (1945). In probate court the plaintiff surety corpora-
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9.022(b). Workmen's Compensation
The general rules of the "installment contingency" section apply to
awards in workmen's compensation cases which provide for payments in
tion sought to be discharged from future liability under a surety bond executed on the
estate of a minor on the theory that it was forced to assume a liability beyond that which
it was willing to accept. The amount of the bond ($30,000) did not determine jurisdic-
tion because the liability under the surety agreement was not presently existent but only
future and "contingent." See State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 378 S.W.2d 459 (Mo. 1964),
trans'd (whether tariff change would effect reduction in gross revenue or net savings
speculative and conjectural); Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Kansas City Transit, Inc.,
339 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. 1960), trans'd, 350 S.W.2d 828 (Ct. App. 1961) (partial costs of
future maintenance expenses "contingent"); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 251 S.W.2d
633 (Mo. 1952), trans'd, 259 S.W.2d 854 (Ct. App. 1953) (no definite "amount" in
action for declaration of non-liability on insurance policy when amount of claim against
insured not shown); cf. Warmack v. Crawford, 192 S.W.2d (Mo.), trans'd, 239 Mo. App.
709, 195 S.W.2d 919 (1946) (in will construction number of shares to be invested held
speculative when investment was discretionary). But see M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. South-
west Baptist College, Inc., 381 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1964). See also Missouri Managerial
Corp. v. Pasqualino, 323 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
Analogous cases indicate that if a definite claim has been filed it will determine juris-
diction although the issue on appeal does not directly involve the claim. An example is
the case in which the defendant interposes a release to plaintiff's petition. The issue of
the release is separated for trial and an appeal from the determination of its validity
must base jurisdiction on the "amount" of the petition. Bogus v. Birenbaum, 375 S.W.2d
156 (Mo. 1964); Conley v. Fuhrman, 355 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1962); Finley v. Smith,
170 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 352 Mo. 465, 178 S.W.2d 326 (1943). The
petition also determines jurisdiction if a third party plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his
claim-for any amount collected by the original plaintiff-against the third party defend-
ant. Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1961) (en banc). In Crouch there was
a three-judge dissent which asserted that the claim for an "amount" which might never
be recovered created a "contingency." The rationale of the cases in which a "contin-
gency" was held to exist (that no recovery might result even after a holding of liability)
is equally applicable to the "release" and "third party petition" cases. The fact that a
definite petition exists in these latter cases does not make it more certain that an
"amount" over the jurisdictional limit will eventually be recovered. That the existence of
a petition is sufficient to dispel any "contingency" indicates the emphasis placed by the
court on the simple and easily applied rule that the petition (unless colorable) controls.
See Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drane, 383 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1964). But cf. M.F.A.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southwest Baptist College, Inc., supra, which held that the supreme court
had jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action on a fire insurance contract which had
a $42,500 limit. No petition under the contract had been fied, but it appeared from
the record that if the company were liable it would have to pay the policy limit because
the insured building was completely destroyed. The question is thus raised (not wholly
answered by the cases) whether a fact of this kind provides an adequate substitute for a
formal petition.
These cases present a further problem usually discussed under the "collateral effects"
doctrine, §9.032(a). The "collateral effects" principle raises the question of whether the
claim on which jurisdiction is attempted to be based is relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.
The "contingency" test raises the question how much of the judgment is speculative.
But the "collateral effects" doctrine requires that the claim used for jurisdiction meet
the additional requirement that it be the "direct object" of the suit from which the
I 9.022(b)
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installments subject to termination. The court gradually restricted and
finally, in 1958,101 virtually eliminated the class of workmen's compensation
cases from its original jurisdiction docket. This factor, combined with the
increase of the jurisdictional limit of the courts of appeals, makes the prob-
lem of exclusive appellate jurisdiction in these cases virtually moot. Never-
theless, a thorough consideration of these cases is valuable because they
vividly illustrate the evolution of the Missouri courts approach to jurisdic-
tion.
Significantly, the court did not arrive at a jurisdictional theory in com-
appeal is taken. Authority exists-chiefly in the "non-money" cases discussed in notes
216-17 infra, which at least questions the directness of the relation between an appeal
litigating the validity of a "release" and a separate monetary claim that might eventually
be recovered. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 255 (Mo.
1962), trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1964). The body of cases discussing the "col-
lateral effects" problem is much less well developed than the "contingency" cases and
thus frequently causes difficulty in distinguishing the concepts. Generally, if the court is
unable to calculate the "amount" of the claim asserted, a "contingency" is involved,
whereas when the question is whether the amount should be considered at all, the prob-
lem is one of "collateral effects." The grey area between the two is illustrated by a case
the facts of which closely parallel the "release" cases. In Cooper v. Armour & Co., 6
S.W.2d 567 (Mo. 1928), trans'd from 277 S.W. 967 (Ct. App. 1925), retrans'd, 222
Mo. App. 1176, 15 S.W.2d 946 (1929), plaintiff was injured in defendant's employ and
while she was injured, her husband through his attorneys and without plaintiff's knowl-
edge filed suit for $3,000. Defendant, also without plaintiff's knowledge, confessed
judgment for that amount. Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the judgment in her favor
so that she could file suit for $50,000, the true extent of her injuries. This motion was
overruled and plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals. That court transferred on the
theory that the value of the relief to plaintiff was the ability to file suit for $50,000 and
therefore that was the "amount" for jurisdiction. The supreme court retransferred,
holding that the "gist" of the controversy was the authority of the husband's attorneys
to bring the first suit. The amount of her injuries set out in her motion to vacate the
judgment was "incidental." The court also noted that the "amount" for jurisdiction
must be "directly involved ... just as where jurisdiction is acquired because title to real
estate is involved." It relied on the fact that although the motion from which appeal
was taken laid plaintiff's damages at $50,000, no second suit had been filed. The ques-
tion thus raised, whether jurisdiction would have been in the supreme court had a sec-
ond suit actually been filed, appears to have been answered negatively:
She [plaintiff] merely wants to expunge the record of the first suit so that the road
will be clear to file another suit. This being true, it seems any inquiry about how
much she will be entitled to sue for in the second action ought not to determine
the jurisdiction on appeal in this case. Id. at 568.
One can conclude from the case that whether the second suit has been filed or not, it
is not relevant to the determination of the jurisdictional issue ("collateral effect") and
therefore cannot provide jurisdiction, and that even if the second suit has been filed a
real issue of how much ("contingency") exists. To the extent that the case rules on the
"contingency" issue decided in the "release" cases, its holding is contrary to the result
in those cases.
101. Snowbarger v. M.F.A. Cent. Co-op., 317 S.W.2d 390, (Mo. 1958) (en bane),
tranfd, 328 S.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1959), discussed infra note 119.
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pensation cases based on a commuted (projected) value despite the exis-
ence of strong precedent both in federal cases 0 2 and within the court's own
catalog of jurisdictional theory."' At the outset commuted value was
considered, utilized in some areas, then allowed to falter and finally rejected.
The court's abandonment of the commuted value determination of
"amount" in compensation cases was calculated to eliminate these cases
from its jurisdiction. As the number of workmen's compensation cases
burgeoned through the years without a corresponding increase in the juris-
dictional limits of the courts of appeals, the work load of the court from
these cases became onerous.' 0' Undoubtedly reinforcing the desire to ex-
clude the compensation cases was the feeling that the relative importance
of the cases had so far diminished that they were peculiarly within the
competence of the courts of appeals. Finally, the court's acquisition in 1945
of the ability to achieve uniformity of decision through an expanded super-
visory power apparently foreclosed entirely the necessity of original jurisdic-
tion in compensation cases.
9.022(b) (1). Temporary Disability
The earliest compensation cases did not consider the fact that an award
which was terminable created a "contingency."'0 5 Moreover, some cases
indicated that if the necessary data were available in the record, jurisdiction
could be based upon the value of the award reduced to present worth' and
a few cases did in fact base jurisdiction on the commuted value of the
102. The United States Supreme Court held in a compensation case that if the state
statute provides for a "single action" and a "single judgment" which is determinative of
the claimant's right to all the payments, the possible termination is "immaterial." The
fact conclusive of jurisdiction is that the right to the entire award is in issue. Aetna Gas.
& Sur. Co. v. Flowers, 330 U.S. 464 (1947).
103. Lending support to the view that jurisdiction could be based on the present value
of the installment award is the case of Schwyhart v. Barrett, 223 Mo. 497, 122 S.W. 1049
(1909), trans'd, 145 Mo. App. 332, 130 S.W. 388 (1910), and the numerous subsequent
decisions for which it forms the basis. The holding in Schwyhart-that jurisdictional
"amount" is determined by the amount for which the judgment could be satisfied on the
date of its rendition-expresses a general theory of jurisdictional "amount" determina-
tion, and would compel affixing a value to a judgment at the time it was entered.
104. Workmen's compensation cases were singled out as involving difficulties in de-
termining jurisdictional "amount" and as contributing a large portion of the cases in
which the "amount in dispute" only slightly exceeded the then jurisdictional limit. Ap-
PELLATE PRACTICE REPORT, discussed supra note 3.
105. Sleyster v. Eugene Donzelot & Son, 323 Mo. 822, 20 S.W.2d 69 (1929), trans'd
on other grounds, 223 Mo. App. 1166, 25 S.W.2d 147 (1930); Anderson v. Aetna Brick-
laying & Constr. Co., 27 S.W.2d 755 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).
106. E.g., Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co., 328 Mo. 899, 42 S.W.2d 573 (1931),
trans'd, 49 S.W.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1932).
§ 9.022(b) (1)
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installment formula." 7 However, these cases have been specifically over-
ruled.'
The statute prescribes compensation for temporary disability injuries to
be paid for a fixed number of dollars per week over a period of weeks not
to exceed a fixed number, with all payments conditioned on the continuance
of the disability."' The supreme court concluded that this kind of an award
created a "contingency" and held, in effect, that the formula attached a
kind of condition precedent to the unaccrued payments which excluded
these installments from the "amount in dispute." '
9.022(b) (2). Permanent Disability
The compensation for permanent disability prescribes a fixed sum for a
fixed number of weeks plus a fixed weekly sum for the continuance of the
claimant's life, the payments being subject to cessation upon his recovery
of the ability to work.1 ' This formula was considered by the court to be
more definite than that of the temporary disability award because the "con-
tingency" arose from the effect of a condition subsequent which would
operate in the future to cut off the award. 12 Nevertheless, several years after
its decision that temporary disability awards were "contingent," the court
held in Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co."' that to the extent that permanent
disability payments were not due at the time of appeal, jurisdiction was
defeated by a "contingency."
However, the Hardt case did not clearly define which part of the award
was contingent. A plausible interpretation was that only the part of the
award which provided for weekly payments for the remainder of the
claimant's life after expiration of the payments for the fixed number of
weeks was "contingent." In a carefully reasoned opinion, the St. Louis
107. Maddux v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 100 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. 1936); Schoen.
herr v. Stoughton, 336 Mo. 290, 78 S.W.2d 84 (1935), trans'd from court of appeals.
108. Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 340 Mo. 721, 102 S.W.2d 592, trans'd, 109
S.W.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1937).
109. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 287.170, .180 (Supp. 1961).
110. Platies v. Theodorow Bakery Co., 334 Mo. 508, 66 S.W.2d 147 (1933) (en
banc), trans.d, 79 S.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1935). After comparing the language of the
death award statute and the installment death award cases over which the supreme court
had jurisdiction on appeal, the court made a "clear distinction" based upon the indef-
inite "character" of "temporary disability" judgments.
111. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 287.190, .200 (Supp. 1961).
112. Cases cited note 107 supra, in which the court held it had jurisdiction of an
appeal from a judgment for permanent injuries without a discussion of its holding on
temporary injury awards.
113. 340 Mo. 721, 102 S.W.2d 592, trans'd, 109 S.W.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1937). The
court based its "contingency" theory squarely on its previous holding on temporary
awards and equated the two as involving the same kind of jurisdictional uncertainty.
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Court of Appeals, bolstered by its own conclusion that the nature of the
permanent award was intended to be more definite than the temporary
award, transferred to the supreme court a case in which the amount which
would be paid under the terms of compensation for a fixed number of weeks
exceeded the jurisdictional "amount.""' On transfer, the supreme court
rejected this distinction and retransferred, holding as "contingent" all
unaccrued payments under any part of the award formula."'
9.022(b) (3). Death Awards
In construing the death award statute, the court early held that the lan-
guage "single total death benefit""" envisioned an award that was definite
for the full value of its terms even though paid by installments. The fact
that an event after the judgment might cause the award to terminate before
an "amount" sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction had been paid did
not make the unaccrued payments "contingent." This reasoning was firmly
entrenched by an en banc decision,"' and repeatedly followed".. until 1958,
when the supreme court in Snowbarger v. M.F.A. Cent. Co-op."9 held that
114. Scannell v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 280 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955),
trans'd, 365 Mo. 899, 289 S.W.2d 122 (1956), retrans'd. In distinguishing the inherent
nature of temporary awards, the court of appeals relied on the statutory language, em-
phasizing that it provided payment under a condition precedent, while an award for
permanent disability would be terminated only upon action of the Industrial Commission
in creating a "different award which in no way vitiates the finality of the first award."
Id. at 488.
The ambiguous language in the Hardt decision was the real leverage for the distinc-
tion made by the court of appeals:
So in the case at bar, the award for permanent total disability was for 300 weeks at
$20 per week, or a total, at most, of only $6,000. It is true that respondent may
live long enough that he may receive a sum in excess [of the then jurisdictional
"amount"] .... Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 340 Mo. 721, 102 S.W.2d 592, 593
(1937). (Emphasis added.)
From this it certainly seemed legitimate for the court of appeals to conclude that if to
the award for 300 weeks had been added an amount for medical costs which was payable
at time of judgment to equal a sum over the jurisdictional limit, the supreme court would
have accepted jurisdiction.
115. Scannell v. Fulton Iron Works Co., supra note 114. In retransferring, the su-
preme court quoted the description of the award from which the appeal was taken in the
Hardt case. The language is significant because it emphasises the uncertain nature of
the total payments.
116. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.240(2) (Supp. 1961).
117. Shroyer v. Missouri Livestock Comm'n, 332 Mo. 1219, 61 S.W.2d 713 (1933)
(en banc). This case held that the computed value (arithmetic value) of the installment
formula was the amount and not the commuted value (present worth) because the
amount could be commuted only by application of the parties and in the discretion of
the commission.
118. E.g., Conley v. Meyers, 304 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1957), and cases cited therein.
119. 317 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1958) (en banc), trans'd, 328 S.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1959).
I 9.022(b) (3)
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there was "no magic in the words [of the statute] 'single total death bene-
fit.' 3120 The "contingency" in Snowbarger was the fact that the claimant's
widow might die or remarry, causing the payments to cease. But because a
widow might have dependent children whose right to the award would not
cease, even upon their deaths, the court quickly limited the decision to cases
in which the widow was the sole dependent. 21
9.023. Multiple Claims and Appeals
9.023 (a). Counterclaims
When a counterclaim is filed, for the purposes of determining jurisdic-
tional "amount in dispute," plaintiff and defendant exchange positions in
relation to defendant's claim.12 2 By treating the defendant as a "plaintiff"
on his counterclaim and applying standard rules, one can generally calculate
without difficulty the "amount" in cases involving a single appellant. If one
party appeals the other's recovery, the amount of the judgment (in favor
of plaintiff on his petition or in favor of defendant on his counterclaim)
For a discussion of this case see Garnett, Appellate Practice in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. Rv.
421, 422 (1959).
120. 317 S.W.2d at 394.
Snowbarger overruled the past decisions on the specific ground that the "amount
actually in dispute at the time the appeal was taken" was no more than the accrued
payments. The court indicated that Shroyer had erroneously concluded that the statu-
tory language "single total death benefit" meant the entire value of the award at a time
when some payments had not accrued and were subject to termination. Thus the court's
interpretation of the inherent nature of the death award gave it the same effect as an
award for temporary disability; in effect, unaccrued payments were subject to a condition
precedent, which was the continuation of the widow's dependency status. The court
stated:
[I]t is clear that what the statute really provides is that the employer shall pay
an employee's widow who is his sole dependent a sum not to exceed -dollars
(computed in a prescribed manner) at the rate of - dollars per week, such
payments to continue until such time as the maximum sum stated shall have been
paid or the widow remarries or dies, whichever shall first occur. Id. at 394. (Em-
phasis added.)
A comparison of this quotation interpreting the language in the death benefit statute
with the statutory language in the temporary disability award section reveals that the
court in Snowbarger, in effect, rewrote the death award statute to make it equivalent to
the temporary award formula in order to "be consistent in the application of the criteria
by which . . . jurisdiction is determined." Id. at 395.
121. Genarri v. Norwood Hills Corp., 322 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. 1959).
122. A party is a "plaintiff" or a "defendant" depending on the claim being consid-
ered. In Rivers v. Blom, 78 Mo. App. 142 (1899), trans'd, 163 Mo. 442, 63 S.W. 812
(1901), defendant appealed his non-recovery on his counterclaim for $4,511.47. "As to
the counterclaim the defendant was a plaintiff and the denial by the circuit court of
any right to recover thereon involves the amount claimed to be due under the counter-
claims .... " Id. at 143.
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fixes jurisdiction.1 2 Or if neither party recovers and the single appellant
appeals his non-recovery (on the original petition or on the counterclaim),
the "amount" of the petition or counterclaim governs. 2
Calculation becomes more difficult if the appellant includes as error in
his appeal the judgment as it determines the issues of both the original claim
and the counterclaim. If the appellant (plaintiff on his claim or defendant
on his counterclaim) appeals both his own non-recovery (or the inade-
quacy"' of his recovery) and the other party's recovery (whether defendant
on his counterclaim or plaintiff on his initial claim), the supreme court has
held that the sum or aggregate of both "amounts" determines jurisdiction. 2'
123. For discussion of the standard "defendant's appeal" rule see § 9.015. Whether
the defendant appeals plaintiff's recovery on the original claim or plaintiff appeals de-
fendant's recovery on his counterclaim should make no difference. E.g., State ex rel.
Lingenfelder v. Lewis, 96 Mo. 146, 8 S.W. 770 (1888) (defendant appeals plaintiff's
recovery). See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R. 84, 106 (1958). If defendant suffers an
adverse verdict on his counterclaim but is granted a new trial and plaintiff appeals, the
amount of defendant's counterclaim fixes jurisdiction. Albers Milling Co. v. Carney, 335
S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 341 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1960).
124. For discussion of the standard "plaintiff's appeal" rule see § 9.015. The
"amount" of counterclaim fixes jurisdiction when defendant appeals non-recovery. Con-
rad v. De Montcourt, 138 Mo. 311, 39 S.W. 805 (1897); Rivers v. Blom, 78 Mo. App.
142 (1899), trans'd, 163 Mo. 442, 63 S.W. 812 (1901); Forster Vinegar Co. v. Gug-
gemos, 24 Mo. App. 444 (1887), tras'd. The same result obtains if plaintiff also re-
covers but defendant appeals only his non-recovery. Luft v. Strobel, 322 Mo. 955, 19
S.W.2d 721 (1929). If relief is denied on both claims and only plaintiff appeals his non-
recovery, the petition governs. Bowzer v. Singer, 231 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950).
125. The standard rule on inadequacy is to subtract the amount recovered from the
total amount claimed. § 9.015, note 37 and accompanying text.
126. The procedure is to calculate separately by use of the standard rules the
"amount" for an appellant who appeals only his non-recovery (or inadequacy of recov-
ery) and the "amount" of respondent's recovery from which appeal is also taken; the
total of the two "amounts" is the aggregate "amount in dispute." For example, if plain-
tiff sued for $20,000 and defendant counterclaimed for the same amount and only de-
fendant recovered $10,000, on plaintiff's appeal-if he appeals both his non-recovery and
defendant's recovery-the jurisdictional "amount" is $30,000: $20,000 for plaintiff's
petition ($20,000 minus recovery if plaintiff alleges inadequacy) plus defendant's $10,000
recovery.
In Wilson v. Russler, 162 Mo. 565, 63 S.W. 370 (1901) (en banc), trans'd, 91 Mo.
App. 275 (1902), the plaintiff appealed defendant's recovery on the counterclaim. The
"amount" of the recovery added to the "amount" of the petition on which plaintiff
received an adverse verdict totaled over the jurisdictional "amount." In transferring, the
supreme court indicated that it would have aggregated the "amounts" of both claims had
not the plaintiffs at trial abandoned part of their claim. When next given an opportunity,
the court did aggregate. In State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v. Reynolds, 245 Mo. 698,
151 S.W. 85 (1912) (en banc), defendant appealed a $6,817 judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. He also insisted that because of his counterclaim the judgment should have
been in his favor for $2,656. Holding that $6,817 plus $2,656 was the "amount in dis-
pute," which exceeded the then jurisdictional limit, the court stated:
Take an a, b, c, case to illustrate: If Roe claims one dollar of Doe and the court
I 9.023(a)
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When both parties recover but only one party appeals the other's re-
covery, jurisdiction is based on the respondent's recovery alone, even though
the "net effect" of the judgment would be realized by subtracting the
amount of appellant's recovery. 2 ' However, a problem exists in counter-
claim cases in which both parties appeal. Since the amount for each ap-
pellant is calculated separately (using the same rules as for a single appel-
lant), it is possible that only one of the two appeals by itself involves the
requisite "amount." To avoid separate appeals to both appellate courts
from the same judgment, the supreme court developed the "consolidation"
principle 28 which vests both appeals in the supreme court if either is
sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction.2 9 Despite the lack of a decision
by the supreme court directly in point, analogous authority in cases involving
cross appeals suggests that if both parties appealed in a counterclaim situa-
not only takes that dollar from him but two dollars more and gives them to Doe,
evidently he is out of pocket and injured in the sum of three dollars, and, on Roe's
appeal, the amount in dispute would be those three dollars .... Id. at 704-05,
151 S.W. at 87.
Accord, Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1955) (plain-
tiff's non-recovery plus defendant's counterclaim recovery); Fulton v. City of Lockwood,
269 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1954) (plaintiff's non-recovery plus defendant's counterclaim recov-
ery); Dawson v. Scott, 330 Mo. 185, 49 S.W.2d 87 (1932) (defendant's non-recovery on
counterclaim plus plaintiff's recovery); Davis v. Hauschild, 238 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct.
App.), trans'd, 243 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1951) (defendant's non-recovery on counterclaim
plus plaintiff's recovery); Schmidt v. Morival Farms, Inc., 232 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1950), transd from supreme court, retrans'd, 240 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1951) (de-
fendant's non-recovery on counterclaim plus plaintiff's recovery); see Annot., 58
A.L.R.2d. 84, 108 (1958).
127. State ex rel. Lingenfelder v. Lewis, 96 Mo. 146, 8 S.W. 770 (1888); accord,
Federal Cold Storage Co. v. Pupillo, 346 Mo. 136, 139 S.W.2d 996 (1940), trans'd from
court of appeals.
128. The policy of consolidating separate appeals was first settled in cases involving
cross appeals from the same judgment. § 9.023(b).
129. Suppose that plaintiff sued for $20,000 and defendant counterclaimed for the
same amount. If both recover $15,000 and plaintiff appeals on the grounds that (1) his
verdict is inadequate by $5,000 and (2) on defendant's recovery of $15,000, the "amount
in dispute" is $20,000. If defendant also appeals the judgment of plaintiff's recovery for
$15,000 (or on the $5,000 inadequacy of his own recovery), the "amount" of his appeal
alone would be insufficient for supreme court jurisdiction. However, plaintiff's appeal
being sufficient for jurisdiction in the supreme court, the defendants appeal would also
be "consolidated" there. E.g., Townsend v. Maplewood Inv. & Loan Co., 351 Mo. 738,
173 S.W.2d 911, trans'd from 167 S.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1943). In this case the plaintiff
appealed non-recovery on his petition for an "amount" over the jurisdictional limit. De.
fendant also appealed apparently on the inadequacy of his counterclaim recovery. 'Al-
though the "amount" of defendant's appeal would not have been sufficient for jurisdic-
tion, it was consolidated with plaintiff's appeal in the supreme court. In this situation,
if the appeal which is for a sufficient "amount" is subsequently abandoned during the
pendency of the appeal, the remaining appeal will be transferred to the court of appeals.
Heuer v. Ulmer, 273 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1954), discussed supra note 71.
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tion and the "aggregate" of both appeals was over the jurisdictional limit,
the supreme court would have jurisdiction-even though each individual
"amount" was below the limit.1 0
The policy of aggregating separate "amounts in dispute"-the principal
claim and the counterclaim-is used in all counterclaim situtations without
reference to the legal issues involved. However, a line of cases, now ap-
parently overruled, developed in which the "aggregation" principle was
held inapplicable.
In 1950 the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Hoefel v. Hammel.. set apart
the situation in which the legal issues involved in both parties' claims are
"merged." The court defined merger as: claims by the plaintiff and
defendant "which could not exist together," so that a finding for one party
on his claim ipso facto determines the case against the other party's claim." 2
This results when the litigation involves a single issue on which both sides
claim damages but only one side can recover. In Hoefel, an automobile
collision case (at a time when the jurisdictional limit was $7,500), plaintiff
sued for $10,800, defendant counterclaimed for $11,800, and defendant
recovered $5,000, while the plaintiff recovered nothing. When plaintiff
received a new trial on defendant's recovery and his own claim, defendant
appealed to the court of appeals. The court recognized that the general
"reinstatement" rule which applied when a party appealed a new trial order
130. Assume the same facts hypothesized in note 129 supra except that plaintiff ap-
peals only defendant's recovery of $15,000 and defendant appeals only plaintiff's recovery
of $15,000. It is clear that each individual "amount" is insufficient for supreme court
jurisdiction (over $15,000), but when aggregated the "amounts" of the two appeals
equal $30,000. In this context "aggregation" is used to total the amounts of more than
one appeal from the same judgment. The "aggregation" principle is also used to total
the "amount" of one appellant when he does not appeal merely his non-recovery or the
other party's recovery, but appeals both. Thus it is possible to use the principle to de-
termine the aggregate "amounts" of each party's appeal and then to aggregate both ap-
peals to determine the aggregate "amount in dispute." On the exact facts in note 129
supra, plaintiff's aggregate individual appeal was for $20,000. The appeal of defendant
(who appealed from only the inadequacy of his recovery) was $5,000. Therefore, the
aggregate "amount" of both appeals is $25,000. Cf. Douglas v. City of Kansas City, 147
Mo. 428, 48 S.W. 851 (1898). See cases cited § 9.023(b) (2). One explanation why
the court has not, in any case found, directly decided this point in a counterclaim con-
text is that when both parties appeal, the individual "amount" of one is generally alone
sufficient. The court will normally cut short its jurisdictional statement by noting that
one appeal was sufficient (impliedly based on a consolidation idea) without specifically
considering aggregation. See Townsend v. Maplewood Inv. & Loan Co., supra note 129.
However, the court did specifically aggregate in a recent counterclaim case involving a
special problem. Cases cited note 146-47.
131. 228 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950); accord, Smith v. Rodick, 286 S.W.2d 73
(Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
132. Id. at 405.
I 9.023(a)
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(reinstatement of defendant's verdict would give an "amount" of $5,000"')
was modified by the "aggregation" principle because the new trial erased
defendant's recovery and put plaintiff's original claim back in issue. Aggre-
gation would clearly have given supreme court jurisdiction.13 However, the
court declined to aggregate and held that because of the merger of issues
the only dispute involved (and the only jurisdictional "amount") was the
$5,000 verdict defendant sought to have reinstated.
The "merger" doctrine begun by Hoefel in a "new trial" context faltered
in its inception,"3 5 but was eventually adopted and expanded by the supreme
court in Jameson v. Fox.'36 On the authority of Hoefel, the court extended
the "merger" principle to a defendant's appeal of both plaintiff's recovery
($1,000) and non-recovery on his counterclaim ($25,900), and concluded
that it did not have jurisdiction.
The rationale of the two cases-that "aggregation" is inapplicable when
only one party can recover-is persuasive. Since both issues are merged
into one on appeal, the "amount" of the one dispute (plaintiff's recovery
133. The general "new trial" rules (§ 9.025) indicate that the "reinstatement" rule
makes the jurisdictional "amount" equal to the amount of appellant's verdict erased by
the order for new trial. Because the amount of defendant's recovery in Holc was rela-
tively large, the court's holding that it is the sole jurisdictional "amount" is plausible and
may reflect influence of the "reinstatement" principle.
134. The "aggregation" cases cited note 126 supra, indicate that the defendant could
aggregate the "amount" of his recovery ($5,000) plus the "amount" of plaintiff's peti-
tion ($10,800) to yield an "amount" over the $7,500 limit of the court of appeals' juris-
diction. Actually, in this case, the one "amount" being sufficient would permit consoli-
dation. However, in this context the court does not distinguish the principles, and it
is unnecessary to do so for analysis. See the explanation in note 157 infra.
135. Nickels v. Borgmeyer, 246 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952), trans'd, 256 S.W.2d
560 (Mo.), retrans'd on other grounds, 258 S.W.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1953), involved a
straight appeal by defendant from both a judgment in plaintiffs' favor for $5,150 and
on defendant's counterclaims for $4,000. The court of appeals recognized that the case
involved "single" or "merged" issues but held that the Hoefel holding involved an "en-
tirely different question." Id. at 384. Clearly Hoefel was directly in point as was stated
by the dissenting opinion. Nevertheless, the court of appeals transferred to the supreme
court after cogently stating the theory of the "aggregation" principle and apparently
having examined the validity of its earlier holding in Hoe!ci. However, the fact that the
court transferred on "doubt" did not persuade the supreme court to decide the obviously
troublesome issue because it made a summary retransfer based on appellant's failure to
file proper post-trial motions. Thus the clear principle enunciated in Hoeel was made
unclear by both its parent court and the supreme court, and it was not until Jameson v.
Fox, 364 Mo. 237, 260 S.W.2d 507 (1953), discussed infra note 136, that the situation
was clarified.
136. 364 Mo. 237, 260 S.W.2d 507 (1953), trans'd, 269 S.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1954).
The Jameson decision expanded the holding in Hoeel, because the latter decision in-
volved a "reinstatement" problem. Note that in a later case before Jameson was over-
ruled, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals' holding in Hocfel that the
"merger" principle was applicable in a new trial context. Note 143 infra.
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which defendant moves to set aside or defendant's counterclaim recovery
which plaintiff seeks to expunge) fully represents the issue of non-recovery
and it is unnecessary to calculate both "amounts." But the rationale is in-
harmonious with the basic theory of "amount" rules which are designed to
reflect the benefit or loss to either party resulting from determination of the
issues.
1 37
Another problem with the "merger" doctrine is its difficulty of applica-
tion in several situations. One difficulty would arise in a case in which
plaintiff claimed an "amount" over the jurisdictional limit but lost to a
defendant who had recovered on a counterclaim for only nominal property
damages. A plaintiff accustomed to the value of the petition rule could
easily fail to appreciate that defendant's property damage recovery vested
jurisdiction in the court of appeals and might appeal directly to the supreme
court. In fact this is what happened in the two recent cases in which the
supreme court rejected the "merger" doctrine."' Furthermore, merger of
137. The rule stated in every case involving non-money relief (§ 9.030) is that juris-
diction is based on the value of the relief to plaintiff or the loss to defendant or vice
versa. This is the foundation principle of every jurisdictional "amount" test, and is,
therefore, central to the "aggregation" policy.
It is likely that the "merger" policy was adopted to limit the court's jurisdiction. In
general, the court has developed rules toward that end although the "aggregation" prin-
ciple is a notable example of a policy which expands the court's jurisdiction.
138. Wilson v. Tonsing, 375 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1964), was submitted to Division Two
in the September Session, 1962. Plaintiff appealed from an adverse verdict on her claim
of $16,765 and a judgment in defendant's favor for $164.50. Plaintiff-appellant's juris-
dictional statement, Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-2, indicates either that appellant considered
the "amount in dispute" to be the aggregate of her petition and defendant's recovery,
or only her petition. Either would have given the supreme court jurisdiction (although
both violated the merger rule) and the jurisdictional statement is ambiguous as to appel-
lant's theory. It appears that the question of jurisdiction in Wilson was raised on oral
argument and the case was twice reassigned. While Wilson was pending, Endermuehle
v. Smith, 372 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1963), was submitted in the January Session, 1963 to
Division One and transferred en banc. In the Endermuehle case, which involved facts
parallel to Wilson, appellant-respondent's jurisdictional statement clearly indicates that
her theory of jurisdiction was that her petition alone was the "amount in dispute." Brief
for Appellant, pp. 1-2. This was disputed by respondent who also filed a jurisdictional
statement, Brief for Respondent, pp. 1-6, in which the existing authorities were carefully
considered and the conclusion drawn that the jurisdictional "amount" was defendant-
respondent's $100 judgment. These cases indicate that the merger rule was confusing
to the bar-especially in cases in which the amount of the respondent's recovery was
so slight that it would have been anomalous to have allowed it to obstruct jurisdiction
in the supreme court when respondent's failure to recover at all clearly would have given
supreme court jurisdiction. See McDonald v. Logan, 364 Mo. 382, 261 S.W.2d 955
(1953). In Palmer v. Lasswell, 279 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), trans'd, 287
S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1956), the plaintiff sued for an amount over the court of appeals'
limit; defendant counterclaimed for an amount less than the limit. Judgment was for
defendant on both claims, but the jury assessed his damages at "nothing." On plain-
tiff's appeal, the court of appeals properly transferred to the supreme court. The court's
discussion of the fact that defendant had abandoned his counterclaim so that it was
J 9.023(a)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss4/11
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
issues is difficult to detect in cases other than automobile collision cases-
most cases following Jameson were of this nature"0 although some were
contract cases.14 As a result, the supreme court found it had jurisdiction of
several contract cases which it apparently could have transferred on the
merger principle. 41
Although not specifically overruled, the "merger" doctrine is apparently
not the present law. In a 1957 decision which involved facts similar to
Hoefel v. Hammel 4 -- the first "merger" decision in a case in which the
no longer a "live issue" upon which the "merger"' principle could be invoked seems
unnecessary because it is likely that plaintiff's petition would have controlled even if
defendant had kept his counterclaim alive, since he had recovered nothing upon it. Sec
note 143 infra.
In Williams v. Kaestner, 332 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960), plaintiff sued for
$2,905, defendant counterclaimed for $7,500. Plaintiff was granted a new trial after
neither party recovered. On defendant's appeal of the new trial order, the court re-
tained jurisdiction, holding that defendant's counterclaim ($7,500) was the "amount in
dispute" because it was "the largest of the two claims." Id. at 25.
139. E.g., Wilkerson v. Smith, 366 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Stonefield v.
Flynn, 347 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Williams v. Kaestner, supra note 138.
140. Smith v. Rodick, 286 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (money had and re-
ceived) ; Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Cervantes, 278 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) (suit
on agency contract for commissions and counterclaim for those already paid); Willibald
Schaefer Co. v. Blanton, 264 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (both sides claimed
damages on issue of who caused non-delivery).
141. In Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1955),
the issue was whether plaintiff could plead his infancy to disaffirm a contract. He bor-
rowed money from defendant and paid back $4,450 leaving a balance of $3,780. Plain-
tiff sued for the amount he paid in an action in which defendant counterclaimed and
recovered ($3,780). Plaintiff appealed his non-recovery and defendant's recovery
which aggregated ($8,230) over the then jurisdictional limit. The supreme court ap-
plied the "aggregation" rule to retain jurisdiction, but the "merger" principle could
have been applied since plaintiff would recover all and defendant take nothing or vice
versa depending on determination of the disaffirmance issue. Although the fact is not
mentioned in the supreme court's opinion, the case was originally filed in the court of
appeals which transferred without opinion to the supreme court because appellant's
jurisdictional statement indicated that "aggregation" would give supreme court juris-
diction. Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-2 (No. 28,943 filed in the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
refiled in the supreme court No. 44,666).
Fulton v. City of Lockwood, 269 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1954) (en banc), involved the
validity of an employment contract under which plaintiff had been partially paid $2,500.
Plaintiff sued to recover the balance of $6,380; defendant contended the contract was
void because not lawfully authorized by the city and counterclaimed to recover the $2,500
paid. Defendant was successful on both claims and recovered a judgment for the $2,500,
from which plaintiff appealed. The supreme court retained jurisdiction ("amount" was
$8,880) specifically invoking the "aggregation" principle, although it recognized that
the "main issue is whether plaintiff's contract is ultra vires and void." Id. at 3. Because
determination of that issue would apparently have "let the winner take all," the "mer-
ger" doctrine, although not mentioned, would seem to have been applicable and could
have required transfer to the court of appeals.
142. 228 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950), discussed supra note 131.
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appellant sought to reverse the trial court's granting a new trial-the su-
preme court held it had jurisdiction without considering Hoefel.'" Then
in a 1963 en banc decision, the supreme court reached a result clearly con-
trary to Jameson.
The case was Endermuehle v. Smith."' The facts of the case-plaintiff-
appellant sued for $22,550, defendant counterclaimed and recovered $100
-peculiarly pointed up the "merger" doctrine's departure from the policy
of "aggregation." Plaintiff's appeal was obviously not designed only to set
aside the adverse recovery of $100-the premise of the Jameson decision.
Rather, she sought a second trial on her claim of $22,550. The decision was
that her claim was in dispute, giving the supreme court jurisdiction. It is
significant, however, that the court did not rest its decision on the amount
of plaintiff's claim.
[A]ctually the money amounts of the appellate-jurisdictional decisive
"deny and grant" monetary impact upon appellant of the appealed-
from judgment in defendant-respondent's favor and against plaintiff-
appellant are in aggregate amount $22,650."'
By including both the "amounts" of plaintiff's claim and the defendant's
recovery, the court's decision marks a return to the principle of "aggrega-
tion" in all counterclaim cases.'" Although the only case which has fol-
lowed Endermuehle involved parallel facts, 4" aggregation will probably be
applied in all counterclaim situations without regard to the type of issue,
143. Harris v. Rowden, 305 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1957). In a suit for approximately
$17,940, defendant counterclaimed for $20,000. The verdict was for defendant on
plaintiff's claim and also for defendant on his counterclaim with damages set at $5,500.
Plaintiff was granted a new trial and defendent appealed. If the court had employed
Hoefel, the "amount in dispute" would have been the $5,500 verdict, but the court
explicitly "aggregated" both plaintiff's claim and defendant's verdict ($23,440). Brief
for Appellant, pp. 1-2, indicates that this was the theory of appellant's jurisdictional
statement. However, the authority in point cited by both the appellant and the court-
McDonald v. Logan, 364 Mo. 382, 261 S.W.2d 955 (1953), discussed supra note 138-
involved facts similar to Harris except that neither party had recovered, making the
"merger" principle completely inapplicable. It was therefore no authority for the result
in Harris. Harris was clearly a de facto overruling of the Hoefel case, and to that extent
contrary to the "merger" doctrine.
144. 372 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1963) (en bane), discussed supra note 138; accord,
Wilson v. Tonsing, 375 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1964), discussed supra note 138.
145. 372 S.W.2d at 466-67. (Emphasis added.) In her jurisdictional statement,
appellant advanced the theory that the "amount in dispute" was determined solely by
the petition and not the "aggregate" of the petition and defendant's recovery. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 1-2.
146. See cases cited note 126 supra, especially State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v.
Reynolds, 245 Mo. 698, 151 S.W. 85 (1912) (en banc).
147. Wilson v. Tonsing, 375 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1964), discussed supra note 138.
I 9.023 (a)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1964/iss4/11
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the motives for the appeal or the relative "amounts" of the individual
claims.248
9.023(b). Multiple Amounts
The "consolidation" and "aggregation" principles illustrated in the pre-
vious section are applicable generally. The principles are used to determine
jurisdictional "amount" in cases in which a single appeal is filed-involving
one or several appellants-and in cases involving cross appeals. When
appeals are taken from several consolidated cases the principles are applica-
ble if the appeals are from the same judgment.'49
9.023(b) (1). Consolidation
"Consolidation" is defined as collecting in one appellate court all appeals
from the same judgment. Its purpose is to prevent the "fractionalization"
which would result if two appellate courts decided appeals from the same
148. Although the two recent decisions are clearly opposite to the "merger" doctrine,
they do not expressly overrule the existing "merger" holdings. The extreme facts of the
two cases were clearly influential because the results might not have been reached if the
defendant's recovery in each case had not been a nominal sum. However, these holdings
subject the doctrine to serious question-even in cases similar to those which gave it its
start and in which the rationale is quite plausible (e.g., where the "merged" jurisdic-
tional "amount" is larger than merely nominal damages). Noteworthy is the fact that
Shepard's Missous CIrrATOR indicates only that the two cases "distinguish" Jameson
v. Fox. In this connection, see Storckman, J., dissenting in Feste v. Newman, 368
S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. 1963) (en bane), discussing the effect appellate decisions have
on jurisdictional confusion.
The motives for filing the counterclaim also play a part in the "merger" rule. The
result in the two recent cases would be less compelling in a case in which the defendant
had counterclalmed for an amount, which, by itself or aggregated with plaintiff's re-
covery, was designed to insure supreme court jurisdiction. In a large number of cases,
defendants do counterclaim and the result is a potential carte blanche jurisdiction in the
supreme court. The court can use its rule that colorable or frivolous claims are dis-
counted, but it is difficult for this to be an efficacious sanction in this context because
of the customary deference exhibited towards personal injury petitions. This point was
made by the dissent in Endermuehle in which it was noted that the court's "dockets are
crowded with enough cases... [having genuine monetary jurisdiction] and should not be
burdened with cases wherein the jurisdictional amounts are illusory." 372 S.W.2d at 470.
Problems of this kind are illustrated in the Brief for Respondent, pp. 1-9 (supplemental
statement on transfer en banc) in the Endermuehle case. The respondent criticized the
divisional opinion (apparently similar to the opinion later adopted by the court en
banc) for its use of the "deny and grant" theory since this would allow a "staggering"
number of cases to reach the supreme court.
Clearly, there are competing policies within the "merger" rule. Its premise appears
logical in some cases, ludicrous in others, such as Endermuehle; its application is simple
in some cases, difficult in others. While it provides the potential for abuse and a great
expansion of the court's jurisdiction, its non-use is contrary to the underlying theory of
jurisdictional "amount."
149. § 9.023(b) (3).
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judgment.' Appeal by a single appellant involves "consolidation" if the
basis for the appeal is non-recovery or liability on several counts of a peti-
tion and only one count is above the jurisdictional limit. 5 ' If defendant
appeals recovery of three verdicts by three plaintiffs joined in one action
and only one verdict is sufficient for the supreme court all the appeals will
be consolidated in that court. 2 Similarly, if several plaintiffs in the same
action appeal non-recovery on their individual claims and only one claim
exceeds the jurisdictional limit the supreme court has jurisdiction of the
entire appeal." 3
The supreme court early held that it would consolidate cross appeals
from a judgment when one of the appeals satisfied its "amount" jurisdic-
tion.5 Typical of "consolidation" in cross appeals are cases in which the
plaintiff who sued in several counts, appeals non-recovery on one count
while the defendant appeals the plaintiff's recovery entered on the second
count and the appeal of only one party is within the jurisdictional
"amount."' 55 A parallel situation exists when the plaintiff sues two defend-
150. For illustrations of "fractionalization" see Feste v. Newman, 368 S.W.2d 713, 718
(Mo. 1963) (en bane) (dissenting opinion), discussed supra note 71; Kitchen v. City
of Clinton, 320 Mo. 569, 8 S.W.2d 602 (1928), discussed infra note 175. See also
Morton v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 280 Mo. 360, 217 S.W. 831 (1920), trans'd
from court of appeals.
151. Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W.2d 481 (1948) (plaintiff
appealed inadequacy of verdict against first defendant and non-recovery against second).
152. E.g., McComb v. Vaughn, 358 Mo. 951, 218 S.W.2d 548 (1949); see Barnard
v. Murphy, 365 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1963) (defendant appealed judgment in two con-
solidated actions one of which involved sufficient "amount").
153. E.g., Kungle v. Austin, 380 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1964), in which the father sued as
next friend for his daughter ($35,000) and in his own name for medical expenses in-
curred in her treatment ($2,500).
154. The foundation case is Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198 (1891).
The "amount" of plaintiff's appeal from non-recovery on three counts of a single cause of
action exceeded the jurisdictional limit. Defendant who lost on the fourth count also ap-
pealed but his liability was insufficient for supreme court jurisdiction. In holding that the
cross appeals were properly "consolidated" for its determination, the supreme court
established the policy that currently prevails:
The entire judgment [when more than one party appeals to the supreme court]
is thus brought here for review. In such a state of the case we think the consti-
tution does not contemplate successive hearings in the cause, first of one appeal in
this court, and then of the other by the courts of appeals. Id. at 280, 16 S.W. at
200.
Accord, Sandusky v. Sandusky, 265 Mo. 219, 177 S.W. 390 (1915); Snoqualmi
Realty Co. v. Moynihan, 179 Mo. 629, 78 S.W. 1014 (1904).
155. E.g., Compte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1964); Snoqualmi Realty Co. v.
Moynihan, supra note 154; Washington Say. Bank v. Butchers & Drovers Bank, 61 Mo.
App. 448 (1895), trans'd. Analogous are cases in which plaintiff appeals the
inadequacy of his verdict and defendant cross appeals asserting complete non-liability.
Consolidation is often necessary in these cases because defendant's cross appeal does not
involve an "amount" sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction. E.g., Coonce v. Missouri
I 9.023(b)(1)
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ants but recovers against only one. Plaintiff's appeal from the verdict for
the first defendant and the appeal by the second defendant from the verdict
against him are "consolidated" in the supreme court if one appeal involves
the requisite "amount.' 15
9.023(b) (2). Aggregation
The principle of "aggregation" which developed from "consolidation,"' 7
may be defined in the following way: supreme court jurisdiction is based
Pac. R.R., 347 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961), trans'd, 358 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1962);
Brown v. Holman, 220 S.W. 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920), trans'd, 292 Mo. 641, 238 S.W.
1065 (1922).
156. E.g., Brown v. Reorganized Inv. Co., 350 Mo. 407, 166 S.W.2d 476 (1942);
Morton v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 280 Mo. 360, 217 S.W. 831 (1920), trans'd
from court of appeals.
Cross claims frequently involve "consolidation" issues in determining jurisdictional
"amount." If plaintiff recovers against two defendants who appeal and one defendant
also appeals dismissal of his cross claim against the other defendant, jurisdiction of both
appeals will be in the supreme court if either plaintiff's recovery or the defendant's
cross claim petition is sufficient. Levin v. Caldwell, 285 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1956).
Similarly, if the suit involves a third party petition, the supreme court will have juris-
diction of appeals by both the defendant (third party plaintiff) from dismissal of his
claim for attorney's fees against the third party defendant and by the third party de-
fendant from a verdict (over the jurisdictional limit) on the damage claim in favor of
the third party plaintiff. Ward v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Go., 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo.
1964). For a careful and accurate statement of the jurisdictional issues in this kind of
third party petition case, see Brief for Appellant (Third Party Plaintiff), pp. 1-2, Ward
v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra.
When plaintiff sued two defendants and recovered against one but appeals non-
recovery against the second, the "amount" of plaintiff's appeal is fixed by his original
petition even though plaintiff recovered the entire amount of his claim against the
first defendant. Brown v. Reorganization Inv. Co., supra; see Siemer v. Schuermann
Bldg. & Realty Co., 381 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. 1964); Bailey v. Canadian Shield Gen. Ins.
Co., 380 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. 1964). If plaintiff recovered the entire amount of his petition
against the first defendant, it is apparently not necessary for him to assert that the first
defendant is insolvent or that his judgment is uncollectable. See Bailey v. Canadian
Shield Ins. Co., supra. Note the qualification of Lemonds v. Holmes, 360 Mo. 626, 229
S.W.2d 691 (1950) (en banc), discussed supra note 33.
157. The first case to consider "aggregation" was Reichenbach v. United Masonic
Benefit Ass'n, 112 Mo. 22, 20 S.W. 317 (1892), trans'd from 47 Mo. App. 77 (1891),
retrans'd, which was transferred to the supreme court on an "aggregation" theory. In
the next case, jurisdiction was based on the aggregate of plaintiff's appeal of inadequacy
(involving approximately $1,464) and defendant's appeal of plaintiff's recovery ($1,218).
Each "amount" was insufficient (the then jurisdictional "amount" was $2,500), but the
court totaled the two "amounts" and held the full $2,682 was in dispute. Douglas v.
City of Kansas City, 147 Mo. 428, 48 S.W. 851 (1898):
We hold that when there are cross appeals in the same case, and the aggregate
amount in dispute in both appeals exceeds $2,500, the supreme court has juris-
diction; in other words, that the amount really in controversy between the parties
as the case stands in the appellate court, and which will be concluded by thejudgment to be rendered by such court in disposing of the appeal of both parties,
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on the total of several "amounts" whether (1) a single appellant appeals
non-recovery or liability in several forms, (2) appeal is taken by several
parties as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, or (3) cross appeals are filed.
The simplest form of "aggregation" is employed when a party appeals a
judgment which denies his recovery on several counts or causes of action. 5 '
The corollary requires "aggregation" when a defendant appeals a judgment
for plaintiff giving recovery on several claims.'59
furnishes the test of appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 433, 48 S.W. at 852. (Court's
emphasis in part.)
But see State ex rel. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Reynolds, 278 Mo. 695, 213 S.W.
804 (1913) (en bane), in which the court held that because neither cross appeal in-
volved an "amount" over the limit, although the aggregate was over, the court of
appeals had original jurisdiction.
In announcing that the court would use the "aggregation" principle, the court in
Douglas relied on Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198 (1891), discussed supra
note 154. Ellis held that jurisdiction of one appeal in the supreme court would cause
all appeals from the same judgment to vest in the supreme court. By equating the
jurisdictional issues in "aggregation" and "consolidation," the court manifested its posi-
tion that "amount in dispute" is not that which affects either appellant, but the
"amount" representing the prospective total effect of the court's decision.
The problem of distinguishing "aggregation" and "consolidation" originates in the
failure of the court in Douglas, in which neither appeal alone involved a sufficient
"amount," to distinguish Ellis, in which one of the appeals did lie to the supreme
court. In view of the purpose of "consolidation"--to prevent "fractionalization"-the
development of the "aggregation" principle does not appear to be a logical necessity;
in situations in which "aggregation" applies there is no possibility that two appellate
courts will hear appeals from the same lawsuit. In fact, "aggregation" (as opposed to
"consolidation") appears to run counter to the court's usual tendency to restrict its
jurisdiction.
Admittedly, it is unnecessary in cases in which plaintiff appeals non-recovery on
several claims (cases cited note 158 infra) to distinguish (the courts do not) between
cases in which the total of all amounts must be aggregated to give the jurisdictional
"amount" and cases in which one claim is sufficient and the others are not. But in cases
involving appeals by multiple parties or cross appeals, in which conflicting authority
exists, the distinction is helpful.
158. See, e.g., Farmer v. Arnold, 371 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1963) ($15,000 for personal
injuries and $1,000 for property damage); Morrow v. Loeffler, 297 S.W.2d 549 (Mo.
1956) (garnishment for collection of judgment and attorney's fees); Berry v. Crouse,
370 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1964) (claim for
recovery of payments plus claim for interest). Compare Salle v. Holland Furnace Co.,
337 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1960), with Berry v. Crouse, supra. Both cases involved appeals
from a suit which plaintiff had unsuccessfully prosecuted for two separate claims. In
Salle one claim was sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction so the "consolidation" prin-
ciple was applicable. In Berry both claims were necessary to yield an "aggregate"
amount for supreme court jurisdiction. However, in these cases involving a single ap-
pellant it is unnecessary to make this distinction.
159. E.g., Cross v. Gimlin, 256 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1953). In this case, as in the
cases cited in notes 157-58 supra, the court found it unnecessary to distinguish "ag-
gregation" from "consolidation." Also in point are cases in which multiple plaintiffs
recover "amounts" which "aggregate" over the jurisdictional limit. Breshears v. Union
Elec. Co., 373 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1964).
§ 9.023(b) (2)
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If two plaintiffs appeal non-recovery their appeal "aggregates" the sep-
arate "amounts" claimed by each plaintiff. 6 ' Class actions are very similar.
When many parties are permitted to file one action and prosecute their
claims so that they may be resolved by one judgment, the "aggregate" of
the "amounts" claimed or recovered fixes jurisdiction. 61 In appeals by
several defendants from a judgment entered for plaintiffs in a consolidated
action, the jurisdictional "amount" is determined by the "aggregate" of the
plaintiff's verdict. 2
"Aggregation" is also used to determine appellate jurisdiction in cases
involving cross appeals. Therefore, if both plaintiff and defendant appeal
and the total of both appeals is sufficient, jurisdiction is in the supreme
court.
1 63
160. See Paisley v. Liebowits, 347 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1961), in which infant plain-
tiff recovered $7,500 personal injury damages and the father recovered slightly more
than $3,000 for special damages (the then jurisdictional limit was $7,500).
161. The applicable statute and rules are Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.070 (1959) and
Mo. SuP. CT. R. 52.08, .09, which provide that the multiple causes must be
so related that a single trial and judgment will determine their rights. E.g., O'Dell v.
Division of Employment Sec., 376 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1964) (947 employees' claims for
unemployment compensation benefits aggregated $218,757); Reis v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 373 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1963) (injunction to restrain sewer construc-
tion involving special benefit assessments aggregating $650,000); Barnard v. Murphy,
365 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1963) (defendant appealed two consolidated class actions in
which aggregate judgment sufficient); Wessler v. City of St. Louis, 242 S.W.2d 289
(Mo. Ct. App. 1951); see Flanigan v. City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1962)
(nine consolidated actions in which each plaintiff recovered $4,000 and defendant ap.
pealed); Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776 (1928)
(en banc) (injunction by several property owners). The leading case involving a large
number of consolidated actions in which the supreme court "aggregated" the juris-
dictional "amounts" of each party's appeal is City of St. Louis v. Essex Inv. Co., 356
Mo. 1028, 204 S.W.2d 726 (1947).
If the plaintiff purports to represent others similarly situated, the supreme court will
reject jurisdiction if it does not appear that the others were made parties to the pro.
ceeding and the jurisdiction amount is insufficient without "aggregating" the others'
"amounts." Corbett v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 4 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1928), trans'd,
223 Mo. App. 329, 17 S.W.2d 275 (1929). But see Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice &
Fuel Co., supra.
162. Still v. Travelers Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963) (four insurance
company defendants appeal judgments which aggregate slightly over $15,000); Priest v.
Deaver, 21 Mo. App. 209 (1886), trans'd (aggregation where plaintiff's verdict over
jurisdictional limit apportioned among several defendants with each individual "amount"
below limit); see Barnard v. Murphy, 365 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1963) (in defendant's
appeal from two consolidated cases the one which was sufficient was a class action
aggregating the "amounts" plaintiffs recovered); Washington Say. Bank v. Butchers &
Drovers Bank, 61 Mo. App. 448, 449 (1895), transd ("liability of the appealing de-
fendants amounts, in the aggregate, to more than $2,500, although individually each is
responsible for less").
163. E.g., Bakelite Co. v. Miller, 372 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1963); Darrah v. Foster,
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9.023(b) (3). Applicability
The problem arises whether the "consolidation" and "aggregation" prin-
ciples apply when appeals from separate claims involving the same or similar
parties or legal issues have been consolidated for trial or tried separately
and consolidated for appellate hearing. 6' When the supreme court first
considered the problem in Bradley v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 6' it
held that "amounts" of appeals from separate suits which had not been
consolidated for trial could not be aggregated. 6 In a later case, the court
355 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1962) (both plaintiff and defendant cross claimant appealed);
Wilson v. Buchanan County, 318 Mo. 64, 298 S.W. 842 (1927) (plaintiff appeals in-
adequacy and defendant asserts complete non-liability). In Sandy Bites v. Highway
Comm'n, 128 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939), trans'd, 347 Mo. 954, 149 S.W.2d
828 (1941), the court of appeals transferred on the theory of aggregation when plain-
tiff appealed non-recovery on his first two counts and defendant appealed plaintiff's
recovery on the last two counts. Its holding is dictum, however, as the court could
have transferred on the "consolidation" principle.
Although no mention is made of the basis for jurisdiction in Bakelite Co. v. Miller,
supra, the court obviously had jurisdiction based on the aggregate "amount in dispute."
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 1-2, contains the following basis for jurisdiction:
The jury found for the plaintiff on count I and gave a verdict for $12,000.00
principal plus $2,618.34 interest. The defendant appealed from this portion of thejudgment. The jury found against the plaintiff on count II and the plaintiff ap-
pealed from this portion of the judgment. The amount is thus in excess of the
sum of $15,000.00, to-wit $20,618.34.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 1 acquiesced in this statement. Also, it appears from
the briefs that the case was transferred from the court of appeals. But see Reames v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 359 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). In this case,
plaintiff sued for $25,000 and recovered $12,500. Both plaintiff and defendant ap-
pealed. The court did not consider the issue of jurisdiction but it seems clear that the
value of each appeal-plaintiff's on inadequacy, defendant's on the liability of the ad-
verse judgment-was $12,500, yielding an aggregate "amount" of $25,000. Interest-
ingly, the court of appeals in holding for defendant because plaintiff had not made a
submissible case under the humanitarian doctrine, indicated that "the issue of
inadequacy of damages raised by plaintiff ...is moot if the court finds for defendant
.... Therefore, we deem it proper to first render judgment in... [defendant's appeal]."
Id. at 235. Although plaintiff's appeal was properly before the court, it may not have
been considered in the calculation of "amount" on a theory akin to the "merger of
issues" doctrine in counterclaim cases, discussed in text accompanying notes 131-48
supra.
164. The circumstances in which "aggregation" and "consolidation" apply are dis-
tinct (§§ 9.023(b) (1), .023(b) (2)) but the problem of appeals from separate claims is
not which principle applies but whether either is applicable.
165. 147 Mo. 634, 49 S.W. 867 (1899), trans'd, 90 Mo. App. 349 (1901).
166. The same plaintiff had recovered an "amount" below the jurisdictional limit in
two suits against separate insurance companies under separate fire policies for damages
arising from the same fire. Two appeals were filed in the court of appeals by each in-
surance company and the judgments in each case were reversed. The Bradley case, supra,
was certified to the supreme court where the plaintiff argued inter alia that the court of
appeals had no jurisdiction since the two cases which were "as inseparable as the
Siamese twins" had "in effect" been consolidated for trial and the aggregate of the
§ 9.023(b) (3)
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held that two different causes of action by the same plaintiff against the
same defendants when consolidated by the trial court become "in contem-
plation of law ...one action"'8 7 upon which a single judgment must be
rendered. 88 The "single judgment" test has also been employed in cases in
which the parties are allowed to join their causes of action in one lawsuit
which results in one final judgment, i.e., class actions89 and joinder of
two judgments was over the jurisdictional limit. (It was stipulated by counsel that the
cases were tried together, that the same attorney defended both cases, that witnesses
were sworn but once, that the record and bill of exceptions in each case were identical,
and it was agreed by counsel that both causes could be considered in the supreme court
on the record, statement and brief in the present case.) Appellant's contention was re-
jected by the court's holding that the test for "aggregation" was whether the two suits
had in fact been consolidated, not whether the trial court had the power or was
authorized by statute to consolidate: "It is plain that a joint judgment could not be
rendered against both defendants in either case, and that a satisfaction of either of the
separate judgments would not be a satisfaction of the other. There is no privity of
liability between the defendants . . . ." Id. at 637, 49 S.W. at 868. The court dis-
tinguished Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198 (1891), discussed supra note 154,
as one case including several counts in which there was one judgment as opposed to the
instant case in which there were "two distinct suits."
167. State ex rel. Owens v. Fraser, 165 Mo. 242, 256, 65 S.W. 569, 571 (1901);
accord, Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 383, 4 S.W.2d 776, 801
(1928) (en banc). Fraser involved two suits on bail bonds of $2,500 each (the then
jurisdictional "amount" was $4,500) which were consolidated pursuant to Mo. REv.
STAT. § 510.180(1) (1959). See also Mo. SuP. CT. R. 66.01 (a).
168. The court analogized this case to one suit "in the first place, with a separate
count on each cause of action" in which judgments on all counts are aggregated accord-
ing to statute in one final judgment. See Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S.W. 198
(1891), discussed supra note 166. The same result obtains if the same defendant is sued
by different plaintiffs and the cases are consolidated for trial. Barnard v. Murphy, 365
S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1963) ("amounts" recovered-$873.89 and $17,654.99-were "consoli-
dated" in a judgment of $18,528.88 which satisfied jurisdictional "amount"); Flanigan v.
City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700 (1962) ("aggregate amounts" of separate jury ver-
dict on nine actions consolidated by trial court order). For a definition of "final judg.
ments," see Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 511.020 (1959) and Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.01. Until a
judgment disposing of all the parties and issues in the case has been entered, there is no
final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. Deeds v. Foster, 361 Mo. 916, 235
S.W.2d 262 (Mo. 1951).
169. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Essex Inv. Co., 356 Mo. 1028, 204 S.W.2d 726
(1947), citing Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d
545 (1931) and Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 37, 4 S.W.2d 776
(1928) (en banc). In Essex twenty-two of 165 defendants in a condemnation action
joined in a motion for a nunc pro tunc order to require payment of interest allegedly due
on the net damages awarded and appealed the overruling of their motion. Although the
defendants (plaintiffs on the motion) each sought separate amounts below the jurisdiction
limit, the supreme court held that it had jurisdiction by aggregating the claims; the
plaintiffs were viewed as seeking one judgment to enforce several demands claimed under
one common right. An examination of the Aufderheide opinion makes clear the reasoning
behind aggregation of claims in representative actions, that is, suits by one or more
plaintiffs "for themselves and others similarly situated." Where the forty-three parties in
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plaintiffs' claims in personal injury actions, 7 ° including the claim of one
spouse for personal injuries and the other for loss of consortium and ser-
vices' or of a minor by his parent as next friend and the parent in his
own right.
The "one judgment" test which has been generally applied-although
two recent court of appeals' decisions are opposite 7s-poses a potential
problem when appeals from separate suits are consolidated for hearing on
appeal because of "common questions of fact and law." When jurisdiction
interest had the right by statute to sue in one action "but one judgment could be rendered
in their favor." The court indicated that if the claims had been asserted in separate suits
"they could have been consolidated and one single judgment entered for the relief
prayed." See Mo. Rav. STAT. § 507.070 (1959) and Mo. SuP. CT. R. 52.08.
170. E.g., Darrah v. Foster, 355 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1962) ($15,000 claim each by
both plaintiff and cross-clainant "aggregated"); McComb v. Vaughn, 358 Mo. 951,
218 S.W.2d 548 (1949). In McComb three plaintiffs joined their claims and received
three separate judgments on verdicts of $9,000, $750 and $250 which were entered as
one final judgment (the jurisdictional "amount" was $7,500). The language of the court
indicates that the "amounts" were "consolidated" for supreme court jurisdiction. "The
judgment appealed from, for a sum in excess of $7500, in favor of plaintiff Lagatha [who
recovered $9,000] vests this court with appellate jurisdiction of the case." Id. at 953, 218
S.W.2d at 549.
171. E.g., Bogus v. Birenbaum, 375 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. 1964) ("aggregation" of wife's
claim of $15,000 and husband's claim for $3,608.81); Schaetty v. Kimberlin, 374 S.W.2d
70 (Mo. 1964) ("consolidation": wife-$7,500 and husband-$17,500).
By amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1965, enforcement
of causes of action accruing to both spouses because of injury to one or the other must be
"in one action brought by both spouses." Mo. SUP. CT. R. 66.01(c), published in
Supreme Court Order of November 16, 1964, 20 J. Mo. B. 540. For exposition of the
practical considerations behind the new rule, see Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365
S.W.2d 539, 547 (Mo. 1963) (en banc) (opinion of Eager, J., dissenting from majority
holding that wife's action would lie for loss of husband's consortium). See also
Shepherd v. Consumer Co-op. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1964) (en banc)
(separate dissenting opinions of Eager and Storckman, JJ.).
172. E.g., Kungle v. Austin, 380 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1964) ("consolidation" of minor's
claim for damages ($35,000) and father's claim for medical expenses ($2,500) when both
appealed non-recovery); Triller v. Hellwege, 374 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1964), trans'd from
court of appeals ("consolidation": personal injuries of minor-$100,000, loss of earnings
and medical expenses of parent-$15,000).
173. Wise v. Towse, 366 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Haynes v. Linder, 323
S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). In both cases, the Kansas City Court of Appeals
refused to "aggregate" the "amounts" of cases consolidated for trial, which if done would
have given the supreme court jurisdiction. The language is particularly perplexing in
Haynes in which the court states that there were "separate appeals from the separate
judgments," and "since each judgment" was less than the jurisdictional "amount," it had
jurisdiction. If the "judgment" were in fact on separate verdicts in separate actions
which had not been consolidated for trial, the decision would be proper. But when
actions are consolidated for trial, as in this case, only one final judgment could be
entered-although it may be composed of several parts-to resolve all the issues involved
in the consolidated actions. See note 168 supra.
§ 9.023(b) (3)
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of only one of such multiple appeals is in the supreme court and the su-
preme court's decision will necessarily decide both, the court nevertheless
has held that it must transfer the appeal not within its jurisdiction," 4 re-
quiring two appellate hearings to decide the same legal issue. (This prob-
lem of course could only arise in the standard "consolidation" situation in
which one appeal was sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction but the other
was not.) However, a contrary policy has been used by the supreme court.
This is the "common questions of fact and law" test of "aggregation-con-
solidation," which had its genesis in Kitchen v. City of Clinton."' The pol-
icy retains vitality because it has not been overruled and Kitchen has been
cited as authority for "aggregation" in recent supreme court decisions.""
9.024. Ancillary Jurisdiction
The "consolidation" principle in "amount" jurisdiction which permits
one appeal or a part thereof to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the
supreme court for another appeal or a part thereof is closely related to the
concept of ancillary jurisdiction in the federal system.7 ' In Missouri,
jurisdiction in the supreme court has been asserted on an ancillary basis in
two situations: (1) review of orders by the trial court which are a com-
174. In re Dean's Estate, 350 Mo. 494, 166 S.W.2d 529 (1942) (en bane). Although
not expressly stated by the court, the rule emerges from the case that if the court is unable
to find that the appeal is from one suit (in the words of the constitution, one "case")
over which it has jurisdiction, it must consider the appeals individually or violate the
constitution. See Sims v. Sims, 253 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1953), which was an appeal from
an order allowing alimony and suit money (for an insufficient "amount") pending appeal
in the principal case, a divorce action properly before the supreme court. Although
noting that '*it may seem absurd and unreasonable to some for this court to refuse or be
unable to also adjudicate this collateral controversy," the court held that the two causes
could not be consolidated because they were "separate and independent proceedings."
But see Kitchen v. City of Clinton, 320 Mo. 569, 8 S.W.2d 602 (1928) (both appeals
from separate judgments ruled on by one opinion when apparently only one "amount"
was sufficient).
175. 320 Mo. 569, 8 S.W.2d 602 (1928). There were appeals from two separate
judgments: one action was by the assignee of the city to enforce payment of tax bills in
seventeen separate suits consolidated for trial and the other was a suit to enjoin as.
sessment of a tax bill. If it were possible to interpret Kitchen as holding that both ap-
peals involved an "amount" sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction, it could be at least
partially reconciled with In re Dean's Estate, supra note 174. This seems unlikely
because of Kitchen's articulation of the "common facts and questions of law" criterion.
176. Flanigan v. City of Springfield, 360 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Mo. 1962); Darrah v.
Foster, 355 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo. 1962).
177. The leading case is Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Ancillary jurisdic-
tion is defined as that which "generally involves either proceedings which are concerned
with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in principal cases or proceedings
which affect property already in court's custody." BLACK, LA W DhcTiNARY 112 (4th ed.
1951).
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ponent part of the judgment pending appeal in the supreme court; (2)
jurisdiction to enforce a decision of the supreme court.
The first situation in which jurisdiction is asserted because one appeal
is related or ancillary to another appeal which is properly within the
supreme court's jurisdiction, involves these facts: an appeal is taken to the
supreme court by one party from the trial judgment on the merits of the
case; pending appellate determination, one of the parties is granted a
monetary allowance, usually taxed as "costs" in the main suit, which is
also appealed (frequently the "amount" of the costs is insufficient for su-
preme court jurisdiction). Because the order granting the costs has been
entered after the main appeal, the supreme court may have decided the
substantive question when the appeal of the costs order is presented to it.
On appeal from the costs order, jurisdiction in the supreme court is asserted
because the costs order is ancillary to the principal appeal.
In these cases, the supreme court has held that its jurisdiction exists in
some cases and not in others. The determinative point is whether the costs
order "modifies" the original judgment or is an independent judgment
entered in an independent action. Also a factor influencing the supreme
court to accept jurisdiction is the extent to which the appeal of the order
involves a consideration of the issue litigated in the main appeal.
The first case to involve these issues was a will construction action in
which the heirs appealed the judgment on the merits to the supreme
court."' After the appeal had been taken, the trial court sustained a motion
by the heirs' attorneys allowing $600 as legal fees in their favor and taxed
the fees as costs to the estate. The executor who had opposed the order for
costs appealed it to the court of appeals which transferred on the ground
that the order was a part of the original action then before the supreme
court."" The gist of the transferring opinion was that since a trial court has
no authority to enter an order for costs apart from a final judgment on the
merits, the order had to be viewed as a modification of the judgment on the
merits. The court further pointed out that whether the cost order was
proper could only be determined in conjunction with a consideration of sig-
nificant legal issues involved in the principal action.
A similar result was reached in a recent case involving costs allowed
garnishees pending the appeal to the supreme court by the plaintiffs from
the judgment quashing the writs of garnishment.'Y0 Although an appeal
178. Sandusky v. Routt, 141 S.W. 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911), trans'd, 265 Mo. 219,
177 S.W. 390 (1915).
179. The opinion on the merits was Sandusky v. Sandusky, 261 Mo. 351, 168 S.W.
1150 (1914).
180. Flynn v. First Natl Safe Deposit Co., 284 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1955), trans'd from
273 S.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1954). The order was entered pursuant to Mo. Rav. STAT. §
§ 9.024
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from the costs order had been taken to the court of appeals, the supreme
.court on transfer held that it had jurisdiction because the allowance order
modified the original judgment and therefore "formed an integral and
component part of the judgment."'' However, in cases developing from
similar fact patterns the supreme court has rejected jurisdiction advanced
on an ancillary basis.
During the pendency of an appeal to the supreme court from the judg-
ment entered in a divorce proceeding, the allowance to the wife by the
trial court of attorney's fees, suit money and alimony is not appealable to
the supreme court on the ground that the allowance order is "auxiliary" or
ancillary to the appeal from the decree in the divorce action."8 2
The distinguishing features in the divorce cases is that the trial court
has power to enter a separate order for "alimony and suit money pending
the appeal."' 8 ' Thus, although the order for allowance is related to the
divorce issue, it is not made until after final judgment in the divorce action
and does not alter or modify it, but rather is an independent proceeding."'
525.240 (1959) which allows attorney's fees to be recovered by the garnishee if plaintiff
fails to recover.
181. Id. at 596. The supreme court on the same day handed down the opinion on the
appeal challenging the quashing of the writs. Flynn v. Janssen, 284 S.W.2d 421 (Mo.
1955).
In its transferring opinion, the court of appeals made an observation similar to that
made in the Sandusky case. It noted that it would be necessary to decide whether the
trial court had properly quashed the writs in order to determine whether the garnishces
were entitled to the allowances. The court stated: "An anomalous situation would be
created if we undertook to affirm the orders allowing the fees to the garnishees and the
Supreme Court would reverse the orders in the main proceeding." 273 S.W.2d at 760.
In an earlier case, the same court of appeals refused to consider a plaintiff's appeal from
the failure of the trial court to order its clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment in
defendant's favor on her counterclaim. Defendants had appealed the case to the supreme
court but because the "amount" for which plaintiff attempted to satisfy the judg-
ment was below the jurisdictional level, appeal was taken on that point to the court of ap-
peals. It transferred to the supreme court because the appeal was an "essential part of
the cause depending in the supreme court on the appeal from the judgment in chief."
The court further noted that it would be "incongruous" for it to decide whether a judg-
ment had been satisfied while the supreme court was reviewing the validity of the judg-
ment. Rosenberger v. Jones, 48 Mo. App. 606, 609 (1892), trans'd.
182. Sims v. Sims, 253 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1953), trans'd; Stuart v. Stuart, 320 Mo.
486, 8 S.W.2d 613 (1928), trans'd, 14 S.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1929); cf. Bauer v.
City of Berkeley, 278 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.), trans'd, 282 S.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1955)
(action on injunction bond an "independent proceeding").
183. Sims v. Sims, supra note 182, at 815-16; Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 452.070 (1959).
184. See Stine v. Southwest Bank, 98 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1936), trans'd, 108
S.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1937). Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court from the
dissolution of a temporary injunction which had issued to forestall foreclosure on plain-
tiff's property. Pending plaintiff's appeal (which was subsequently dismissed) defendant
sought recovery (of an "amount" below the jurisdictional level) on the injunction bond
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Supreme court jurisdiction was held lacking in another similar case. This
was an action..5 for the appointment of a receiver for a defendant corpora-
against plaintiff and her surety. This action was dismissed but reinstated and plaintiff
appealed. Her appeal was to the supreme court on the theory that that court's juris-
diction on the first appeal from the judgment dissolving the injunction gave supreme
court jurisdiction of the second appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the
first appeal because the "amount" was insufficient. It further held that it would have no
jurisdiction in any event since the second appeal arose from a new, separate and inde-
pendent controversy and involved a new party (plaintiff's surety).
An appeal taken from the appointment of a receiver to manage temporarily
property would not be within supreme court jurisdiction even though the appointment
was ancillary to the decision of a dispute involving an issue within its jurisdiction (suit to
quiet title to real estate). Stip v. Bailey, 331 Mo. 374, 53 S.W.2d 872 (1932), trans'd
from 22 S.W.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1929), retrans'd, 62 S.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1933). The
case must be distinguished because no appeal had been taken which gave supreme court
jurisdiction over any part of the dispute. The appeal related to an issue at trial, not
one on appeal. This presents the problem of suit in two counts, one involving an issue
which, if appealed, would confer supreme court jurisdiction but the case is appealed only
on the count not involving the jurisdictional issue or it is appealed from some pre-
liminary order before the issue having supreme court jurisdiction becomes appealable. In
this state of facts, it is clear that supreme court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the
ancillary basis. Hyer v. Baker, 130 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.) (en banc), trans'd from 128
S.W.2d 1067 (Ct. App. 1939), retrans'd; Stip v. Bailey, supra. If the judgment or order
disposed of both counts, however, and an appeal was taken from both, supreme court
jurisdiction would clearly attach. Missouri City Coal Co. v. Walker, 183 S.W.2d 350
(Mo. Ct. App. 1944), trans'd, 188 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1945).
Early cases had held that suit on a recognizance was ancillary to the criminal proceed-
ing so that an appeal from the recognizance action would lie to the supreme court if
the criminal proceeding was a felony, even though the "amount" of the recognizance
was below the jurisdictional limit. E.g., State v. Wilson, 265 Mo. 1, 175 S.W. 603
(1915) (en banc). However, this position was specifically overruled. State v. Gross, 306
Mo. 1, 275 S.W. 769 (1924) (en bane), trans'd.
The anchor for the court's holding in Sims that the order for suit money was a
separate proceeding from which a separate appeal must be taken was its conclusion,
based on a review of the applicable law, that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a
decree for the allowances after final judgment had been entered in the divorce action and
appeal therefrom had been taken. This distinguishes the Sandusky and Flynn cases where
the supreme court had jurisdiction, because in those cases it was carefully set out that
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter a decree for costs after entry of final
judgment. This incapacity of the trial court required the conclusion that the trial court
had modified the original judgment (even if permitting the assessment was erroneous).
Therefore, cases arising on facts similar to those in the cases in this section must depend
on whether the substantive law permits the trial court to enter a separate decree for
costs. The cases suggest this result: if a separate order for costs may be granted, an ap-
peal from that order must have independent jurisdictional standing to go to the supreme
court; if a separate decree may not be entered after final judgment on the merits of the
case, then the appeal must go to the supreme court when the trial court assesses "costs"
whether or not the assessment was a proper and timely modification of the original
judgment.
185. Niedringhaus v. William F. Niedringhaus Inv. Co., 330 Mo. 1089, 52 S.W.2d
395 (en bane), transd, 54 S.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1932).
§ 9.024
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tion and for other equitable relief. Appeal was taken by plaintiffs to the
supreme court from the trial court's order denying relief, made upon the
report of a referee appointed by the court to investigate the claims."' 0 The
judgment dismissing plaintiff's bill did so "at the cost of plaintiffs" but did
not rule on the claim by the referee for additional fees.187 When the trial
court later entered an order for additional fees, it was held that an appeal
from the order would not lie to the supreme court on the principle that it
was related or ancillary to the pending appeal on the merits. Because the
original judgment included a provision that the costs were to be taxed to the
plaintiffs, the subsequent order fixing the amounts of the costs "did not in
the slightest degree change, alter, or amend the decree," but was "purely
collateral to it."1 s
The distinction proposed by this case is whether the order for costs
"changes or modifies" the original judgment or merely implements it.1"" It
is not difficult to grasp the point that the trial court's order only applies the
existing judgment. But the relation between an order implementing a judg-
ment, and the judgment is so intimate, that it seems unsatisfactory for su-
preme court jurisdiction not to attach.190
186. The decision in the principal appeal was Niedringhaus v. William F. Niedring-
haus Inv. Co., 329 Mo. 84, 46 S.W.2d 828 (1931).
187. When the referee made his report, he requested an additional fee as full com-
pensation, and stenographer's fees. He had already been allowed some compensation, paid
equally by both parties, and his additional request was opposed by plaintiffs who as.
serted that he had been fully and justly compensated.
188. Niedringhaus v. William F. Niedringhaus Inv. Co., 330 Mo. 1089, 1093, 52
S.W.2d 395, 396 (1932) (en banc).
189. In this connection it should be noted that the court was careful to point out
that consideration of the allowances to the referee in no way depended on the legal issues
involved in the main appeal. This point is also made by other cases involving analogous
fact situations and in which ancillary jurisdiction in the supreme court was rejected, e.g.,
Sims v. Sims, 253 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1953), discussed supra note 182. The opposite con-
clusion was reached in Flynn v. First Nat'1 Safe Deposit Co., 284 S.W.2d 593 (Mo.
1955), discussed supra note 180; Sandusky v. Routt, 141 S.W. 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911),
discussed supra note 178, in which the supreme court jurisdiction was sustained.
The holding in Niedringhaus was possibly applicable in the Flynn case, although the
latter did not cite the former (in fact Niedringhaus apparently has never been cited). In
Flynn, the motion to quash the writs which was granted and appealed also contained a
request for a reasonable attorney's fee. It does not appear from the opinion whether
the trial judgment in granting the motion included provision for granting the fees so
that its later assessment could, within the holding in Niedringhaus, have been considered
only an implementation of the existing judgment.
190. Consider the case of Rosenberger v. Jones, 48 Mo. App. 606 (1892), discussed
supra note 181, in which the court of appeals held "incongruous" its consideration of
whether the judgment being appealed to the supreme court had been satisfied. Ob-
viously underpinning the decision by the court of appeals to transfer was the fact that
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In Lang v. Taussig,"9 ' the supreme court considered an appeal based on
"amount" jurisdiction from a judgment in a will construction case. It or-
dered the trial court to enter a decree in accordance with its decision, but
the decree entered by the trial court was still objectionable to the appellant
who again appealed to the supreme court. 92 The basis for the second
appeal was that the trial court had failed to follow the supreme court's
decision in entering the second decree and had erred in not permitting ap-
pellant an allowance for "costs," although the trial court was conceded to
have obeyed the supreme court's decision to an extent sufficient to reduce
the "amount in dispute" below the jurisdictional level. The supreme court
rejected the argument that only it could properly know the meaning of and
enforce its prior decision, and transferred, holding that "the mere fact
that a prior appeal in the present case was to the supreme court is no
ground to support the notion that this second appeal lies to the supreme
court."'
The Lang case permits a supreme court decision to be interpreted and
enforced by the court of appeals. This causes "fractionalization" similar to
that avoided in cases like Flynn v. First Nat'l Safe Deposit Co.,' in which
jurisdiction was preserved in the supreme court after the trial court modi-
fied the original judgment (by assessing "costs") while the judgment was
its decision would impede the supreme court's power to decide how a judgment within
its jurisdiction should be enforced. See note 192 infra and accompanying text.
The holding in Niedringhaus seems to be unfair to the appellant. If the court had
entered its order permitting the additional fees contemporaneous to the initial judg-
ment, clearly the appeal on the merits would have placed the issue of the fees before the
supreme court. But because the trial court was tardy in ruling on the issue, the ap-
pellant was required to have appeals in two different courts. Apparently, he should have
protested the inclusion of the provision for assessment of costs on the main appeal.
191. 180 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. 1944).
192. Lang v. Taussig, 354 Mo. 930, 192 S.W.2d 407, trans'd, 194 S.W.2d 743 (Ct.
App. 1946).
193. Id. at 934, 192 S.W.2d at 410. The court relied on Bragg v. Ross, 173 S.W.2d
415 (Mo. 1943), trans'd, 177 S.W.2d 543 (Ct. App. 1944), in which a demurrer to the
plaintiff's petition in an equity action to redeem an interest in real estate was reversed
by the supreme court and, after a second trial on the merits, the plaintiff suffered an
adverse verdict. Plaintiff again appealed to the supreme court, where the judgment was re-
versed and it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to an accounting. Plaintiff ex-
cepted to the finding which resulted from a separate trial on the issue of accounting and
for a third time appealed to the supreme court. Jurisdiction of the third appeal was re-
jected because the title to real estate issue which had provided jurisdiction in the
earlier cases had been settled. The Bragg case is distinguishable to some extent from
Lang, because in Bragg the final appeal was from a separate "trial" which the trial court
held to determine the accounting, while in Lang the final appeal resulted from the trial
court's immediate action applying the supreme court's opinion.
194. 284 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1955), trans'd from 273 S.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 1954),
discussed supra note 180; see cases cited notes 178-81 supra.
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being reviewed in the supreme court. It is arguable that the rationale of the
Flynn decision and the inherent supervisory power vested in the supreme
court,'95 provide authority for a result contrary to Lang, even though the
second appeal resulted from a new decree.'
9.025. Appeal from New Trial Order
If a litigant suffers an adverse verdict, but succeeds in getting a new
trial ordered, the jurisdictional "amount" on appeal by the other litigant
is determined by the value to the appellant of having the new trial order
reversed and the original verdict reinstated. To employ the standard rules
of "amount" calculation, a rule of thumb which may be used is to deter-
mine the "amount" as if the new trial had not been granted and the original
adverse verdict had been appealed by the litigant who (because of the actual
appeal of the new trial order) becomes the respondent.
9.025(a). Plaintiff Granted New Trial
The most frequent appeal from a new trial order is prosecuted by the
defendant when a plaintiff who was unsuccessful at the trial has been
granted a new trial. In this situation, the "amount in dispute" is the full
amount of the plaintiff's original petition because it has been "reinstated"
by the new trial order. 97
195. See Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4.
196. In Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Mo.
1962), trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1964), the court stated that "jurisdiction
once established would normally continue, in order to give effect to our judgment."
In Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry., 257 Mo. 555, 166 S.W. 272 (1914) (en bane) (the
history of the case and statute involved therein are set out in "Introduction," note 36),
the supreme court had to determine the constitutionality of a statute which purported
to give the supreme court original appellate jurisdiction of any case then pending in which
the court had made a prior ruling or decision. The majority held the statute uncon-
stitutional because it gave the supreme court jurisdiction beyond that delineated in the
constitution. The dissenting opinion would have held the act valid under the legislative
power to increase or diminish the jurisdictional "amount."
197. E.g., Roberts v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 362 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1962); Harris v.
Rowden, 305 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1957); Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo.
13, 160 S.W.2d 740 (1942); Barrett v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 143 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.
1940); Johnson v. Ramming, 340 Mo. 311, 100 S.W.2d 466 (1936); Powell v. St.
Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 336 Mo. 1016, 81 S.W.2d 957 (1935); Cames v.
Thompson, 48 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1932). If the defendant had counterclaimed and was
granted a new trial after failing to recover on his counterclaim, his petition would be re-
instated and would determine jurisdictional "amount." McDonald v. Logan, 364 Mo.
382, 261 S.W.2d 955 (1953); Albers Milling Co. v. Carney, 335 S.W.2d 207 (Mo.
Ct. App.), trans'd, 341 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1960). The new trial purges the "amount" of
plaintiff's petition of any implied reductions which may have occurred during the first
trial. Poe v. Kansas City, C.C. & St. J. Ry., 238 S.W. 1082 (Mo. 1922), trans'd from
court of appeals.
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The calculation is more complex if a plaintiff is granted the new trial
because his recovery was inadequate. Although the new trial restores the
full "amount" of plaintiff's original petition, the courts have generally held
that the amount plaintiff recovered must be substracted from the petition.19
The reason for the subtraction is that the defendant's appeal is on the
theory that the trial court erred in dissolving the plaintiff's recovery by the
new trial order. Thus in effect, defendant is conceding liability for the
amount recovered so that even though plaintiff's full petition is reinstated,
the amount of his initial recovery is removed from the realm of dispute. 9 '
198. E.g., Sofian v. Douglas, 324 Mo. 258, 23 S.W.2d 126 (1929); Craton v. Hunt-
zinger, 187 S.W. 48 (Mo. 1916), trans'd from 177 S.W. 816 (Ct. App. 1915); Jones v.
Allred, 298 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957), trans'd; Harmon v. Foster, 297 S.W.2d
783 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957), trans'd; Ford v. K. Jones Motor Co., 115 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1938), trans'd; see Wessels v. Smith, 362 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1962); Mosley v. St.
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 301 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1957).
199. This specific reasoning was detailed in Craton v. Huntzinger, supra note 198,
in the opinions of both the supreme court and the court of appeals. Accord, Sofian v.
Douglas, supra note 198. Contra, Stein v. Baskowitz, 157 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. Ct. App.
1942), trans'd; see McCarty v. St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 396, 91 S.W. 132 (1905).
McCarty was cited as authority by the supreme court in Craton v. Huntzinger, supra, but
it appears to be opposite in result. In McCarty plaintiff recovered $500 on a $5,000
claim, had the verdict set aside as inadequate by an order for new trial, and defendant ap-
pealed. Because the supreme court had original appellate jurisdiction at that time only
if the "amount" exceeded $4,500, it apparently decided the case without jurisdiction.
A recent case, because of its peculiar facts, is difficult to assess. In Langhammer v. City
of Mexico, 327 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1959), plaintiff sued for $10,250, and recovered $4,000.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict which was denied but he was granted a new
trial. From the new trial order both parties appealed. The supreme court carefully ex-
amined the jurisdictional issues and concluded its jurisdiction was established because
the new trial reinstated the full amount of plaintiff's original petition, notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiff's verdict was set aside at the behest of defendant. Thus, the
case could be interpreted as holding that the effect of a new trial, in any event, is to re-
store the entire petition. However, the fact that cross appeals were filed by both the plain-
tiff and defendant makes it possible to explain the case by "aggregation"; the
"aggregate amount in dispute" equaled $10,250, the full amount of the petition
(§ 9.023(b) (2)). On plaintiffs appeal, the verdict set aside-$4,000 was the "amount"
disputed. The "amount" of defendant's appeal is more difficult to calculate. Obviously,
if a directed verdict rather than a new trial had been ordered, defendant would not have
appealed. So the "amount in dispute" must be the value to the defendant of a directed
verdict in excess of the new trial's value. A directed verdict would have completely in-
sulated him from liability while the new trial reinstates plaintiff's petition, subjecting
defendant to potential future liability of $10,250. However, the fact that defendant may
be liable for that amount does not necessarily make that amount the "amount in dispute."
For example, if a plaintiff sues for $10,250 and recovers $4,000 but appeals the in-
adequacy of that recovery, the "amount in dispute" requires subtraction of the recovery
from the petition plaintiff wants reinstated. Cases cited note 37 supra. Therefore, the
jurisdictional "amount" would be $6,250, even though a successful appeal by the plain-
tiff would permit him to retry his case for $10,250 and recover the entire amount.
Logically, in Langhammer the fact that the defendant may be liable on retrial for
§ 9.025 (a)
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9.025(b). Defendant Granted New Trial
In cases in which the defendant is granted a new trial after the plaintiff
recovered at trial, and plaintiff appeals, the "amount" for determination
$10,250 places in actual dispute only the "amount" of liability in addition to that of
plaintiff's first verdict. Defendant could have completely terminated his liability by pay-
ing the $4,000 verdict, and this fact removes the $4,000 from the realm of "dispute" in
the same way a plaintiff appealing "inadequacy" removes from "dispute" the "amount" of
the verdict which he could have accepted but with which he was dissatisfied. Therefore,
because of the cross appeals the "aggregate" of the two "amounts" was $10,250 and
the supreme court properly held that it had jurisdiction.
200. Reaves v. Rieger, 360 Mo. 1091, 232 S.W.2d 500 (1950), trans'd, 241 S.W.2d
389 (Ct. App. 1951); State ex rel. Long v. Ellison, 272 Mo. 571, 199 S.W. 984 (1917)
(en bane); Williams v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 233 Mo. 666, 136 S.W. 304 (1911);
Culbertson v. Young, 156 Mo. 261, 56 S.W. 893, trans'd from court of appeals,
retrans'd, 86 Mo. App. 277 (1900); Voss v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 341 S.W.2d
270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Deaver v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 199 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1947; see De Maire v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 457, 222 S.W.2d 93 (1949).
If plaintiff recovered a verdict, but it was erased by the granting of a new trial and plain-
tiff appealed including in his appeal the ground that his recovery was inadequate, it
would seem that the entire petition would be restored. His appeal of the granting of a
new trial would, by the "reinstatement" principle, place in dispute his verdict set aside
by the new trial. In addition, his inclusion of "inadequacy" should place in dispute the
unrecovered part of the amount asked for in his petition. (The "inadequacy" rules-note
37 supra-would require subtraction of the amount recovered from the amount asked for
in the petition, but as the amount recovered was set aside by the granting of a new
trial and plaintiff appealed from this, the "subtraction" rationale--that plaintiff could
have accepted his verdict so that "amount" is not in "dispute"-is inapplicable.) See
Vogrin v. Forum Cafeterias of America, Inc., 301 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd,
308 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1957), holding that plaintiff's petition was reinstated on his ap-
peal from the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial on inadequacy after plaintiff had
recovered $1,000 on a $20,000 petition. The verdict was set aside by the court's entry of
judgment for defendant notwithstanding the plaintiff's verdict. However, the court of ap-
peals applied the standard "inadequacy" rule and substracted the $1,000 from the $20,000
in determining the "amount in dispute," apparently because plaintiff's appeal was pred-
icated on the court's failure to grant a new trial on inadequacy and also did not include
as error the setting aside of the $1,000.
201. This was the precise holding of Culbertson v. Young, supra note 200 approved
en banc by the Long case, supra note 200. It has been challenged on authority of
.Langhammer v. City of Mexico, 327 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1959), discussed supra note 199,
by the assertion that Langhammer stands for the proposition that a new trial reinstates
the entire petition as the "amount in dispute." However, the latest case to consider the
problem has rejected that contention, clearly holding that even though plaintiff's petition
is reinstated, the "amount in dispute" is set by the "amount" expunged by the new trial
order. Voss v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., supra note 200. See Wessels v. Smith
362 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1962) (dictum).
202. E.g., Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, 358 Mo. 476, 215 S.W.2d 481 (1948); Gipson
v. Fisher Bros. Co., 204 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); see Hutchinson v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1956); Reaves v. Rieger, 360 Mo. 1091, 232
S.W.2d 500 (1950), trans'd, 241 S.W.2d 389 (Ct. App. 1951). A different rule was
contended for in the dissenting opinion in the Gipson case. In that case, plaintiff sued
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of appellate jurisdiction is fixed by plaintiff's recovery which was vitiated
by the new trial order."' 0 Although the new trial will permit the plaintiff
to retry his case, the "amount" of his petition does not control because the
purpose of his appeal is to have his recovery restored by the appellate
court. 01 The same rationale is applied if the plaintiff's verdict is set aside by
a judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict."°2
9.030. SuITs SEEKING NON-MONEY RELIEF
Although the drafters of the 1875 constitution may have intended that
the category of "amount in dispute" should include only appeals from
suits in which a money judgment was sought or obtained,0 3 the Missouri
courts have concluded to the contrary. An 1890 statement of the St. Louis
Court of Appeals in Gartside v. Gartside.°4 has been consistently followed:
We find no analogous case in this state, and cases decided by the
supreme court of the United States do not leave the question entirely
free from doubt. We assume it is settled beyond controversy that,
where the right of appeal depends on the value of the matter in dispute,
such value must be estimated in money.0 5
The directive to estimate monetary value0 6 acknowledges that complexity
and imprecision exist in the non-money jurisdictional tests. It inevitably
for $25,000 and the court, after overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict,
sent the case to the jury which returned a verdict of $7,500 for plaintiff (the then
jurisdictional limit of the court of appeals). Thereafter, on motion by defendant the
court set aside the verdict for plaintiff and rendered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff
appealed the judgment n.o.v. to the court of appeals where it was held that, because plain-
tiff's sole objective was to have his recovery reinstated, the amount of the verdict con-
trolled. The dissent contended that a judgment n.o.v., although entered after plaintiff
had recovered, was a decision by the trial court that plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover at all so that the plaintiff on appeal stands as though he had recovered nothing.
203. The judiciary committee's majority recommendation for a jurisdictional
"amount" category originally included the phrase "amount claimed"; this was changed
to "amount in dispute" to conform to federal court terminology. The committee's
minority recommendation had proposed that the "amount" category be restricted to
cases of debt, damages and possession of personal property, which may indicate that the
committee had intended to provide for supreme court jurisdiction based on a monetary
dispute only in cases where a specified dollar claim was made. These recommendations
are discussed in the "Introduction," note 9 and accompanying text.
204. 42 Mo. App. 513 (1890), trarss'd, 113 Mo. 348, 20 S.W. 669 (1892).
205. Id. at 514. (Emphasis added.)
206. As illustrated by Gartside, Missouri courts were originally influenced by federal
cases concerning estimation of the "amount in dispute" in suits for non-money judgments.
The federal jurisdiction cases decided since Gartside indicate that the course chosen by
the Missouri judiciary in assuming jurisdiction in non-money cases was correct. E.g.,
Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U. S. 121 (1915);
Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
J 9.030
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confficts with both the supreme court's rule that it may not engage in
conjecture and speculation to establish jurisdiction and the requirement
that the "amount in dispute" must affirmatively appear from the record.
Since Gartside, a large number of cases involving suits for non-money
judgments have been appealed to the supreme court based on "amount in
dispute"; many of these have been transferred to the court of appeals
because the monetary value of the appeal was not affirmatively established.
"Amount in dispute" based on some pecuniary effect of the trial court
judgment potentially provides for supreme court jurisdiction in almost every
appeal filed in this state. However, the supreme court, by restricting the
meaning of "amount in dispute," and requiring proof which frequently
cannot be shown in the record.. that the monetary effect will actually
result from the litigation, has excluded from its docket many appeals from
non-money judgments.
The appellate courts calculate the "amount in dispute" in non-money
cases in three stages. First, the court decides whether the value to the
plaintiff or the value to the defendant is to be measured. This is the selec-
tion of the formula. A second step is to identify a particular referent from
the range of effects which the judgment will have. This involves both the
constriction of the range of effects of the judgment by excluding its "col-
lateral effects," and the selection, within the resulting narrower range, of
one effect which is characterized as the value of the gain or loss which the
judgment could have to the chosen party. In the third step, the court gives
an exact pecuniary value to the selected referent. This requires it to exclude
certain parts of the amount involved and to sift the facts in the record to
insure that they affirmatively establish the "amount in dispute."
9.031. Formulae for Estimating the "Amount in Dispute"
The initial step in determining the "amount in dispute" in non-money
cases was first described in Evens & Howard Fire Brick Co. v. St. Louis
Smelting & Ref. Co.:2.
207. The "affirmative appearance" requirement is an extremely effective lever for the
exclusion of "collateral effects." Frequently, the facts necessary for precise dollar evalua-
tion are so unrelated to the issues of the suit that they would never be introduced at the
trial. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Doe, 311 S.W.2d 15 (Mo.), trans'd, 315 S.W.2d 465
(Ct. App. 1958). In one case, facts necessary for supreme court jurisdiction were ex-
cluded as irrelevant evidence by the trial court and the court of appeals retained the ap-
peal after transfer from the supreme court. Freeman v. De Hart, 303 S.W.2d 217 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1957).
Moreover, the kind of relief sought frequently has no monetary value. E.g., Ameri-
can Petroleum Exch. v. Public Sere. Comm'n, 172 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.), trans'd, 238
Mo. App. 92, 176 S.W.2d 533 (1943) (no "amount in dispute" from order of public
service commission).
208. 48 Mo. App. 634 (1892), transd.
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When the object of the suit... is not to obtain a money judgment, but
other relief, the amount involved must be determined by the value in
money of the relief to the plaintiff, or of the loss to the defendant
should the relief be granted, or vice versa, should the relief be denied.
If either is necessarily in excess of [the jurisdictional amount] ... the
supreme court has exclusive cognizance of the appeal.2 0 9
The vice versa principle provides four possible formulae for the determina-
tion of the "amount in dispute": (1) the value or benefit to plaintiff if the
relief is granted, (2) the loss to plaintiff if the relief is denied, (3) the loss
to defendant if the relief is granted, and (4) the benefit to defendant of
avoiding liability for the relief sought by plaintiff. The selection of one
particular measurement is necessary only if any two would produce different
results. Usually, the court considers only the benefit to plaintiff or loss to
defendant, because the facts in the record support only one of those amounts.
Thus the court is seldom required to make a deliberate choice.10 When the
facts in the record do present a choice, the supreme court has ruled that the
formula producing the greater "amount" controls.2 '
209. Id. at 635.
210. However, the supreme court considered the application of all four of the formulae
in Fred A. H. Garlichs Agency Co. v. Anderson, 284 Mo. 200, 223 S.W. 641 (1920),
trans'd from 202 S.W. 260 (Ct. App. 1918), retrans'd, 226 S.W. 978 (Ct. App. 1920):
The only matter to be considered in determining jurisdiction is [I] the value
which would accrue to the plaintiff should the defendant be restrained from en-
gaging in the insurance business . . .for 5 years, or [2] the loss the plaintiff would
sustain by reason of the defendant engaging in such a business. Or if the defendant's
gain or loss is to be considered, the question is [3] what would he lose by being pre-
vented from engaging in that business, or [4] what would he gain by continuing
in the business during the period of 5 years. Id. at 205, 223 S.W. at 642.
The existence of the first three formulae was expressly acknowledged in Ward v. Con-
solidated School Dist., 320 Mo. 385, 7 S.W.2d 689 (1928) (en banc), trans'd, 225 Mo.
App. 1139, 16 S.W.2d 598 (1929):
In the case at bar it makes no difference whether the amount in dispute be tested
by [I1 the value of the relief asked by appellants, or [2] the damage to accrue to
them by its denial or [3] by the damages to be suffered by respondents had the re-
lief sought been granted. There is no evidence in the record to show the value of
the relief sought by appellants or the damage accruing to either party by reason
of a decision adverse to it. Id. at 388, 7 S.W.2d at 690.
211. The plaintiff may stand to gain by his suit, though the relief granted will not be
a detriment to the defendant. Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 360 S.W.2d 593 (Mo.
1962), trans'd, 380 S.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1964); Ross v. Speed-O Corp. of America,
343 Mo. 504, 121 S.W.2d 865 (1938), trans'd. Or, the cost to defendant if the relief is
granted may exceed the gain to plaintiff. Fleischaker v. Fleischaker, 338 Mo. 797, 92
S.W.2d 169 (1936); Clotilde v. Lutz's Adm'r, 73 Mo. App. 37 (1898), trans'd, 157 Mo.
439, 57 S.W. 1018 (1900). These cases also indicate that in such situations the mea-
sure producing the greater "amount" controls.
A problem which has apparently not been considered by the court is the applicability
of the "aggregation" principle (§ 9.023 (b) (2)) to non-money cases. The result reached
by the court in every non-money case supports the conclusion that the "or" in the state-
ment of the vice versa rule is purely disjunctive. For a recent statement of the "deny
and grant" effect of a money judgment, see Endermuehle v. Smith, 372 S.W.2d 464
(Mo. 1963) (en banc).
1 9.031
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The defendant's loss and gain formulae involve peculiar problems because
they produce a significant expansion of the supreme court's non-money
jurisdiction. This is because they greatly increase the range of a judgment's
effect and permit jurisdiction when the record shows that the "amount" of
the monetary effect on the plaintiff is incalculable or insufficient or when the
record shows that the judgment would have no effect on the plaintiff. Some
authority challenges the use of formulae measuring the value to the de-
fendant. However, the two cases2 12 which explicitly make this rejection,
although not expressly overruled, are clearly inconsistent with the weight of
more recent authority." 3
9.032. Selection of the Referent
The second step in the determination of jurisdictional "amount" is the
selection of one particular aspect of the judgment's effect on one of the
parties. This procedure involves a dual inquiry. One part is to restrict, by
applying the "collateral effects" rule, the potentially limitless range of
monetary effects which result from estimating the value of a non-money
judgment. The court must further choose one precise effect from those
within the range circumscribed by the "collateral effects" principle. Al-
though the court primarily considers the assertions of the parties concerning
the jurisdictional referent, it may make a selection sua sponte."4 The
212. Steinmetz v. Federal Lead Co., 176 S.W. 1049 (Mo. 1915), trans'd; Scheurich
v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 183 Mo. 496, 81 S.W. 1226 (1904), trans'd from court of
appeals, retrans'd, 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003 (1905). These two cases established
a peculiar "relevancy" test; in both the court refused to consider elements of damage to
defendant resulting from the granting of an injunction, because the court issuing the in-
junction would be in no position to award money damages to defendant in the instant
litigation. In effect, the court rejected one half of the vice versa directive to estimate in
the absence of a money judgment. There is, however, some possibility that the recent
case of Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), dis-
cussed in text accompanying note 241 infra, may have imposed a serious restriction on
the applicability of the defendant's loss and the defendant's gain formulae, thus resurrect-
ing the older "relevancy" cases.
213. E.g., Cooper v. School Dist., 362 Mo. 49, 239 S.W.2d 509 (1951); Fleischaker
v. Fleischaker, 338 Mo. 797, 92 S.W.2d 169 (1936); Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice &
Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776 (1928) (en banc).
214. The burden is normally on the appellant, in a proper jurisdictional statement in
his appellate brief, to establish that an appeal lies to the supreme court; if this is not
done, the appeal may be dismissed. (For a discussion of the applicable court rule, see
§ 9.012.) However, as a practical matter, the court will usually sustain its jurisdiction
even though a defective basis of jurisdiction is asserted. For example, in the recent case
of Reis v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 373 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1963), the appellant's
only statement of jurisdiction was that the appeal lay to the supreme court because of
"Article V, Section 3 of the Constitution." Brief for Appellant, p. 1. However, the su-
preme court retained jurisdiction based on "amount," probably because the respondent
had made a careful jurisdictional statement. Brief for Respondent, pp. 1-3. Even if the
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referent selected must be characterized by the court as the "right" or
"value" which represents the monetary effect of the relief sought upon
either the defendant or plaintiff.
9.032 (a). Collateral Effects
The "collateral effects" principle is employed by the courts to insure
that the jurisdictional referent selected as representing the value of the suit
is chosen from a restricted range of effects. The rule generally stated is that
jurisdiction is based on "not what may be affected by the result of the case,
but what is directly involved in the suit."21
A large number of the cases which raise a "collateral effects" problem
are actually decided on the basis of an application of the "contingency"
principle. Although the court uses the language of the two doctrines
interchangeably, they can be analytically distinguished. A "contingency"21
issue is present when the "amount" asserted for jurisdiction is clearly
in dispute, but it is impossible to calculate exactly how much is in dispute.
In a "collateral effects" problem, the exact value of the "amount" asserted
for jurisdiction is readily measurable, but it is uncertain whether this
"amount" is relevant for jurisdictional consideration. This type of problem
is usually presented in an appeal from a judgment which will also determine
the defendant's future liability or the plaintiff's future recovery. The
jurisdictional theories advanced by both parties are ruled invalid, the supreme court will
seek another basis for jurisdiction by examining the record. See Dunbar v. Board of
Zoning Adjustments, 380 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. 1964), trans'd.
It is clear that the court assumes the burden of determining jurisdiction in spite of a
countervailing trend to transfer if the facts do not conclusively establish jurisdiction. (See
J 9.014.) This is apparently based on the rule that if jurisdiction in fact exists, it is the
court's duty to assume jurisdiction even though the basis has not been properly stated by
the parties.
215. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. 1962),
trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1964).
216. For a discussion of contingencies in suits for a money judgment, see § 9.022(a).
The courts use "contingency" language in two situations. The first is a case in which
the facts do not permit a finding of the value of the matter in dispute. The court typi-
cally rules that if the establishment of any value in dispute would require speculation and
conjecture, that amount is contingent. A large number of non-money cases are transferred
by the supreme court with an opinion which contains only this type of statement. E.g.,
Dunbar v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 380 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. 1964), trans'd. This is a
contingency of fact. The courts frequently find that an asserted amount has no jurisdic-
tional value by holding that the facts necessary to support the evaluation are insufficient
or contingent, rather than holding that the amount, even if established, is not relevant for
jurisdictional consideration. The other type of contingency is represented by the install-
ment award cases, in which a condition subsequent may operate to defeat the interest in
the award before an amount sufficient for supreme court jurisdiction has been paid under
the judgment. See cases cited note 98 supra.
I 9.032(a)
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"amount" considered a "collateral effect" is not the direct object of the
litigation from which appeal is taken, but often will result only from
separate litigation.2"
217. The "collateral effects" problem that exists when the result of the litigation will
determine future liability or recovery frequently arises in suits for money judgments. It
may also arise in non-money cases. In Fred A. H. Garlichs Agency Co. v. Anderson, 223'
S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1920), discussed supra note 210, plaintiff sought an injunction to re-
strain his former employee from engaging in the insurance business. An employment con-
tract had been executed by the parties whereby the defendant was to work for the plain-
tiff for fifteen years at a monthly salary which totaled, for the period covered, more than
the jurisdictional "amount." It was asserted that the supreme court had jurisdiction be-
cause the injunction suit would require the court to construe the contract to determine
which party was in breach, so that a determination could permit defendant to recover, or
the plaintiff to avoid liability, under the contract in a separate action based on the con-
tract. The court held that the amount of future contract damages was collateral, because
a judgment for damages could not be given in the injunction action.
It is difficult to distinguish Garlichs Agency, in which the "collateral effects" principle
was applied, from cases holding that an amount to be recovered in a subsequent action is
"contingent." E.g., Cotton v. Iowa Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 363 Mo. 400, 251 S.W.2d 246
(1952), discussed supra note 99. The court held that in a declaratory judgment action to
determine the insurance company's liability where the plaintiff had not yet filed a claim
in a personal injury action against the insured, the "mere chance of a judgment or settle-
ment exceeding [the jurisdictional limit] does not vest appellate jurisdiction here." Id. at
404, 251 S.W.2d at 249; accord, National Sur. Corp. v. Burger's Estate, 183 S.W.2d 93
(Mo. 1944) (future liability by surety corporation on bond it sought to cancel was "con-
tingent") (discussed supra note 100). In Cotton and Burger's Estate, the rulings that
future liability is not accurately calculable indicates that the decisions rest on the "con-
tingency" principle. If it had been held that the amount, whether or not established as
sufficient, was not the jurisdictional referent, the two cases would also involve the applica-
tion of the "collateral effects" principle. In fact, they probably involve both.
The supreme court has retained analogous cases in which the amount was calculable
and sufficient, indicating that Cotton and Burger's Estate were, at least partially, "contin-
gency" cases. For example, in "release" cases, the issue of the validity of a release
pleaded to a personal injury action is tried separately from the question of liability. It is
consistently held that an appeal from the ruling of the trial court on the validity of the
release vests jurisdiction in the supreme court, even though the issues of the damages and
negligence have not been litigated, if the plaintiff's petition is for a sufficient "amount."
These cases differ from Cotton because in each a suit for personal injuries has been
filed; the amount claimed in that suit fixes the "amount" of the dispute. Cases cited
note 100 supra; accord, Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1961) (en banc),
discussed supra note 100. In Crouch the third party plaintiff appealed the dismissal
of his petition. This petition was against third party defendent for recovery of any sum
for which third party plaintiff might be found liable to the plaintiff. At the time of
the appeal, plaintiff's petition was for a sufficient "amount," although the liability of
third party plaintiff to plaintiff had not been adjudicated. Crouch and the release cases
must be distinguished from Cotton, however, on the ground that the personal injury
petition that was held to satisfy the "amount" requirement was also part of the same
action, although the issues had been separated.
Thus, it is likely that the Fred A. H. Garlichs Agency case, supra, stands for the rule
that in a case where a determination of liability is not accompanied by a ruling on the
amount of damages, supreme court jurisdiction cannot be based on the amount of dam-
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The court's use of the "collateral effects" test in non-money cases is
illustrated by appeals in which the plaintiff seeks to test the validity of a
tax. If the suit advances the right to be free of a specific tax that would be
assessed against the plaintiff or the class he represents, the tax is held to be
"directly" involved in the appeal. However, it has recently been held that
if the restraint of the tax is not the sole object of the suit but would be a
mere concomitant of the judgment, the tax is not relevant to the calculation
of jurisdictional "amount."218
Cooper v. School Dist.219 is the leading case holding that the extent of tax
liability is to be included in the calculation of "amount" in non-money cases.
The plaintiffs, six voters and taxpayers, sought to enjoin the school district
from certifying to the county clerk that the county voters in a special election
had approved a property tax increase. The supreme court sustained its
"amount" jurisdiction on the loss which the defendant school district would
incur ($3,000,000-the full amount of the tax increase 2°) if the injunction
were granted.
The court made three important points in its opinion: (1) in a suit to
enjoin a tax levy, the value of the prospective taxes may be relevant for
purposes of jurisdiction; (2) where it "may not be possible in... [a] class
action, to accurately estimate in dollars the value of or benefit in tax sav-
ings322 1 to the plaintiffs, the "defendant's loss" formula is applicable; 22 2
ages assessed in a separate suit, because the amount of liability is collateral. But in spite
of the "collateral effects" problem the court may sustain its jurisdiction if the contin-
gency is dispelled. See M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southwest Baptist College, Inc., 381
S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1964), in which a declaratory judgment was sought to determine if
the insurance company was liable on a fire insurance policy. Although the amount of the
liability under the policy was not liquidated, the supreme court was apparently satisfied
with its amount jurisdiction because the insured building having a value in excess of the
jurisdictional "amount" was completely destroyed, and the limits of the policy also ex-
ceeded the jurisdictional "amount."
218. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 230-32 infra.
219. 362 Mo. 49, 239 S.W.2d 509 (1951).
220. See Brief for Appellant, p. 1, Cooper v. School Dist., supra note 219.
221. 362 Mo. at 54, 239 S.W.2d at 511.
222. The leading case employing the "defendant's loss" formula is Aufderheide v.
Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W.2d 776 (1928) (en banc). In a suit
to enjoin as a nuisance defendant's establishment of an ice plant in a residential neighbor-
hood, the court considered jurisdictional "amount" in a lengthy opinion. A division
opinion was filed by a commissioner which partially based jurisdiction on the threatened
dimunition of plaintiff's property value. This conclusion was principally reached because
the court judicially noticed the impact of the ice plant-depicted by photographs-on the
value of plaintiff's property. The divisional opinion was adopted by the court en banc.
The shift in emphasis toward "defendant's loss" formula was noted by a concurring
opinion which stated that although the consideration of plaintiff's property value was
proper, the loss to the defendant if it were forced to dismantle the ice plant was also a
I 9.032(a)
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(3) the "amount" of the defendant's loss is estimated as the full extent of
the disputed taxes.
The situation presented in Cooper points up two additional problems
which were not specifically handled in the opinion but which have arisen
as issues in other cases. These are the use of the value to plaintiff formula
to measure the amount of a disputed tax, in cases in which the plaintiffs
sue to restrain the imposition of a tax on the community in general, and
the question whether a prospective tax may be included in the calculation
of "amount" if it is periodic so that its future validity will also be determined
by the trial court's decision.
The first question presents the difficult problem of whether one taxpayer
has standing to raise the issue of taxation for all taxpayers.223 The supreme
court has not squarely ruled upon this issue in any jurisdiction case because
in appeals involving class actions and restraints of general taxes, it has
usually based its "amount" jurisdiction on the loss to the defendant taxing
authority, using the "defendant's loss" formula. Therefore, with the excep-
tion of several cases indirectly involving the problem,224 it exists without
causing serious jurisdictional difficulty.
The second problem is the extent to which the value of annual or
periodic taxes may be included in the calculation of "amount." A typical
situation is a suit brought by a corporation to avoid payment of both present
reliable basis for jurisdiction. This judge also wrote the majority en banc decision deny-
ing a motion for a rehearing, in which opinion the "defendant's loss" formula was adopted
as an unimpeachable basis for supreme court jurisdiction.
223. Class actions are discussed in text accompanying note 161 supra.
224. Jurisdictional difficulty on this point did occur, however, in two cases. In Bauer
v. City of Berkeley, 278 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.), trans'd, 282 S.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1955),
two plaintiffs, as taxpayers, purported to represent all similarly situated taxpayers in an
action to enjoin the city from contracting for street improvements to be financed through
special tax bills. Because the tax bills had already been issued, the court concluded that
they could not be included in the "amount in dispute." In transferring, the court as-
sumed that the total amount of tax bills would otherwise have been in issue and that
the plaintiffs would have had standing to raise the issue even though they were not abut-
ting property owners and so would not be affected by the special tax bills.
In Koch v. Board of Regents, 256 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953), trans'd, 265 S.W.2d 421
(Ct. App. 1954), the plaintiff, suing as a taxpayer, purported to represent the interests
of the taxpaying public. Plaintiff challenged the validity of a contract for repair of school
buildings, alleging that the amount specified in the contract was excessive by $29,000.
The contractor who was to make the repairs would be paid out of a fund already avail-
able to the Board, so there was no issue of restraining a specific tax levy to cover the costs
of the repairs. Because there was no loss of prospective revenue to the defendant board,
there was lacking the jurisdictional predicate that existed in the Cooper case, and the
court had no alternative but to refer to the plaintiff's gain or loss. This reference revealed
that there was no evidence in the record indicating what plaintiff stood to gain or lose as
a taxpayer by the result of the action. The effect on all state taxpayers was not consid-
ered.
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and future license fees or business taxes; usually, only taxes accrued at the
time the suit was filed are recognized as the "amount in dispute."225
Similarly, jurisdiction in the supreme court on the "amount" of taxes has
been established in suits to prevent the levy of a license fee on a business; 2.
to obtain a declaration that the plaintiff's sales were not subject to the
state sales tax;227 to review the action of the State Tax Commission increas-
ing the value assessment of plaintiff's property;2. and to review the action of
the Industrial Commission assessing the plaintiff-employer for contributions
to the state unemployment compensation fund.22 In these cases, the full
extent of the disputed taxes was levied against the individual plaintiff so
that the "amount" was calculated by the "plaintiff's value" formula. Thus
the problem of unassessed taxes is generally resolved by including only ac-
crued taxes when the "plaintiff's value" test is used (when an individual or
corporation attempts to restrain a specific tax), while in a suit by a class of
plaintiffs, the "defendant's loss" measure is used to permit inclusion of the
entire amount of future taxes.
The recent case of Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson,'" raises
questions concerning the directness with which a tax levy is involved in
non-money cases. The plaintiff sought and obtained an injunction restrain-
ing the city from annexing its property and from "levying, assessing or col-
lecting municipal taxes." ' In the city's appeal to the supreme court, juris-
225. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 308 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1958) ("amount"
based on increase of property taxes for one year after increase of property valuation);
Missouri Ins. Co. v. Morris, 255 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1953) (en bane) (disputed 2% pre-
mium tax for one year); see Anderson Air Activities, Inc. v. Division of Employment
Security, 321 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. 1959) (dispute over rate of contribution to employment
compensation fund for one year). It is clear that in these cases the decisions determine
more than the tax for one year, since a decision that the taxation was proper, in effect,
means that it will be imposed in the future. In no case, however, was it necessary for the
plaintiff to include prospective taxes to reach the jurisdictional "amount," so the issues
remain undecided by the court. See the discussion of federal authorities in note 252 infra.
226. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Morris, supra note 225 ("amount" was annual premium tax
assessed against plaintiff who sought to restrain its collection); see Fishbach Brewing Co.
v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 1044, 87 S.W.2d 648 (1935), trans'd, 231 Mo. App. 793,
95 S.W.2d 335 (1936) ("amount" insufficient where plaintiff sought to restrain annual
license tax of $1,500 because only one year's license fee was in dispute).
227. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Smith, 350 Mo. 1, 164 S.W.2d 370 (1942) (de-
claration that plaintiff's natural gas sales not subject to sales tax); accord, Laclede Gas
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 842, 253 S.W.2d 832 (1953) (en bane) (declaration as
to plaintiff's liability for city's 5% license tax).
228. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 308 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. 1958).
229. Anderson Air Activities, Inc. v. Division of Employment Security, 321 S.W.2d
710 (Mo. 1959).
230. 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1964).
231. Id. at 226.
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diction was based on the value of the taxes. The court held that the pri-
mary purpose of the plaintiff's suit was to adjudicate the validity of the pro-
posed annexation; the taxes which the city would impose if the annexation
were accomplished were incidental, prospective and not "directly in dis-
pute." 232
The Emerson case presents a valuable model for analysis of non-money
cases, because its holding involves difficult problems in each of the three
stages of "amount" calculation. However, because the case has not been
cited or explained by the court in a subsequent opinion, and contains alter-
native bases for the transfer to the court of appeals, it is difficult to
ascertain the impact of the court's careful analysis.213 One thing is clear:
Emerson is the most fully developed articulation of the "collateral effects"
principle in a non-money case. Certainly, it must be considered in any case
involving an attempt to invalidate or restrain the levy of taxes.2 "
Emerson delevoped 35 the "single issue" test for "collateral effects." Un-
der this test, the issue presented by plaintiff's theory of action must be the
single and primary cause of the monetary effect on which jurisdiction is
asserted. Thus in Cooper, where plaintiff sought to prohibit enforcement of
an adopted tax levy, the tax was "directly in dispute."23" However, when,
as in Emerson, the plaintiff sought to enjoin annexation, because "annexa-
tion involves many things besides taxes," the plaintiff was precluded from
characterizing the effect of the annexation as the value of the future
taxes.
237
The "single issue" test applied in Emerson requires that the nature and
purpose of the plaintiff's theory of action be carefully compared with the
232. Id. at 229.
233. It may be that the court will restrict the Emerson holding to the caveat con-
tained in the opinion that an annexation case involves no "amount in dispute." In a
similar annexation case, the supreme court held that it had jurisdiction based on the
presence of a constitutional question. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 367
S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1963).
234. See Nichols v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1963) (en banc),
discussed in text accompanying note 239 infra.
235. In a case decided prior to Emerson, the court had also considered the "single
issue" problem. Gomez v. Gomez, 336 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Mo. 1960) (en banc). The
plaintiff appealed the setting aside of an order of divorce, which had included a pro-
vision for alimony in gross in an amount which exceeded the jurisdictional limit. The
jurisdictional issue prompted a dissent and a transfer to the court en banc. Although the
dissent stated that the decree of divorce was the one issue involved, and that the matter
of alimony was merely collateral, the majority based jurisdiction on the "amount" of the
alimony.
236. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962),
trans'd, 376 S.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1964).
237. Id. at 228.
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particular effect of the judgment which is relied upon for jurisdiction. Some
cases decided before Emerson in which supreme court jurisdiction was
sustained appear to be inconsistent with its application of the "single issue
test.
238
Because Emerson, by using the "single issue" test, held that prospective
taxes were collateral, a special question is presented when the plaintiff seeks
to restrain a bond issue. A suit to enjoin a school district from issuing and
registering bonds to be retired by future taxes may, under Emerson, in-
volve the value of the taxes in only an incidental and secondary way be-
cause the taxes would be assessed only after the bonds had been approved
and issued. Moreover, the holding in Cooper, as interpreted by Emerson,
using the "single issue" test, indicates that the taxes are directly in dispute
only if the injunction is sought directly to restrain their levy.
Nevertheless, a case subsequent to Emerson indicates that the supreme
court may have "amount" jurisdiction in a suit to restrain a bond issue." 9
It does not appear from the opinion, however, whether the court reasoned
that the value of the taxes which would be levied if the bonds were author-
ized provided the jurisdictional referent, or characterized the loss to the
school district as the restraint of its ability to sell the bonds. If the court
looked to the value of the taxes using the "defendant's loss" formula, its
holding should be considered a limitation of Emerson's "single issue" test,
while if it held the bonds themselves were the referent, the case indicates
that a pecuniary evaluation may be given to a bond issue.
2 4 1
The effect of Emerson's application of the "collateral effects" principle
to the vice versa rule must also be discussed because the opinion failed to
consider specifically the loss of the taxes to the defendant city. Since a single
corporate plaintiff was before the court, the opinion focused on the plain-
tiff's interest in the prevention of the annexation; the court was not re-
quired to evaluate the defendant's interest to avoid the standing of taxpayers
problem encountered in Cooper. The court recognized that the vice versa
238. The dissenting opinion in one case suggests this limit on divorce cases. See Go-
mez v. Gomez, 336 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1960) (en banc), discussed supra note 235.
239. Nichols v. Reorganized School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1963) (en banc).
240. The court has always upheld its jurisdiction based on the loss to the authority
attempting to issue the bonds. Reis v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 373 S.W.2d
22 (Mo. 1963) (class action to enjoin sewer construction to be financed through special
assessment against plaintiffs); Frago v. City of Irondale, 364 Mo. 500, 263 S.W.2d 356
(1954) (cancellation of city's tax bills assessed against plaintiff's property for street im-
provement); Reorganized School Dist. v. Robertson, 262 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. 1953)
(school district sought decree validating proposed bond issue of $147,000); see Freed
v. Feeny, 374 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1964) (part of "amount" was liability of city under de-
claratory judgment for special tax assessment). In none of these cases, does it appear
how the court characterized the loss to the defendant authority.
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principle permits reference to both sides of a law suit, yet its opinion specifi-
cally considered only the plaintiff's side, denying jurisdiction by application
of the "collateral effects" principle. The failure to refer to the "defendant's
side of the suit has two possible implications: either (1) the "defendant's
loss" formula is inapplicable to the calculation of "amount," or (2) the use
of the test is qualified by the "collateral effects" principle. Clearly, the
former conclusion is unwarranted, because a holding so contrary to existing
precedent would probably have been stated more specifically in the court's
opinion. -4 ' If the court applied the "collateral effects" principle to the
"defendant's loss" formula, the mechanics of this application do not appear.
Apparently the court, having ruled the taxes collateral vis-a-vis the plain-
tiff, also ruled them collateral for purposes of the "defendant's loss" formula.
Although the result is warranted because the value involved by the applica-
tion of either the "plaintiff's value" or the "defendant's loss" formula was
the taxes, the ruling that the taxes were collateral to the plaintiff should not
automatically foreclose a showing by the defendant of some other loss.-" '
The use of the "collateral effects" doctrine in cases in which supreme
court jurisdiction rests upon the "defendant's loss" seems especially question-
able. The obvious purpose of the "defendant's loss" formula is to provide an
241. The Cooper case, strong authority for the application of the "defendant's loss"
formula, was distinguished but not expressly overruled in Emerson. The context in which
Cooper was considered was a test of the "single issue" by which the court defined the
"collateral effects" principle. No mention was made of the significance of Cooper regard-
ing the "defendant's loss" formula. 359 S.W.2d 225, 228. Non-use of the "defendant's
loss" formula, does, however, have some authority in older cases. See, e.g., Steinmetz v.
Federal Lead Co., 176 S.W. 1049 (Mo. 1915), discussed note 212 supra and accompany-
ing text. Although Emerson did not refer to those cases, its silence on the issue would
serve to bolster an argument that the case law has now rejected this formula, were it not
true that cases subsequent to Emerson have applied the "defendant's loss" formula with-
out any reference to Emerson. A recent consideration of this formula is Nichols v. Re-
organized School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1963) (en banc).
242. Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 346 Mo. 524, 142 S.W.2d 332
(1940), provides an interesting illustration by way of analogy. This was an action to
enjoin the city from spending for the construction of community facilities funds which
had been authorized in a bond issue election. The fact that the "amount" of the bonds
exceeded the jurisdictional limit would not alone have given the supreme court jurisdic-
tion because they had already been voted. Bauer v. City of Berkeley, 278 S.W.2d 772
(Mo.), trans'd, 282 S.W.2d 154 (1955), discussed supra note 224. However, the court
approved its "amount" jurisdiction because if the injunction were granted, the city would
lose a $32,000 federal grant to aid in the construction of the facilities.
With this case in mind, an additional fact in the Emerson situation may be hypothe-
sized. Suppose the City of Ferguson stood to receive a federal grant in excess of the
jurisdictional "amount" if it could effect the annexation. Plaintiff's interest in avoiding
taxes would bear no relation to the city's interest in receiving the grant, and therefore a
ruling that the former was collateral should not automatically preclude the consideration
of the latter on the same ground.
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alternative measure more flexible than "plaintiff's value," and thus permit
supreme court jurisdiction in cases in which the value to the plaintiff is in-
calculable or insufficient. The restriction of the value which may be asserted
under the "defendant's loss" formula to the single and primary issue on
which the plaintiff demands relief, ignores the fact that frequently the only
loss to the defendant is entirely unrelated to the benefit the plaintiff will de-
rive from the right he seeks to protect, although the granting of the relief to
the plaintiff will actually cause defendant's loss.24 If Emerson requires the
court to employ the principle of "collateral effects" in all cases in which
jurisdiction rests on the loss to the defendant, it is likely that a strict applica-
tion of the principle (as illustrated in Emerson) would foreclose supreme
court jurisdiction in a large number of cases.
9.032(b). Characterization
After the vice versa rule is qualified by an application of the "collateral
effects" principle, the court must select one particular effect from the nar-
rowed range of effects which may be given a pecuniary evaluation. This
particular effect will be characterized as the positive or negative value of the
relief under the previously chosen formula, and so will be the basis for the
determination of the "amount in dispute." Only one effect is selected be-
cause the courts apparently do not apply the "aggregation" principle to
non-money cases; they do not inquire as to the total of all effects upon the
party in question.
There are no uniform criteria for the characterization of the jurisdictional
referent. Because the court is not required to select the referent accepted in
an earlier case involving the same or closely related issues, the referent
chosen in most cases is the effect which is best supported by the facts or is
the logical result of the judgment.
A hypothetical case illustrates the range of choices which arises in an in-
junction affecting business and property values (a typical non-money case).
Assume that the plaintiff, who owns a house and lot in an area zoned resi-
dential, has appealed the denial of an injunction against the board of zon-
ing adjustments to restrain enforcement of a zoning restriction. Assume fur-
ther that the evidence in the record shows that the property in question has
a value of $20,000 as a residence, but that if the injunction is granted,
243. The discussion of Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau, supra note 242,
points up that case as a classic example. It is clear, however, that the judgment must in
fact cause the benefit or loss. See Nemours v. City of Clayton, 351 Mo. 317, 172 S.W.2d
937, trans'd, 237 Mo. App. 497, 175 S.W.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1943) (evidence did not
show plaintiff's property value decrease was caused by traffic signals they sought to have
removed).
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the market value will increase to $40,000 because the plaintiff could sell
the property to a prospective buyer for use as a night club. The record also
shows that the plaintiff has invested $16,000 in alterations and installations
of fixtures, all adding to the value of the property as a night club but having
no salvage value should the injunction be denied, and that the anticipated
yearly net profits, if plaintiff operated the property as a night club, would
be $25,000.
Under these facts, the supreme court could retain "amount" jurisdiction
by afinning a characterization of the value of the relief to the plaintiff2"4 as
(1) the increase in the value of the property2" (or business if the case in-
244. If the action were brought by one seeking to enjoin the use of the property as
a night club, the same result would obtain based on the "loss to the defendant" if the in-
junction were issued. See Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 363 Mo. 305, 251 S.W.2d
8 (1952). This example is intended to illustrate the value to only one party, not to ex-
haust all values to each of the parties. Nor is it offered as representing the only kind of
case in which characterization is crucial. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 239-40.
245. In the following cases the supreme court recognized as the jurisdictional refer-
ent the value of property incerase or decease, depending on the party whose value was
considered. In each case, the court did not discuss the alternative effects illustrated by
the example because they were insufficient, not raised by one of the parties, or the facts
in the record would not have supported their pecuniary evaluation. E.g., Veal v. City of
St. Louis, 365 Mo. 836, 289 S.W.2d 7 (1956) (jurisdiction based on increase in plain.
tiff's property value when plaintiff had equipped residential property for operation as a
funeral establishment); Scallet v. Stock, 363 Mo. 721, 253 S.W.2d 14S (1952) (jurisdic-
tion based on value of plaintiff's property decrease when defendant dcsired to operate
mortuary contrary to zoning restriction); Hubert v. Magidson, 243 S.W.2d 337 (Mo.
1951) (denial of injunction forcing removal of easement encroachments would damage
plaintiff's property value); Cowherd Dev. Co. v. Littick, 361 Mo. 1001, 238 S.W.2d
346 (1951) (evidence showed that removal of restrictions would increase market value
by a sufficient "amount"); Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo,
1, 40 S.W.2d 545 (1931) (market value of restricted property); see Barnes v. Anchor
Temple Ass'n, 369 S.W.2d 192 (Mo.), transd, 369 S.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1963) (evi-
dence insufficient to permit jurisdiction based on loss if property could not be used for
parking lot although construction of lot had begun).
The court's discussion of the effect of the judgment in a recent case indicates its
awareness of the broad range of values arising from the vice versa rule. In Dunbar v.
Board of Zoning Adjustment, 380 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. 1964), trans'd, the respondent had
applied for permission to construct a sewage lagoon:
There is considerable evidence in the record pertaining to the cost of the pro-
posed lagoon ... the cost and value of the work done under a prior (expired)
permit, and the costs of alternate suggested sewage disposal plans. There are state-
ments in evidence to the effect that a denial of the application would do irreparable
damage . . . in that it would relegate that land ... to permanent status as farm
land by preventing urban development .... Id. at 444-45.
Thus the court considered the prior expenses of the respondents, the effect of the denial
of relief on the market value of the property, and impliedly, the fact that granting the'
relief would permit the development of the property as a profitable enterprise. The court
next considered the effect of the permit on the appellant's adjoining land; the evidence
indicated ihat a substantial property value depreciation would result. The court declined
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volved an existing business"'); or (2) the loss of prior investments if he
were unable to use the property as a night club;2 ,1 or (3) anticipated
profits from the operation of the business. 4 '
In non-money cases presenting similar facts, decisions indicate that if any
of these jurisdictional theories were asserted by the parties (or developed by
the court itself"") and were supported by the facts in the record, the su-
preme court would hear the appeal. Thus, the court's failure to develop
criteria for the choice of one theory or another reveals a non-restrictive ap-
plication of the "collateral effects" principle.
A problem inherent in the characterization process may arise if one effect
produces a value which is insufficient or is not relevant for the calculation
of "amount." If the court, considering the range of choice, selects one right
or effect which is evaluated as yielding an "amount" insufficient for supreme
court jurisdiction, this evaluation would not prevent the court from making
a further evaluation; there is no rule that the parties are limited to a con-
sideration of but one effect of the judgment. However, it is likely that if the
jurisdiction, however, as none of the effects was sufficiently supported by concrete evi-
dence in the record.
246. See Frank Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, 347 Mo. 466, 147 S.W.2d 670,
trans'd, 154 S.W.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1941), in which the court recognized that an inter-
ference with the right to conduct a business involves a property right which can be evalu-
uated: "Also it is generally agreed, we believe, that a going business derives from thai
status an asset upon which a money value may be placed." Id. at 468, 147 S.W.2d at
671. The court transferred the appeal, holding that gross receipts alone could not estab-
lish the value of the business. See Marx & Haas Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133,
67 S.W. 391 (1902) (en bane) (labor boycott would damage plaintiff's business by suffi-
cient "amount").
247. The most illustrative case is State ex rel. Public Water Supply Dist. v. Burton,
379 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 254-58 infra; see
Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Barnett, 354 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1962) (result of easement
dispute could force defendant to remove completed house at a cost over the jurisdictional
limit); State ex rel. Sims v. Eckhardt, 322 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1959) (sufficient monetary
loss if construction permit were revoked); Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 363 Mo.
305, 251 S.W.2d 8 (1952) (injunction would prohibit defendant's erection of apartment
and also require removal of completed parts); Cambest v. McComas Hydo Elec. Co., 292
Mo. 570, 239 S.W. 477, trans'd, 212 Mo. App. 325, 245 S.W. 598 (1922) (allegations
that removal of dam would destroy investment value and involve expense of removal
and would impede the business of distributing power not supported by evidence in rec-
ord).
248. Frank Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, 347 Mo. 466, 147 S.W.2d 670
(1941) (dictum), discussed supra note 246, held that the gross receipts must be reduced
to net profits. "A proper consideration in arriving at the value of the relief sought would
be the loss of the profits reasonably expected from these sales." Id. at 468, 147 S.W.2d
at 672. State ex rel. Lamm v. Mid-State Serum Co., 264 S.W. 878 (1924), trans'd, 272
S.W. 99 (Ct. App. 1925) (dictum) (cost of removing serum plant and profits derived
from operation of business not shown in the record).
249. See note 214 supra.
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court reaches such a conclusion, it will transfer the appeal rather than con-
tinue its efforts to find a sufficient "amount." Because focus is upon the
value specifically considered by the court and the parties, other facts in the
record will probably be ignored.
A more serious characterization problem arises if the court rules that one
effect of the non-money judgment, even though it can be given a precise
evaluation for a sufficient amount, is collateral, and the appellant or the
court itself then raises another effect of the judgment and asserts it as rep-
resenting the value to the party. This problem arose in Emerson Elec. Mfg.
Co. v. City of Ferguson."' In this case, the supreme court ruled that the
taxes for which plaintiff would be liable if the injunction to prevent the
annexation of its property were denied, were collateral and could not
be characterized as the value of the judgment to the plaintiff.2"' The su-
preme court recognized that the evidence clearly supported that a decrease
in plaintiff's property value considerably in excess of the jurisdictional mini-
mum would result from the annexation. If the court had characterized the
value to plaintiff as the property value decrease if the relief were denied,
its power to hear the case would have vested. It refused to do so, but held
that the anticipated depreciation in property value would result from the
imposition of the taxes, and that the taxes, having been ruled collateral,
could not be brought back into the case by characterizing them as a prop-
erty value decrease."'
250. 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), discused in text accompanying notes 230-37 supra.
251. Text accompanying notes 230-32 supra.
252. The evidence of property value decrease was based on a capitalization of future
taxes. The supreme court's refusal to characterize this as the jurisdictional referent is
supported by the result in the analogous United States Supreme Court case of Healy v.
Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1933).
The problem of characterization is well illustrated by federal cases. Compare Healy v.
Ratta, supra, with Berryman v. Board of Trustees, 222 U.S. 334 (1912). In the Healy
case, the appellee asserted satisfaction of the federal jurisdictional limit in a suit
to contest the annual imposition of a $150 "peddlers" tax. He argued that the
matter in controversy was either the tax he would be required to pay which, when
capitalized, satisfied the limit, or the value of his business conducted free from the
taxes, which value also exceeded the limit. The district court sustained jurisdiction on
the capitalized value of the tax. The court of appeals (Healy v. Ratta, 67 F.2d 554 (Ist
Cir. 1933)) affirmed by characterizing the right to conduct this business free of the tax
as the jurisdictional referent. The Supreme Court, in reversing both lower courts, ruled
that the taxes could not be capitalized and that the court of appeals had improperly
characterized the value which was in dispute. It held that because the entire legal issue
turned on the validity of the tax, the effect of this tax on the value of appellee's business
was "collateral and incidental." 292 U.S. at 268.
The Berryman case involved a contract which, if valid, would have permanently ex-
empted the respondent from taxes sought to be imposed by appellant. While the amount
of accrued taxes at the time the dispute arose would not have been sufficient for "amount"
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The rule that emerges from the Emerson case is that if one effect of the
judgment is held to be collateral, the consequences of that effect cannot be
used to determine the "amount in dispute." ' This interpretation, however,
was not followed in State ex rel. Public Water Supply Dist. v. Burton."4 On
appeal from the refusal of the Public Service Commission to rule that the
defendant-respondent was supplying water in an area beyond the boundaries
of its certificate of convenience and necessity, the jurisdictional "amount"
was identified as the possible monetary affect the Commission's ruling would
have on facilities owned by the water company-the cessation of service to
the disputed area would cause the water company to lose the value of pipes
which it had laid to service the area. 5
The court acknowledged, but did not rule on, appellant's position that
the case involved no "amount in dispute," because the appeal was from a
ruling by the Public Service Commision on a certificate of convenience and
necessity. This position is well supported by prior holdings of the supreme
court.25" Appellants had developed a jurisdictional theory very similar to
Emerson's "single issue" test"" even though they did not cite that case: they
jurisdiction, the court characterized the "thing in issue" as the "contract right," because
if it were valid, it would have permanently exempted the respondent from taxes, and
thus brought all prospective taxes into the realm of dispute. 222 U.S. at 345.
253. In effect, this means that if any particular value to a party is declared "col-
lateral," all further attempts to characterize the effect of the judgment will be ineffective.
However, if the record in the Emerson case had included evidence that the plaintiff
would suffer property value decrease because of impending municipal regulations besides
taxes-e.g., land use restrictions, noise and smoke provisions-the effect of any of these
on the plant's market value might have been ruled a proper referent. Cf. cases cited
supra note 242.
254. 379 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1964).
255. Brief for Respondent, p. 3, State ex rel. Public Water Supply Dist. v. Burton,
supra note 254. "Obviously, if Raytown Water is denied the right to use these mains,
their value has been lost, and the 'loss to defendant if the relief be granted' exceeds the
jurisdictional amount."
256. This line of cases began with State ex rel. Pitcairn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 338
Mo. 180, 90 S.W.2d 392 (1935), trans'd, 100 S.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1937), which held
that the privilege of operating as a motor carrier for hire could not be given any pecuni-
ary value. Accord, American Petroleum Exch. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 172 S.W.2d 952
(Mo.), trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 92, 176 S.W.2d 533 (1943); State ex rel. Pitcairn v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 92 S.W.2d 881 (1935), trans'd. The American Petroleum case
held that an appeal from a commission ruling on a railroad's certificate of convenience
and necessity did not involve any "amount in dispute"; the railroad's lessee, who would
be required to remove his filling station, tanks and pumps could not base jurisdiction on
"amount."
257. In Emerson, the prospective taxes were ruled a "collateral effect" of the judg-
ment, so the property loss caused by these taxes was likewise collateral. In Burton, the
requested ruling would have prohibited the water company from servicing the disputed
area. Although not expressly stated by the court, it appears from the decision that the
ruling on the certificate would involve no monetary amount; this is suggested by
§ 9.032(b)
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stated that the "sole question... to be determined is whether or not the
Public Service Commission's order dismissing Respondent's complaint . . .
was reasonable and lawful,"25 and that no "amount" was placed in dispute
by the ruling, even though it would obviously have some monetary effect on
the parties. Therefore, they concluded that it was improper to characterize
the loss of the pipes as representing the value of the judgment to defendant.
However, the court held that the loss of the pipes' values to the defendant
could be characterized as the value of defendant's loss.
9.033. Monetary Evaluation
After a "right" or value is selected as representing the object of the relief
or the effect of the judgment, this referent must be given a precise monetary
value as the third step in the calculation of "amount in dispute" in non-
money cases. At this stage the court attempts to reduce the "amount in-
volved" to the "amount in dispute."
9.033 (a). Initial Steps in the Reduction Process
The first step in the reduction is the exclusion of every property interest
or portion thereof that is not owned by any party to the suit. The cases in
which the appointment or removal of an administrator is challenged il-
lustrate this practice. Although the value of the whole estate is "involved,"
the administrator claims only that portion constituting his statutory commis-
sion. This commission and the value of the temporary control of the estate
constitute the "amount in dispute." '259
The court will also exclude from consideration the value of any res which
is not claimed by one party to the suit adversely to the claims of another
the cases cited note 256 supra. The ruling would cause the company the loss of the
value of its pipe. However, the question is not the effect of the ruling, but whether the
effect involves any "amount in dispute." The Emerson decision also has caused a po-
tential characterization problem in suits to restrain a bond issue. See text accompanying
notes 239-40 supra.
258. Brief for Appellant, p. 3, State ex rel. Public Water Supply Dist. v. Burton, 379
S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1964).
259. Minzi v. White, 360 Mo. 319, 228 S.W.2d 700 (1950); Fields v. Luck, 327 Mo.
113, 34 S.W.2d 710 (1931), trans'd, 226 Mo. App. 1203, 50 S.W.2d 156 (1932); In
re Wilson's Estate, 320 Mo. 975, 8 S.W.2d 973 (1928), trans'd, 16 S.W.2d 737 (Ct.
App. 1929); In re Bennett's Estate, 243 S.W. 769 (Mo. 1922), trans'd, 249 S.W. 685
(Ct. App. 1923); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Guinotte, 180 Mo. 115, 79 S.W. 166 (1904)
(en bane), transd, 113 Mo. App. 399, 86 S.W. 884 (1905); Wimberly v. McElroy, 295
S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); In re Jackson's Will, 291 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956); In re Christian Brinkop Real Estate Co., 215 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 148); cl.
City of Doniphan v. Cantley, 330 Mo. 639, 50 S.W.2d 658 (en bane), trans'd, 52 S.W.2d
417 (Ct. App. 1932) (in suit to have claim declared preferred, value of having it a
preferred claim).
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party. In Strothkamp v. St. John's Community Bank, Inc.,26° plaintiff sued
the bank in replevin to recover possession of a bag worth $50 which con-
tained a sum of money in excess of the jurisdictional "amount." The bag
was returned by the sheriff to the plaintiff, who removed the money from
the bag. After he failed to comply with court orders concerning the posting
of bonds, plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The court ordered that the instru-
ments into which the money had been converted be delivered to the court
to be held for the use and benefit of the persons lawfully entitled to them.
Because the bank claimed no ownership of the instruments, and the sole
issue was their possession, plaintiff's appeal was transferred by the supreme
court. The value of the instruments could not serve as the "amount in dis-
pute," and the value of possession was insufficient to meet the jurisdictional
requirement.
Consideration of the four formulae discussed in section 9.031 is usually
involved in this reduction process. In Long v. Norwood Hills Corp.,"' a mi-
nority stockholder sued to dissolve the corporation and have its assets sold
by a receiver and the proceeds distributed. The appellant's contention that
the value of the total assets of the defendant corporation fixed the jurisdic-
tional "amount" was rejected by the court. Because nothing appeared in the
record to indicate that the proposed liquidation would result in either a
monetary gain or loss to the corporation, the court could not use either the
"defendant's gain" or "defendant's loss" formula; any "amount in dispute"
had to be measured by the plaintiff's gain or loss. This choice of formula
reduced the amount involved-the total assets to be liquidated-to the dis-
puted "amount" of plaintiff's interest in the liquidation if relief were granted
or denied.
9.033(b). Net Value
The jurisdictional referent must be given a monetary evaluation in terms
of "net value" in order to identify the "amount in dispute."2 ' This rule
was developed in cases that involved the value of a decedent's estate, fre-
quently actions for will construction or will contest,"6 3 which refer to the
260. 329 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. 1959), trans'd; accord, Bowles v. Troll, 262 Mo. 377, 171,-
S.W. 326 (1914), trans'd from 172 Mo. App. 102, 154 S.W. 871 (1913), retrans'd, 190
Mo. App. 108, 175 S.W. 324 (1915). In Bowles, a resident and a non-resident guardian
of an insane person were disputing the right to custody of a fund belonging to the estate.
The sum was held not to be the "amount" because neither party claimed ownership of
the fund in his own right.
261. 360 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1962), trans'd, 380 S.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1964).
262. A related rule exists in suits for a money judgment in which the plaintiff would
be entitled in any event to part of the amount he claims § 9.021 (a) (2).
263. The rule has also been applied in a suit based on services rendered by the plain-
tiff to the decedent during the latter's lifetime when the decedent allegedly agreed to pay
1 9.033 (b)
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value of the estate for "amount" calculation. The record in these cases must
affirmatively indicate that the estate has a net value in excess of the jurisdic-
tional limit before supreme court jurisdiction will attach. This requires the
record to show that the assets comprising the estate will not be reduced in-
dependently of the court's decision. Thus the "net value" of the estate is
not the appraised value:264 rather, it is the value after all debts and claims
have been paid.26 Furthermore, if the period for filing claims against the
estate had not expiied when the case was tried, it is impossible for the rec-
ord2 . to indicate "net value," and the supreme court will transfer the ap-
peal after taking judicial notice that further claims may be filed which could
reduce the value of the estate below the limit of its jurisdiction."' The rec-
ord must also show that the costs of administration have been subtracted
from the estate's value if a transfer is to be prevented."'
to plaintiff the entire amount of his estate. Whitworth v. Monahan's Estate, 339 Mo.
1123, 100 S.W.2d 460 (936), trans'd, 111 S.W.2d 931 (Ct. App. 1938); cf. Smith v.
Oliver, 148 S.W.2d 795 (Mo.), trans'd, 157 S.W.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1941) (suit for de-
cree that plaintiff was decedent's adopted son and heir).
264. Early cases had assumed the opposite. Meyers v. Drake, 324 Mo. 612, 24 S.W.2d
116 (1929); Fowler v. Fowler, 318 Mo. 1078, 2 S.W.2d 707 (1928). These were specifi-
cally overruled by Fleisehaker v. Fleisehaker, 338 Mo. 797, 92 S.W.2d 169 (1936),
trans'd from 228 Mo. App. 98, 70 S.W.2d 104 (1934), retrans'd.
265. The leading case is Fleischaker v. Fleischaker, supra note 264; accord, Pasternak
v. Mashak, 383 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1964), trans'd; Bostian v. Milens, 354 Mo. 153, 188
S.W.2d 945 (1945), trans'd, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W.2d 797 (1946) (action to
cancel bankrupt's renunciation of interest in decedent's estate); Gee v. Bess, 171 S.W.2d
672 (Mo.), trans'd, 176 S.W.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1943); Smith v. Oliver, 148 S.W.2d 795
(Mo.), trans'd, 157 S.W.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1941); Higgins v. Smith, 346 Mo. 1044, 144
S.W.2d 149 (1940) (en bane), trans'd, 150 S.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1941); Aurien v.
Security Nat'l Bank Say. & Trust Co., 129 S.W.2d 1047 (Mo. 1939), transd, 137 S.W.2d
679 (Ct. App. 1940); In re Ellis' Estate, 127 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1939), trans'd from 110
S.W.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1937), retrans'd (action by guardian of testator's widow to deter-
mine whether to take under will); Nies v. Stone, 108 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1937), trans'd
(action to compel executor to pay plaintiff one half decedent's estate); Freeman v. Do
Hart, 303 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); see McGrail v. Rhoades, 323 S.W.2d 815
(Mo. 1959) (amount appeared affirmatively if inferentially when parties during trial
assumed the winner would take entire estate).
266. The record can, of course, only document the value of the estate as of the time
judgment was entered. Although the appellant might be able to show by affidavits at-
tached to his brief that the value of the estate has been established at a "net value" over
the limit, the court has consistenty held that facts appearing outside the record will not
be considered to calculate jurisdictional "amount." E.g., Nemours v. City of Clayton,
351 Mo. 317, 172 S.W.2d 937, trans'd, 237 Mo. App. 497, 175 S.W.2d 60 (1943) (reply
briefs); Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co., 328 Mo. 899, 42 S.W.2d 573 (1931), trans'd,
49 S.W.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1932) (reply brief); MeGregory v. Gaskill, 317 Mo. 122, 296
S.W. 123, trans'd, 296 S.W. 833 (Ct. App. 1927) (affidavits).
267. Nies v. Stone, 108 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1937), trans'd.
268. See Higgins v. Smith, 346 Mo. 1044, 144 S.W.2d 149 (1940) (en bane), trans'd,
150 S.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1941). The court uses a hypothetical test when the record
Washington University Open Scholarship
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE
The "net value" requirement has been similarly applied in other types of
cases. In one case, the referent selected for monetary estimation was ap-
pellant's right to pursue his business free from a labor boycott which he
sought to enjoin.8 9 The evaluation asserted was the value of plaintiff's
anticipated loss of business receipts if the injunction were denied, which
receipts were in excess of the supreme court's jurisdictional minimum. The
appeal was transferred because the record did not affirmatively show that
the anticipated loss reflected plaintiff's net profits. Net profits refer to more
than the difference between sales receipts and the amount paid a supplier;
the record must also account for "operating costs, such as rent, insurance,
salaries for clerks, etc."
270
does not show that all debts and costs of administration have been paid. If any claim
could be filed, it makes the value of the estate "contingent" regardless of the size of the
appraised value.
269. Frank Schmidt Planing Mill Co. v. Mueller, 347 Mo. 466, 147 S.W.2d 670,
trans'd, 154 S.W.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1941). But see State ex rel. Missouri Water Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 308 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1957) (jurisdiction based on "amount" of
gross annual revenue from rate increase); cf. State ex rel. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. R.R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 378 S.W.2d 459 (Mo. 1964) (dictum), trans'd.
270. Bell v. Wagner, 169 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. 1943), trans'd, 238 Mo. App. 152,
178 S.W.2d 813 (1944). This was a suit for a money judgment based on loss of profits.
The court held that the evidence did not support plaintiff's claim for profits because the
factors reducing the gross profits to net profits were not contained in the record. This con-
clusion is further supported by Ingle v. City of Fulton, 260 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1953),
trans'd, 268 S.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1954), in which plaintiffs sought to base jurisdic-
tion on the value of clay they wished to mine. They had been prevented from mining
because of the operation of a city ordinance, the enforcement of which they sought to en-
join. Although the market value of the clay was $35,000, the court transferred the ap-
peal because there was no affirmative showing of the profits plaintiff would make in the
mining operations and because it was felt that "the money value in gross of the fire
clay on the land could not . . .represent the (net) money value of the right" to mine
the clay. Id. at 668. What the plaintiffs apparently would have been required to show
in the record was that the cost of the mining operations did not reduce the $35,000
anticipated revenue below the jurisdictional "amount." There is analogous dictum in
Koch v. Board of Regents, 256 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953), trans'd, 265 S.W.2d 421 (Ct.
App. 1954), in which the plaintiffs sought to void a construction contract between the
Board and a private contractor. The court assumed arguendo that plaintiff's prayer for
relief included a request that the Board be required to contract with them at the price
of the challenged contract and stated that "plaintiffs allege no facts showing how much
of the $173,616 [contract price] was for materials, labor, supervising costs and profit."
Id. at 787.
It appears logical that if the court requires a plaintiff, who seeks to establish
"amount" jurisdiction on the value of anticipated profits, to reduce them to net value,
then a defendant asserting jurisdiction on the value of a loss which plaintiff's relief will
occasion should also be required to demonstrate that the loss is net. Although the
courts do not thus characterize their jurisdictional consideration, this is the usual result.
A recent case illustrates, however, that the "net value" principle is possibly inapplicable
to the "defendant's loss" formula. In State ex rel. Public Water Supply Dist. v.
Burton, 379 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1964), the plaintiff sought to have the Public Service
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Although the "net value" principle has not caused a great number of
jurisdictional transfers," its rationale appears to be applicable in cases in
which it has not been specifically used. For example, when the relief would
increase the value of the plaintiff's property by removal of a use restriction,
the court has held that the full value of the increase as shown on the record
is the "amount in dispute."2"2 It has also held that the entire increase in
Commission rule that the defendant was supplying water in an area for which it had no
certificate. Jurisdictional "amount" was based on the loss to be suffered by the water
company if the relief were granted (the loss of water mains installed to service the
area, the value of which was considerably over the jurisdictional limit). The re-
spondent water company in its brief, (Brief for Respondent, pp. 1-4), apparently
feared that the court might conclude that the full amount of its investment would
not be lost if permission were withdrawn to use the facilities in question, for it noted that
the "salvage value .. . is only about one half the cost of construction." Id. at 4.
(Emphasis added.) It is difficult to see why this statement, which was not mentioned
in the opinion's jurisdictional statement, did not persuade the court to employ that "net
value" principle in its plenary form. For instance, the salvage value of the pipes was not
the only possible reduction factor. The investment in the pipe had, no doubt, been
amortized over the period of time the pipes had been used. It is not too remote to
speculate that the company was selling water at a considerable loss in the disputed area
(not impossible if it were an outlying area and the company maintained the service
merely to retain its certificate of convenience and necessity). In fact, attention to this
kind of intangible benefit, speculative as it is, appears to be commanded by the case of
Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of Ferguson, 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), discussed in
text accompanying notes 276-78 infra.
271. Recently, however, the "net value" rule caused a transfer by the supreme court
in a case which, on its facts, resembles the decedent's estate cases. In Long v. Norwood
Hills Corp., 360 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1962), trans'd, 380 S.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1964),
the plaintiff was a minority stockholder in the corporation which he sought to have dis-
solved and whose assets he sought to have distributed. The court held that the total
value of the corporation's assets was not the "amount in dispute" and that there was
no "amount" produced by application of the "defendant's loss" formula. The court
acknowledged, however, that plaintiff would realize some benefit if the corporation were
liquidated, and held that the excess of the liquidation value over the market value of
plaintiff's stock was the jurisdictional "amount." In sifting the evidence, the court
found that the book value of the corporate stock, when liquidated, was such that the
plaintiff would receive a sum sufficient for its jurisdiction. It denied jurisdiction, how-
ever, because the book value would not be the "net amount that would be available for
distribution." Id. at 597. This conclusion was based on the failure of the record to show
the costs of selling the corporation's property, its liability for taxes, and other debts of the
corporation.
272. E.g., Hall v. Koehler, 347 Mo. 658, 148 S.W.2d 489 (1941), in which plain-
tiff sued to enjoin violation of covenants restricting the use of land to residential pur-
poses. The court found that the evidence established that removal of the restrictions
would enhance the value of plaintiff's property by an amount sufficient for its jurisdic-
tion. Apparently, plaintiff would not have to put the property to the different use or sell
the property in order to realize the amount of increase for jurisdictional purposes. If
plaintiff had been required to do so, the court would not have taken jurisdiction under
the net value rule unless the record had established the costs of selling the property or
Washington University Open Scholarship
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE
plaintiff's property value resulting if relief were granted and the land were
put to a certain use is the "amount in dispute.""7 3 This result was reached
in a case in which the court expressly noted that the value of the property
"equipped as a funeral establishment is approximately" $1,000 in excess of
the then jurisdictional "amount." ' No mention was made of the cost of
equipping the establishment. To the extent that the value increase reflected
an expenditure by plaintiff to equip the property as a funeral establishment,
the "net value" of the relief derived from a removal of the use restriction
would be lowered. 7
The greatest uncertainty caused by the application of the "net value"
qualification derives from the case of Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. City of
Ferguson.7' The court applied the "net value" principle to bolster its opin-
ion to transfer an appeal in which the plaintiff had asserted jurisdiction on
the increased tax burden which it would bear if relief were denied and the
city were allowed to annex plaintiff's property. Against the loss which the
plaintiff would incur based on the tax liability (which the court also held
was not the jurisdictional referent) the court ruled that to establish "net
value" the record must show a "balance [of] all possible prospective bene-
fits.... tangible or intangible." 77 This language would seem to be a man-
date to exclude almost any non-money case from the supreme court's docket,
because any evaluation based on a gain or loss to either party potentially
involves some offsetting gain or loss, whether tangible or intangible. The
result reached in almost all non-money cases, however, does not support this
extreme interpretation of Emerson.
adapting it to the different use. See Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., supra note 271;
Veal v. City of St. Louis, 365 Mo. 839, 289 S.W.2d 7 (1956).
273. Veal v. City of St. Louis, supra note 272.
274. Id. at 839, 289 S.W.2d at 9.
275. The cases involving the requirement that profits derived from an investment be
expressed in terms of "net value" appear to be most nearly in point. See cases cited
notes 271-72 supra. But cf. State ex reL. Public Water Supply Dist. v. Burton, 379 S.W.2d
593 (Mo. 1964), discussed supra note 255. Burton would suggest the amount expended
would be net only if it had no salvage or alternative value.
276. 359 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 230-32 supra.
277. Id. at 229. Consider, for example, the application of Emerson to State ex rel.
Public Water Supply Dist. v. Burton, 379 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1964), discussed supra note
270.
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